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*Abdelhamid El-Zobeiry*

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# A DEFINING MOMENT: CAN WE PREDICT THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION?

ABDELHAMID EL-ZOHEIRY

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In the past century, the world has witnessed devastating global events that transformed the way we live, work and educate. This includes outbreaks, such as the 1918 Flu pandemic (aka Spanish Flu), wars, including the 1st and 2nd World Wars and economic crises, like the great depression of 1929. Obviously, in the short-term, these events caused massive disruption in our lives, however, in the long-term, they spurred great technological innovations and scientific developments that better our adaptiveness. For example, the 1918 pandemic ushered in fundamental advancements in science and medicine, including cultivating viruses in laboratories for study (1931) and developing flu vaccines (late 1930s).

It is a testament to the progress of science and medicine that it took our scientific community less than a year to develop, test and manufacture the Covid vaccine. Yet, despite our greater response capacity, given our highly mobile and interconnected societies, the consequences of the 2019 Pandemic are likely to be unprecedented in terms of persistence and impact. The Covid pandemic will be regarded by future generations as a significant episode in human history, with its socio-economic and political implications reaching far and wide.

The implications on higher education were immediately perceived at the onset of the pandemic. The sudden lockdown and forced closure of educational institutions left educators in uncharted territory. Universities were forced to adapt, replacing classroom teaching with online education; faculty members



and staff struggled to couple conventional teaching and learning methodologies with technologically innovative pedagogies. However, the long-term impact of the pandemic on higher education institutions (HEIs) depends, to a large extent, on pre-pandemic global trends, including internationalization of higher education and digital transformation, just to name a few.

The paradigm shift to online education is part of the wider digital transformation that started in recent decades. This necessary transformation is not limited to technologies and infrastructure but includes building educators' capacities for online teaching and novel means of instruction, building the capacity of administrative and support staff to effectively utilize the virtual learning environment, and expanding the traditional educators' teams to include online learning designers and cognitive experts. This also implies integrating digital transformation in HEI's strategies and ensuring the "buy-in" of staff members, students, and other stakeholders.

Internationalization in higher education can be measured by the number of foreign students enrolled in universities outside of home, the short-term mobilities for study abroad, foreign academic staffing in higher education institutions, the volume and extent of international research collaboration and publications, to name a few elements. While the pandemic created challenges to the continued mobility of students, staff and researchers, it became clear that the associated digital transformation is offering opportunities to pursue effective collaboration through virtual communication and online work technologies. The crisis also provided a strong argument for international research collaboration, contributing to advancing global knowledge and developing vaccines. The positive attitude among scientists and governments towards cross-border collaboration in research is likely to endure, and maybe even intensify, post-pandemic.

Seen in terms of compounding already existing problems, the Covid crisis is an opportunity for change within the HE institutions and an invitation to reinvent answers for already existing questions:

- What are the hallmarks of the digital transformation? What challenges and opportunities it offers?

- What constitutes quality online education? Are there standards?
- How can we attain digital readiness in our institutions?
- How can internationalization be practically applied in the era of Covid?
- Will science remain an international enterprise?
- Basically, can we foresee the future of higher education and research institutions?

To respond to these questions and others, EMUNI is organizing a conference titled “Higher Education in the Covid era: Shaping the future of Euro-Mediterranean institutions”. This event will take place in Piran, Slovenia in September 2021, alongside the meeting of the University bodies that will discuss the revised strategy of EMUNI to address the post Covid higher education and research changing landscape.



# SECURITY SECTOR REFORM BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LIBYA

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In our paper we aim to examine the contribution of three inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to Libyan Security Sector Reform (SSR) by providing case studies of their activities carried out in Libya. The starting point of our analysis is the military intervention of 2011 based on UNSCR 1973, since it contributed greatly to the regime change. Even though it is not part of the SSR, its dynamics must be displayed. We identified three stages in the evolution of the Libyan crisis (2011–2014, 2014–2017, 2017–2019), thus the activities of our IGO's are examined separately within each time period. In our paper we build on Law's (2013) guide on SSR field activities and we seek to apply that specifically to the case of Libya. Our aim is to evaluate the variance of SSR activities by comparing the IGOs' theoretical SSR activities to those that were allowed to occur by the circumstances in Libya. Analysing the SSR activities of three different international organizations (European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations) we find that their actual activities and commitments are lagging behind their theoretical commitments towards SSR. Libya has not experienced a truly peaceful period ever since the protests of the Arab Spring broke out in early 2011. The international community contributed significantly to the regime change by intervening militarily. Nevertheless, the military intervention was not followed by a successful state building process. Even



though several international organizations are active in Libya and committed to reform the country's security sector, a striking success is still missing.

*Key words:* Security Sector Reform, Libya, United Nations, European Union, North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

## INTRODUCTION

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Even though the Arab Spring did bring to Libya the much-desired regime change, ever since the Gaddafi regime fell, Libya has not seen neither durable peace, nor stability. The lack of security inhibits progress in Libya: pervading insecurity has hampered economic progress and undermined the credibility of the central government, threatening the fragile democratic transition (Mikai 2013), since no other reform (e.g. political, economic, social) can stem from insecurity. It has been increasingly recognised that the connection between the state of a country's security sector and its prospects for fostering sustainable social development and prosperity is relevant to all socio-economic contexts including developed countries (Law 2013). Since security is regarded as a precondition of sustainable development and stability, Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be a top priority for the international community in any plan for rebuilding Libya. SSR in the fragile Libya would be critical to regional security as well in order to prevent the potential spill-over of insecurity in the region.

The civil war-torn country became scene of a proxy war where not only regional and European, but also great powers aim to secure their often-conflicting interests. Parallel to this proxy war several intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – whose very members are active participants of the proxy war – are committed to reform the Libyan security sector. Currently, apart from bilateral cooperation, Libya's SSR has depended on three main external actors: the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The UN is acting as a coordinator of international SSR assistance, primarily in the form of the United Nations Support

Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). NATO has been virtually absent from Libya since the end of its military intervention, however, from 2017 on, it is supposed to provide SSR assistance to the Libyan government upon its request. The EU acts as Libya's long-term strategic partner and, via its EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), focuses on Libya's border protection.

In our paper we aim to examine the three IGOs' contribution to Libyan SSR by providing case studies of their activities carried out in Libya. The starting point of our analysis is the military intervention of 2011 based on UNSCR 1973, since it contributed greatly to the regime change. Even though it is not part of the SSR, its dynamics must be displayed. We identified three stages in the evolution of the Libyan crisis (2011–2014, 2014–2017, 2017–2019), thus the activities of our IGOs are examined separately within each time period. In our paper we build on Law's (2013) guide on SSR field activities and we seek to apply that specifically to the case of Libya. We seek to compare the prospective SSR activities that each IGO intended to foster against the reforms that were eventually implemented in Libya. By so doing we aim to evaluate whether the circumstances in the field allowed for the SSR to fully come to fruition or not.

Our paper argues that despite the decennial international cooperation and the comprehensive development programmes implemented by the above-mentioned IGOs, the SSR attempts - even though there were partially successful programmes - were unsuccessful. Moreover, that only a fraction of the programmes undertaken in the aforementioned three IGOs' SSR concepts have been fulfilled in reality. The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a short definition of SSR and an overview of the relationship between SSR and IGOs which we use as our conceptual background. The following section will examine the SSR related activities of the UN, NATO and the EU in the field of the Libyan security sector. This section in turn is itself divided into three sub-sections based on the events within Libya. At the beginning of each sub-section, we provide a short overview of the Libyan situation in order to contextualize our analysis, then the case studies are displayed.

## CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

*SSR and IGOs*

At its core SSR is about development: the concept itself emerged from the security-development discourse after the end of the bipolar world order, when scholarly attention shifted towards the so-called security-development nexus (Duffield 2010; Spear and Williams 2012; Jackson 2015; Denney 2015; Schnabel 2015). The international community became increasingly entrenched in complex international peacekeeping missions which resulted in acknowledging the importance of stabilizing fragile states, thus facilitating regional stability (McFate 2008). A secure and stable environment is essential to sustainable economic development. Effective governance of security and justice can contribute to structural stability and is key for preventing conflict and resolving disputes without violence (Schnabel 2015; ISSAT).

Scholars agree that SSR is a fundamentally political process (United Nations 2008; Schröder and Chappuis 2014; Tansey 2009; Hensell and Gerdes 2012; Eckhard 2016; OECD 2016) involving institutions associated with national sovereignty (which remains a significant problem in the Libyan case). SSR becomes even more political once one considers the relationships between local communities and donors, amongst donors themselves, and with other regional actors (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance).

As Law (2013) claimed IGOs play a crucial role in security sector reform, not only by norm development but also by their implementation. Empirical data supports his argument: in almost all recent and current SSR programmes IGOs lead or support the lead provided by other actors (e.g. Liberia, Ukraine, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, etc.) When analysing IGOs' contributions to the Libyan SSR, it must be taken into consideration that their approaches to SSR partly diverge, since different matters are the focus of their attention. The main "cleavage" between their approaches to SSR is whether they focus more on development or on security (usually depending on the organizations' core functions). Based on their approaches IGOs tend to focus





on one component of SSR while ignoring others, however, they can be involved in both areas (See later Table 1 and Table 2). In the following part the SSR concepts of the three IGOs are briefly displayed.

### *The SSR concept of the UN*

As a global international organization, the UN has always played a key role from the outset in strengthening the security sector of fragile states. SSR is an integral element of the UN's sustaining peace and prevention agendas. As in other fragile states, in the case of Libya, the United Nations Support Mission has implemented its peace operation programme with an SSR mandate since 2011. The UNSC-sanctioned mandate for Libya includes the promotion of national dialogue, transparency, and public financial management (United Nations Peacekeeping).

The first coordinated and comprehensive approach of the UN to SSR was embodied in resolution 2151(2014) (UNSCR, 2014). The UN's activities in the scope of the SSR mandate include the reform of the police and justice system, the support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias/irregular troops/combatants, in addition to the establishment of legislative institutions backed by a dedicated and strong civil society. The main guiding principles for the aforementioned approach include – without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (United Nations Peacekeeping) – the promotion of effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions; national consultation; the effective commitment to the tasks by involved states; the creation of flexible and country-region-environment-specific projects; a focus on gender sensitivity and early recovery and development strategies; the following of a clearly defined strategy including in the identification of priorities, indicative timelines and partnerships; shaping the international support by the integrity of motive, the level of accountability and the amount of resources provided; the coordination between the efforts of the national and international partners is essential; and lastly, the monitoring and evaluation of all the processes (United Nations 2017).

### *The SSR concept of NATO*

Until recently the term SSR has not been used as an operational concept within NATO. Until the end of the bipolar era the Alliance concentrated its efforts on traditional collective defence-related tasks. For most of its history “defence reform” for NATO has meant trying to bring the military capabilities of its members, particularly its European members, more in line with what would be needed to achieve NATO’s stated military objectives (Fluri and Lunn 2007). Nevertheless, NATO contributed greatly to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Soviet European countries which can be considered as some predecessor to SSR (Molnár 2016). In that process, changes in the security sector – the army, the other armed services, the intelligence services and the police – played a central part. Partnerships were forged with several countries through programmes (e.g. Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) and action plans (e.g. Membership Action Plan) with the scope of forging practical security links (Neretnieks and Kaljurand 2007).

NATO does not have an official SSR concept agreed on by its member states, but a strongly SSR related initiative was launched after the Crimean events unfolded. In September 2014 at the NATO Summit in Wales the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative was launched. The DCB’s aim is to help projecting stability by providing support to nations requesting assistance from NATO. DCB helps partners improve their defence and security-related capacities, as well as their resilience, and, therefore, contributes to the security of the Alliance. It can include various types of support, ranging from strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution-building, to development of local forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialised areas such as logistics or cyber defence (NATO 2014).

### *The SSR concept of the EU*

Prior to the SSR concept, the European Union has already played a significant role in areas related to security sector reform through its external relations, development policy, the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)



and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in several crisis situations. The European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, identified SSR as one of the key instruments of EU foreign policy and drew attention to the fact that “security is a precondition for development”. Subsequently, in 2005, the Council developed its own second-pillar SSR concept to support ESDP operations (Council of the European Union 2005). In 2006 the European Commission also developed the Concept for European Community Support for SSR for the first pillar’s external relations activities (European Council 2016a). The 2005 Concept set out the EU’s SSR-related principles: 1. democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles, the rule of law and, where necessary, international humanitarian law; 2. respect for local ownership; and 3. coherence with other areas of EU external action (Council of the European Union 2005). Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the implementation of SSR-related activities was essentially the responsibility of the High Representative and thus of the European External Action Service. However, it is important to emphasize that the European Commission has continued to play a key and active role both in the development of the SSR framework and in the implementation process.

The process leading to the development of a new EU SSR framework began in autumn 2015 and resulted in a new policy framework (a joint communication by July 2016 summarizing Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform) strengthening the EU’s effectiveness in supporting third countries’ efforts to ensure security for individuals and the state. The new comprehensive policy framework puts an emphasis on the respect for the rule of law, the application of human rights and transparency and accountability, and the need for local ownership. According to the comprehensive approach, all EU diplomatic, development and CSDP support action should be coherent, coordinated, complementary, properly sequenced and in line with legal, policy and institutional frameworks” (European Commission 2016; European Parliament 2020). According to the proposal, it will finance capacity building of military actors in support of development and security for development (CBSD) (European Parliament 2020).



METHODOLOGY

In order to avoid any risk of bias in evaluating these three IGOs, we eschew their definition of SSR (displayed above) in our paper, instead we build upon the SSR reform definition put forward by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC): [s]ecurity sector reform means transforming the security sector/system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that they work together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (OECD DAC 2008). Based on the framework provided by the OECD-DAC definition, the primary goals of SSR can be described as follows:

1. Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system.
2. Improved delivery of security and justice services.
3. Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.
4. Sustainability of justice and security service delivery

Based on their own definitions the SSR profiles of the above-mentioned organizations can be described as follows in Table 1.

Table 1: *IGO SSR Profiles*

Name of IGO	SSR focus	Geographical scope	Country context
UN	capacity-building technical assistance	global	developing transition post-conflict
NATO	capacity-building technical assistance norms development	global	developing transition post-conflict developed (as concerns defence reforms)



<b>EU</b>	capacity-building technical assistance norms development	regional/ Euro-Atlantic	developing transition post-conflict developed (through members' ESDP activities)
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Authors' own elaboration based on Law (2013).

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Table 2: *SSR Field Activities by IGOs*

	<b>UN</b>	<b>NATO</b>	<b>EU</b>
<b>Special post-conflict programmes</b>	primary	secondary	primary
<b>Gender &amp; Security</b>	secondary	secondary	secondary
<b>Civil Society &amp; Media Capacity Building</b>	secondary	secondary	secondary
<b>Judicial &amp; Legal Reform</b>	primary	-	primary
<b>Police Reform</b>	primary	secondary	primary
<b>Border Service Reform</b>	secondary	primary	primary
<b>Intelligence Reform</b>	secondary	secondary	-
<b>Defence Reform</b>	secondary	secondary	primary
<b>Good Governance of the Security Sector</b>	secondary	secondary	secondary

Authors' own elaboration based on Law (2013).

Reading: 'Primary' represent the main activity of the respective IGOs and "secondary" represents other SSR activities that can be carried out by them based on their *own* definitions and strategies.

In our study we use the contents of Table 2 as a conceptual background, building on this we aim to identify the main differences between theoretical SSR commitments and their practical implementation through the case of Libya. We analyse the Libyan SSR activities of the above-mentioned three IGOs as case studies. When analysing IGOs's contribution to the SSR in Libya the special domestic situation of the country must be taken into consideration: after the international community intervened militarily in 2011 the rhetorical commitments of IGOs such as UN or EU did not turn into concrete actions since the new interim government was not able to control rebel groups. As a consequence, state building and democratisation process halted. It is of utmost importance to highlight the significance of the Weberian concept of statehood used by the intervening international community. State formation processes in post-colonial and post-conflict states differs greatly from the European one. As a consequence, when these states receive international assistance the recipient political and security institutions rarely comply with the ideal-typical Weberian form of statehood (e.g. state monopoly on the legitimate use of force). Regarding security issues, state monopoly on the use of force is frequently contested by several domestic groups, while the provision of security by state institutions can be limited territorially or to specific groups (Herbst 2000; Hagman and Péclard 2008). In post-colonial or post-conflict states, the settings that structure the political life are informal – opposed to the formal structures of the classical Weberian concept (Schröder and Chappuis 2014).

We analyse the SSR attempts in Libyan from 2011 to 2019 by dividing this timeframe into three periods based on the characteristics of the prolonged uncertain nature of the crisis. In the first period between 2011 and 2014 it seemed that the National Transitional Council (NTC) could replace the Gaddafi-regime and could become the central authority in a *Weberian sense*, however, in 2014 the second Libyan civil war broke out. This hopeful period abruptly ended when the civil war broke out, thus we decided to end the first period of our analysis in 2014. From the onset of the civil war, Libya basically splits into three parts, similar to the era before the official unification of the state: Tripolitania

(the Western part), Cyrenaica (the Eastern part) and Fezzan (Southern territories) functioned almost as independent entities. Several Eastern and Western groups have been fighting for power and since foreign actors started to support them, the internal conflict became international/was internationalised. Our second period regards the first phase of the civil war from 2014 until 2017 when the majority of the IGOs present in Libya were forced to relocate to Tunisia due to the worsening of the security situation on the field. We decided to draw the line of the second phase here, since from 2011 on this was the first time that the active IGOs left Libya while representation and cooperation activities of several of their member states continued. We mark the third period from 2017 to 2019. The internationalisation of the conflict (about Libya see: Sawani 2012; Eriksson 2016; Aliboni et al. 2017; Joffé 2020) was once again clearly confirmed when Khalifa Haftar launched its attack against Tripoli in April 2019 and a new – third – civil war emerged. Taking into consideration these conditions two questions arise from the Libyan (recipient's) point of view: 1.) Is the country already in post-conflict phase? 2.) Is the UN-backed Sarraj-government an institution with national sovereignty? While acknowledging the above-mentioned facts about the peculiarity of the Libyan situation and the importance of local ownership we do not seek to answer whether without these prerequisites SSR could be successful or not. Using a donor-centred approach we focus on IGOs activities in Libya and we try to identify barriers to success from their point of view.

## DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

### PERIOD 2011-2014

#### *Overview of the Libyan situation*

In 2011 the Arab Spring spread throughout the MENA region, and in February demonstrations began in Libya. The early demonstrations against the Qaddafi regime were non-violent, nevertheless Qaddafi responded rapidly and fiercely using a



combination of verbal threats, intimidation and violence. By 26 February 2011, the opposition had formed the NTC in a bid to oust the Qaddafi regime and its supporters. Upon the repression of the demonstrations the international community decided to intervene (see later) thus from March 23 to October 31 a military intervention was underway. As the Qaddafi regime fell on 20 October 2011, Libya entered a new political transition phase, which laid the ground for political chaos: power vacuums allowed militias to claim their stake in the post-Qaddafi Libya. While the international community backed the NTC, there was no overall plan for how to support Libya as a country (Erikson 2016). Since taking office officially, the NTC (5 March 2011–8 August 2012) was constantly faced by repeated armed challenges by a number of militias from across Libya that attempted to secure their own political and economic interests. The NTC was unable to maintain law and order across the territory of the country. On 7 July 2012 national elections were held in Libya for the first time, leading to the transfer of power from the NTC to the democratically elected General National Congress (GNC). The GNC failed to address the country's economic, political, and security problems. General Khalifa Haftar managed to capitalize on rising anti-Islamist sentiment by launching a full-scale military campaign against Islamist militias based in the East with strong popular support. The armed confrontation between Haftar's Karama (Dignity) coalition and the Fair Libya (Libya Dawn) coalition (composed mostly by Islamist forces related to Tripoli) pushed the country into chaos (Badi et al. 2018). Amidst these circumstances national elections were held on 25 June 2014.

The 2012 Fragile State Index (FSI) was unsurprisingly focused on Libya as the state went through a rough civil war in 2011. In that year, according to the Index Libya was the 111<sup>th</sup> out of the 177 examined countries indicating that Libya was in the 'warning' category.<sup>1</sup> At the time of the 2011 FSI researchers could not yet predict the outbreak of the civil war, however, the

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1 Fragile State Index Categories: Very Sustainable – Sustainable – Very Stable – More Stable – Warning – Elevated Warning – High Warning – Alert – High Alert – Very High Alert.



country was ranked among the five (along with Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria) states at risk in this regard (FSI 2011). Later, by 2011 according to the 2012 FSI Libya has suffered the worst deterioration, landing straight to the 111<sup>th</sup> place from the 50<sup>th</sup><sup>2</sup> within a year. The FSI emphasizes the fact that even though the revolution was successful, the unemployment rate reached a peak as Libyan oil-based economy is highly sensitive to disruptions (FSI 2012). After Libya achieved the largest and fastest deterioration in the history of the FSI, by 2013 it seemed that the situation was beginning to stabilize (FSI 2013), however in 2014 the second civil war broke out (FSI 2014).

### *SSR by IGOs*

At the beginning, EU Member States expressed very different views on NATO's intervention in Libya. Having very different interests they were not united on whether and how to establish a no-fly zone over the country. France with full support of the UK led the intervention, Germany refused to take part in any military operation, while during the first week Italy hesitated. The intergovernmental decision-making method of CFSP did not help the European Union to act coherently and effectively (Koenig 2011; Overbeck 2014; Fabbrini 2014; Weitershausen et al. 2020). After this short period of disagreement at the end of February, both the EU and the United States decided to impose sanctions on Libya (e.g. an arms embargo). In February the EU adopted sanctions and started to prepare a CSDP military operation (named EUFOR Libya) to support other humanitarian interventions. In the absence of a UN call for that and full support of EU member states, the operation was not implemented (Stavridis 2014).

Following the intervention, the EU tried to give immediate answers to the crisis promoting democratic reforms and economic growth. In May 2011, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President

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2 The higher a country ranks in the list, the more serious political, economic and security difficulties are present in the country.

of the Commission (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton visited Libya in order to discuss the EU's support and to open the EU office in Benghazi. In November the EU Delegation also opened in Tripoli. In 2011 the EU launched the SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) and supported local authorities to build democratic institutions. Approximately €39 million were provided in 2011 for projects in the field of "public administration, democratic transition, civil society, health and education". The EU provided humanitarian assistance (€80.5 million) during the conflict phase. In addition, €68 million were provided between 2012 and 2013 for projects regarding "security, technical and vocational education and training, economic development, migration and civil society" (European Commission 2013). In 2012 the EU started to help institution-building, it deployed an Election Assessment Team, provided technical assistance to organise democratic elections and supported civil society organisations (Civil Society Facility). In 2013 the European Commission announced an additional €15 million support package.

The European Union launched the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya under the CSDP in 2013. The objectives of the mission aimed to support the capacity development of Libyan authorities to improve border security in the short term, and to develop Integrated Border Management in the long term. (IECEU 2017; European Council 2013; Molnár and Vecsey 2020). According to Gaub the assistance provided by the EU was mainly bound by the Libyan security conditions (Gaub 2014). Security and political developments in Libya are closely related to the security of NATO member states for several reasons, be it energy security, immigration and illegal trafficking of people, the fight against terrorism or preventing state failure in the EU's neighbourhood.

Since the protests broke out in Libya in early 2011, NATO's most important 'act' have been to intervene militarily in Libya. The NATO-led intervention in Libya remains the only overt foreign military intervention during the Arab Spring which targeted a ruling regime. As per the UNSC Resolution 1970 (imposing arms embargo on Libya) adopted on 26 February, from

8 March, NATO increased its surveillance operations in the Mediterranean. After further deterioration of the Libyan situation the UNSC resolution 1973 (17 March) was adopted, which gave authorisation to use ‘*all necessary measures*’ to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. Thereafter/subsequently, a US-led multinational coalition launched Operation Odyssey Dawn. On 22 March 2011, NATO agreed to deploy forces in Libya as a response to the UN’s call to prevent the supply of “arms and related materials”. The Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was officially launched on 23 March. In support of UNSCR 1973, NATO then agreed to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya on 24 March 2011, then it took sole command and control of the international military effort for Libya on 31 March 2011. The military intervention lasted 222 days, the North Atlantic Council decided to end the mission immediately after the killing of Gaddafi, thus on 31 October 2011 a NATO AWACS conducted the last sortie and OUP ended (Gaub 2013).

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Only ten days after the killing of Muammar Gaddafi NATO prematurely declared the accomplishment of the mission and with the subsequent – premature – withdrawal of international actors a political and military vacuum was created in Libya (Eljarh 2018). The aftermath of NATO’s Libyan operation was not planned at all by either side. The National Transitional Council’s communication was mixed: it asked for NATO’s military operations to continue and for the provision of military advisers on the ground to counter any attacks by remnants of the regime’s forces and to secure the border (Sengupta 2011). At the same time, the NTC rejected any military personnel on the ground<sup>3</sup>, including even UN observers. Thus, NATO did not take any role in the country’s post-conflict stabilization efforts, however, it

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3 It has to be mentioned that the NTC’s communication was very mixed, since in the same time it called NATO to maintain air patrolling: “We hope (NATO) will continue its campaign until at least the end of this year to serve us and neighbouring countries, ensuring that no arms are infiltrated into those countries and to ensure the security of Libyans from some remnants of Qaddafi’s forces who have fled to nearby countries” (Gaub, 2013 and Al Arabiya 2011)



pointed out that member states could offer military commitment to Libya on an individual basis (Sengupta 2011). The absence of demand on the ground for an international force coincided with a clear lack of political will on the supply side (Sergei and van Zuijdewin 2016). As a result of the lack of a decisive and internationally-led state-building process, the Libyan power vacuum turned into a proxy battleground. In order to understand current security conditions in Libya, due to the long-term consequences of OUP some of its features should be considered.

Regarding Unified Protector we must acknowledge that at the early stage at the campaign, the air strikes were launched by France, the UK and the US acting unilaterally and not within NATO. Unlike former NATO interventions carried out after the Cold War (e.g. the Balkans, Afghanistan) Unified Protector was characterized by a sparse participation of member states, poor organization and different levels of support by member states, as Jeffrey argues it was conducted by a '*coalition within the alliance*' (Jeffrey 2014). In Libya, NATO coordinated the actions of 18 countries — 14 member states and four partners — under a unified command, however, it has to be mentioned that an equal number of NATO member states (14) decided not to participate. Several of the non-participating countries lacked the resources to do so but lent their political support, but others, such as Germany, decided not to participate despite their resources. (Daalder and Stavridis 2012). When taking into consideration the current security situation in Libya, one of the biggest limitations of the NATO's intervention is the lack of a post-conflict mission in Libya, which is in contrast with the original formulation of the R2P concept.<sup>4</sup>

Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned characteristics from the international institution's point of view, NATO played a leading role in 2011 despite its internal divisions. In comparison with other international organizations featured in

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4 According to the initial formulation of R2P, it consists of three elements: responsibility to prevent (1), react (2), and rebuild (3), however, as the doctrine developed further the responsibility to rebuild was removed. (Jay 2014).

this study - the UN and the EU – in this phase NATO was by far the most active and influential. However, by taking on the role of the enforcer of the UN resolution, NATO did not follow an inclusive notion of the international community, its particularistic character prevailed. (Carati 2017:16) Ever since the protests broke out in early 2011, NATO played a decisive role only until the regime change, after which the weak state-building initiatives were carried out by the UN.

It is difficult to analyse NATO's involvement in Libya after the military intervention ended in October 2011, since then, the member states' interests have prevailed, hindering the implementation of joint actions. A particularistic-universalistic parallel can be drawn: during the intervention the Alliance with its particularistic nature was handled by a significant part of the international community as if it were a universalistic organ. However, even if we accept NATO as a universalistic institution, the particularistic nature of the member states' interest overwhelmed its 'universalism' immediately after the regime change happened.

When Collin Powell claimed in his often-quoted statement *"if you break it, you own it"*, he referred to the fact that *"when you take out a regime and you bring down a government, you become the government"* (Samuels 2007). However, this was not the case in Libya, where during military operations, political planning for the transition took stock with the NTC in line to govern the country after the 'liberation' from Gaddafi. Since the military intervention was characterised by a 'light footprint' it was unlikely there would be a heavier footprint during the transition, better still, after the aerial bombardment campaign, NATO has been virtually absent from Libya.

The Libyan government – then led by Ali Zeidan – formally requested NATO to support SSR efforts as early as May 2013 then again in October 2013, before the overall security situation worsened in Libya and the second Libyan civil war broke out in 2014. Therefore, NATO took on the responsibility to provide advice to the Libyan authorities on SSR and on defence and security institutions. Expert support in the SSR was underway and perspectives of cooperation in the field of training,

joint exercises and educational cooperation in the field of security studies and military science became possible. NATO conducted its advisory work in full coordination with the efforts of other national and international actors, including the United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)'. However, it was evident that the Alliance was not willing to deploy troops to Libya, not even in the form of a training mission (Filípková and Kužvart 2013). Later the cooperation was put on hold by the Libyan side, due to domestic political upheavals (Ghasem 2018).<sup>5</sup>

In a statement on 15 February 2011, the UN reacted quickly for the events by urging Gaddafi to put an end to the cruel response to the revolution. On 26 February 2011, 1970 resolution was voted by the UNSC. As part of the resolution Libya was urged to end the massive and systematic human rights violations, an arms embargo was imposed on the country, along with a travel ban and a freeze on the Libyan authorities' properties. were imposed (UNSC RES/1970 2011). Gaddafi did not comply with the instructions given in the resolution, thus on 17 2011, the 1973 resolution was voted on, in which a no-fly

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- 5 Then Prime Minister of Libya Ali Zeidan visited NATO Headquarters on 27 May 2013 and officially requested NATO's assistance for the creation of a National Guard aimed at the reintegration of Libya's revolutionary brigades. The North Atlantic Council decided to send an expert-level fact-finding delegation to Libya to clarify the specific requirements of the Libyan request, assess the situation and identify areas in which NATO could possibly add value. Following that initial request, on 22 July 2013, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan sent a second letter to the NATO Secretary General in which he confirmed that the National Guard concept (on which he had earlier asked for NATO support) had been put on hold. This was due to the fact that the Libyan General National Congress (GNC) could not find agreement on the law establishing the National Guard. In his new request, Prime Minister Zeidan asked NATO's assistance in developing Libya's security architecture and its security and defence institutions, into which eventually the National Guard concept might later fit. The North Atlantic Council agreed that the NATO Team of experts led by the International Staff, would continue exploratory work with the Libyan authorities and key stakeholders. (Ghasem, 2018)

zone was over the country introduced in order to protect the civilian population and a mandate was given to enforce a cease-fire (Brockmeier, Stuenkel, Tourinho, 2015).

Since October 2011, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has also been present in the country and later, in January 2012, the SSR Unit of UN was deployed too, to support the joint efforts. The main goal of UNSMIL is to coordinate the international assistance in peacekeeping and to build up a democratic institutional system in Libya, namely by facilitating political dialogue and delivering targeted technical support in the areas of electoral assistance, constitution drafting, human rights, transitional justice and public security (Nasr 2013 and Filípková-Kužvart 2013). All UN bodies are involved in the UNSMIL-led mission in order to achieve constitutional, judicial, electoral, and social security progress (Marsai 2014).

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2011 the UN General Assembly accepted the National Transitional Council - that was established earlier in 2011 by the liberated cities' city councils (Transitional National Council 2011) - as the new Libyan Government and as the representative of Libya in the UN. On the same day UNSC Resolution Nr. 2009 (year: 2011) that allowed the supply of arms to the new Libyan authorities under certain conditions was passed (SIPRI, 2011). Following the consultation process between UNSMIL and the Libyan government, a draft electoral bill was ready by early 2012 and published by the NTC for consultation with civil society. In May 2014, the Second Libyan Civil War broke out and by the 7 July 2014, the security situation had worsened so much that the UN decided to evacuate all its international personnel to Tunisia (UNSMIL 2014). Regarding human rights, UNSMIL was working to establish an impartial judicial system and a police force to coordinate international cooperation and to encourage the Libyan state to carry out a full review of detention facilities (UNSMIL 2012a). The Libyan Government had managed to bring some former revolutionaries and their arms under state control with the support of UNSMIL. They developed an integration plan at the end of 2012 (UNDP 2014). In addition, UNSMIL trained 700 police officers to prepare them to secure the elections (UNSMIL 2012b).



## PEIOD 2014–2017

### *Overview of the Libyan situation*

Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk. The enhanced diplomatic efforts aiming for a power-sharing deal, led by multilateral institutions led to the signature of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) among Libyan factions in December 2015 and the establishment of a Government of National Accord (GNA) in March 2016. Despite its international recognition the GNA could not exercise executive functions without the consent of local militias (Eriksson and Bohman 2018). The rivalry between the eastern and western sectors intensified.

The GNA lacked the military capacity to enforce binding decisions, since its power was undermined by a fragile political consensus among its constituencies, and by the technocratic nature of its leadership. As a consequence, the sovereignty of the GNA remained dependent on the precarious consent of a multitude of non-state armed actors, possessing a large degree of independence and impunity (Raineri 2019).

From 2014 to 2017 the main conflict remained the incompatibility between the GNA in Tripoli, under Prime Minister Sarraj, and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, under the influence of Chairman Aguila Saleh Issa and General Haftar (Fitzgerald and Toaldo 2017). The HoR is supported by the so-called Dignity coalition, backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and various domestic actors with anti-Islamist agenda. The LNA is by far the most important domestic military actor in eastern Libya. Experts estimate that during the second half of 2017, the LNA and its allies controlled about 70 per cent of Libyan territory (Pack et al. 2014). The Islamic State's emergence in late 2014 further complicated the crisis. Both governments were soon forced to turn their attention to the Islamic State's growing presence.

In 2017 little progress was made in reconciling the GNA and Haftar. The political situation deteriorated in December when Haftar declared that the political agreement from 2015 was void and the GNA was obsolete (Al Jazeera 2017). As stated by the





FSI, in the period of 2014 and 2017 Libya's situation has further worsened becoming the 25<sup>th</sup> of the 178 countries and keeping its place through the examined three years. The country gained an alert rating in the 2015 FSI and even then, it was probable that Libya could join Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with a high alert rating in the next few years (FSI 2015). In 2015 and 2016 Libya was in the limelight as the world was much more concerned about the Middle East and North Africa since Europe faced a massive refugee crisis that time (FSI 2016).

### *SSR by IGOs*

Due to the worsening security situation, many institutional building projects were suspended in 2014. Since 2015 the EU has been backing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, it has also supported the UN-backed Government of National Accord and local authorities in order to strengthen inter-governmental cooperation and coordination. In 2017, the EU provided €120 million to support 37 projects in six sectors: civil society; governance; health; youth and education; migration and protection; and support to the political process, security and mediation (European External Action Service 2019).

Due to the deterioration of the situation in Libya, the EUBAM Libya mission had to relocate to Tunis in 2014 and was put on hold from February 2015 to early 2016 (IECEU 2017), which provided limited tools for assessing and understanding the complex Libyan situation. In this period EUBAM's field of action reduced to advising Libyan authorities. The political fragmentation of the country prevented the mission from identifying and establishing systemic relations with local actors, thus it was not capable to carry out its tasks successfully. (Christensen, G et al. 2018). By the time of EUBAM's evacuation, the EU was no longer capable of carrying out a civilian crisis management operation in Libya. After the second Libyan civil war broke out in 2014, three conflicting, rival powers emerged in the country, however, EUBAM's mandate dictated that its only counterpart should be the western-backed GNA (Loschi and Russo 2020), even though it gradually lost its power over the majority of the country. In 2016 upon the request of the Government



of National Accord the mandate of the EUBAM Libya mission was prolonged. Despite the local difficulties the tasks remained the same with one addition: support of a comprehensive civilian security sector reform was included in its mandate (European Council 2016b; European Council 2016c).

In April 2015 the European Union launched an EU military operation, EUNAVFOR MED, to tackle the migration and refugee crisis outside the Libyan territory. In June 2016 the mandate of the operation was reinforced with the supporting tasks of capacity building, training of and information sharing with the Libyan Coast Guard and the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas (Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993).

In 2014 NATO again offered its advice to the Libyan Government, stating that the Alliance was ready to help. In the Rome Conference (March 2014) of international efforts to help Libya were discussed with the participation of international organisations and a high-level Libyan delegation led by Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. At the Conference, Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said that NATO's first objective would be to advise the Libyan authorities on the establishment of the necessary structures, processes and arrangements to enable them to develop a national security strategy. Only after this goal was achieved it would have been possible to give advice on the adaptation of Libya's existing security architecture to make sure that is compatible with the new policy framework. It was once again underlined, however, that NATO's advisory mission will "not seek to establish a full-time presence on the ground in Libya). Six months after Zeidan's original request, a NATO advisory team was not yet put together (NATO 2014).

In March 2016 and in June 2016 (NATO 2016a) NATO reiterated, in line with the Wales Summit decisions, to assist Libya in the field of defence and security institution building, if requested by the Government of National Accord and in concert with other international efforts (NATO 2016b). Since 2012 GNC ignored the ICD roadmap (Democracy Reporting International). In 2015, part of UNSMIL's delegation returned

to Tripoli, but the majority was still working from Tunisia even in 2016 (UNSMIL 2016a).

Over the period 2015-2016, the UN's primary task was to solve the political and institutional crisis, and to end the armed conflict, furthermore to handle the political disagreements in the country. UNSMIL was trying to ease the tension by bringing the rivals namely the HoR and its associated government, based respectively in the eastern cities of Tobruk and al-Bayda, and the GNC and its government in Tripoli to the negotiating table (Lamont, 2016). UNSMIL, UNDP and UN-Women, as in the parliamentary elections, supported the population by giving lectures and presentations for the citizens about the elections (UNSMIL 2016b).

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Regarding the Police Reform, the programme management capacity of UNDP in cooperation with UNSMIL Police Advisory Section has developed a 3-year project to support the Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Police to implement a police reform in the country. The main objective of the project was to increase the operational capacity and also the trust and legitimacy of the Police, furthermore to improve them to be able to tackle modern day challenges with effective law enforcement (UNDP 2014).

## PERIOD 2017–2019

### *Overview of the Libyan situation*

Within this period the UN-brokered LPA failed largely due to the exclusion of key armed groups, anti-Islamists, tribes and elements loyal to Qaddafi. Despite several revival initiatives (such as the Libyan Action Plan), the conflictual nature of intra-national east-west relations contributed to a lack of durable success. The GNA remained impotent due to the split with the LNA, lack of control over Tripoli, and the power of armed factions (al-Shadeedi, van Veen and Harchaoui 2020).

In April 2017, Serraj called for international help concerning the escalation of hostilities in southwestern Libya. After the hostilities stabilised at a certain – tolerable – level in early April 2019, Haftar instructed the LNA to take Tripoli by force,



initiating Libya's latest war of Post-Qadhafi Succession. During the latest few years Libya did not gain a high alert rate as it was predicted in the 2015 FSI, however its situation has worsened. After the unsuccessful Berlin Meeting in January 2019 between the warring parties and the international stakeholders to secure a ceasefire, clashes continued and the Libyan conflict remained one of the world's most dangerous one. Most of the peace-making attempts were proved to be slow and fraught with numerous clashes between the fighting parties. For 2019 according to the FSI Libya became the 20<sup>th</sup> most fragile state from the examined 178. This worsening was due to Haftar's (unsuccessful) attack against Tripoli in April 2019 which led to the third civil war in Libya. It appears that chaos will continue in Libya for the foreseeable future (FSI 2020).

### *SSR by IGOs*

In the end of 2017, the situation allowed EUBAM to re-establish its presence in Tripoli, (European External Action Service 2019), and due to its new mandate, it was no longer a mission with overarching strategic objectives, but a mission to support Libya's security sector reform in the fields of border management, law enforcement and the criminal justice system (European Council 2017).

In 2019, due to conflict of interests between EU member states and to the resistance of the Italian government, the deployment of the EUNAVFOR MED Sophia operation's naval assets was suspended temporarily. The operation continued with strengthening surveillance by air assets and reinforcing support to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy. (European Council 2019/a) After heated debates about the future of the operation, the member states of the EU agreed to extend the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia until 31 March 2020, but the deployment of the operation's naval assets remained suspended (Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/535; European Council 2019/b; Molnár -Vecsey 2020).

The European Union adopted special measures in favour of Libya for 2019 and 2020 and provided €32 million. The two programmes were entitled 'European Union Mousanada for Libya

– European Union support to Public Administration in Libya’ and ‘European Union for Private Sector Development in Libya’. The Mousanada programme aims to support Libyan institutions in institution building with full respect for the rule of law, helping the ‘stabilisation, conflict prevention and democratic transition’. The ‘European Union for Private Sector Development in Libya – Phase 2’ programme intends to strengthen the Libyan business environment (Commission Implementing Decision 2019).

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As reflected in the 2016 Warsaw Summit communiqué, the allied leaders agreed on “projecting stability” on the southern flank (NATO 2016c). Based upon the experiences of the Arab Spring this strategy recognized the fact that NATO members can be secure only if their neighbourhoods are stable. In 2017, NATO officially joined the anti-ISIS coalition and (Wilson Center 2017), in the same year, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub was inaugurated in Naples. After the Warsaw Summit “Active Endeavour” counter-terrorism mission was transformed and another pillar of NATO’s Mediterranean engagement became Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) which is a non-Article V maritime security operation aimed at working with Mediterranean stakeholders to maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter-terrorism (including the prevention of foreign fighter influx into NATO territory) and enhance capacity-building in the region (NATO n.d.). OSG is a direct “link” between NATO and the EU as it supports the EU’s Operation Sophia to tackle the migrant crisis and human trafficking.

In February 2017, when Fayez Al Sarraj visited the Brussels NATO Headquarters, he requested NATO’s assistance<sup>6</sup> in the area of security and defence institution-building. The stated goal was to develop Libya’s ministry of defence, the chief of defence staff and intelligence and security services under the civilian control of the government (Ghasem 2018). Although several

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6 Libya requested assistance within the framework of Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative which is a mechanism provided by the NATO alliance to bolster and support partner countries by improving their defence and security capacities

meetings have taken place, actual assistance did not make it past the planning stage.

The latest offer of assistance marks the prevalence of a bilateral approach to reform the security sector. Promising attempts to provide assistance in a multilateral context suffered from the conflicting agendas of different powers regarding the Libyan crisis. Even though NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reiterated several times the organisation's readiness to help Libya rebuild security and military institutions, the offer was undermined by intra-European rivalries. According to Maghreb Confidential, France and Germany raised their objections, in a moment in which both Paris and Berlin were at odds with Italy over Operation Sophia (Profazio 2019).

NATO's offer was to run parallel to other initiatives that were discussed in international fora. The several Libya conferences organized by member states clearly show that interferences of regional and international powers resulted detrimental to NATO's efforts which never concretised further than just rhetoric. These developments limited NATO's room for manoeuvre in Libya, confining the activity of the organisation to the Operation Sea Guardian. There have been speculations about a bigger role for NATO in the fight against human smuggling networks, responsible for the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, but the lack of will prevented concrete action. In an interview with the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*, Stoltenberg claimed that there are no military solutions to the migrant crisis, but reaffirmed NATO's commitment to tackle the problem, referring to NATO's mission in the Aegean Sea as a success that helped decrease the illegal and dangerous trafficking of human beings (Cadalanu 2018). As tensions have begun to ease a bit after the signing of the LPA, the UNSMIL evacuation was abolished and the entire delegation was gradually repatriated to Tripoli in February 2018 (UNSMIL 2018a).

Following the completion of the Libyan Election Assistance Project in December 2016, the UNDP was given a new mandate to evaluate Libyan electoral processes, during which a new electoral support project was developed (Talbot 2018). UNSMIL - as in previous years - continued to provide comprehensive



assistance during the preparation of elections, in October 2017, the mission set up three working groups to coordinate the registration of voters, public information and the international support for electoral legislation. Despite the efforts and positive outcomes of the preparation period, parliamentary elections have not taken place until today, but the municipal elections were held in a few communities 2019 (Elumami 2019). After this modest success, the UN launched a new project to organize and to secure further municipal elections and a national one (UNDP 2018-2020) that is also supported by the rival parties in Libya (Laessing and al-Warfalli 2019).

## CONCLUSION

The security sector reform can be seen as a strategic institutional reform process aimed at creating a stable security environment that is optimal when obtained through the coordinated action of different actors (external, internal, state, non-state, etc.), in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. When implemented in such manner, security sector reform that emphasises civilian control of the armed forces can promote sustainable economic and social development in the medium and long term, while contributing to poverty reduction and supporting the creation of the conditions for good governance and the respect human rights. Since the beginning of the development of the SSR concept, it has become clear that its success may be hampered when it misses the objective of economic and social development and of local ownership of the process.

A fundamental barrier to NATO's effective and active participation in the Libyan SSR was that several member states that intervened in the R2P mission under UNSC1973 remained interested parties in the conflict in the post-intervention phase (e.g., France, Italy, Turkey, etc.) and they either continue to support their respective local partners materially, or side with different armed factions in reaction to local and regional developments (Eljarh 2017,69). The increasingly independent policies of NATO member states add further complexity to the conflict and weaken the Alliance cohesion. NATO can only address human





security problems and the terrorism challenge through a renewed cooperation model with its partners, because these risks are emanating particularly from the southern neighbourhood due to instability. In this theatre, the West should be capable of deterring Russia from turning the eastern Mediterranean into its backyard (Kasapoğlu 2019). Although in theory NATO could offer Libya various forms of partnerships like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) or its Middle Eastern equivalents called the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the particular interests of member states seem to overshadow the Alliance activities on Libya. As a whole, military victory was not turned into a strategic success: since NATO has been virtually absent from Libya, the lack of state building limited the possibility of having a lasting impact. The fact that NATO was not able/willing to commit to providing help and assistance to Libya beyond rhetoric – upon the request of the Libyan government – shows lack of determination.

The EU can be considered as the opposite of NATO: indecisive at the beginning of the crisis, but more active later. After the intervention the Union tried to promote a democratic transition and economic growth, as within the first phase (2011-2014) more than €200 million were spent on supporting Libya. However, the EU's actions were dominated by member states' interest, thus real progress lagged behind. The establishment of EUBAM Libya is in strong connection with the EU's own interests, since member states' views on how to handle migration differ significantly. EUBAM's mandate is closely related to the SSR, but to this day the mission fails to deliver, since it lacks proper staff and tools to fulfil its mandate. In 2015 the European Union launched an EU military operation, EUNAVFOR MED, to tackle the migration and refugee crisis outside the Libyan territories, then its mandate was reinforced with the supporting tasks of capacity building, training of and information sharing with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even though the mission was replaced by a new one (IRINI) in 2020, EUNAVFOR MED was more likely meant to treat the symptoms of a problem rather than treating its root causes. Eventually EUNAVFOR MED fell victim of member states' disputes.



Critics say that there could be two the major obstacles for the UN in implementing a security sector reform. The first is that every time a major armed conflict burst out in the country UNSMIL refuses to use military power, except once, in the beginning of the conflict when UN resolution 1970 was approved. As the UN does not want to use hard power (Soudan 2020), they are trying to make peace by mediating between the two major actors, the HoR and the GNA, who are fighting for the leadership of Libya. However, as neither of the rivals has actual control over their militias (Libya's Conflict 2019), any peace-making attempt from the UN has remained unsuccessful in the long run. The second obstacle is that the UNSC passed numerous resolutions and statements regarding the SSR in Libya which cover almost every programme in the field of development and security. This is due to the UN's comprehensive approach, however, with the exception of resolutions 1970 and 1973, the UN was unable to implement any other resolution properly (Fetouri 2018).

For the UN some of the most challenging parts of implementing the SSR program were to enforce a police reform, giving electoral assistance and draft a constitution. Regarding the electoral assistance, with the support of UNSMIL, Libya could hold two parliamentary elections in 2012 and 2014 and some municipal elections in early 2019. Regarding the police reform, UNSMIL trained 700 former revolutionaries to police officers in 2012, and developed a 3-year project to execute a police reform with the Police Advisory Section and the Ministry of Interior. Regarding the constitution, as for now the efforts to create and vote on a permanent constitution have been fruitless. Besides all the aforementioned technical and structural support, under the aegis of UN agencies like the UNDP, UNICEF or UN Women, UNSMIL implemented numerous development projects such as immunisation campaigns, women empowerment initiatives and assisting internally displaced persons and their needs. Overall, the UN has achieved some success, however due to limited resources and in chaotic security environment, stabilisation programmes can hardly succeed. The main takeaway of the UN's intervention in Libya is that without a basic security there is no chance for development.



Table 2.1: SSR Field Activities by IGOs in Libya

Time period	Activity	UN		NATO		EU	
		IGOs own concept	real activity in Libya	IGOs own concept	real activity in Libya	IGOs own concept	real activity in Libya
2011-2014	<b>Special post-conflict programmes</b>	primary	active	secondary	not active	primary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		not active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	<b>Gender &amp; Security</b>	secondary	active	secondary	not active	secondary	not active
2014-2017			active		not active		not active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	<b>Civil Society &amp; Media Capacity Building</b>	secondary	active	secondary	not active	secondary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	<b>Judicial &amp; Legal Reform</b>	primary	active	-	not active	primary	not active
2014-2017			active		not active		not active
2017-2019			active		not active		not active
2011-2014	<b>Police Reform</b>	primary	active	secondary	not active	primary	not active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			active		not active		active



2011-2014	<b>Border Service Reform</b>	secondary	active	primary	not active	primary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			not active		not active		active
2011-2014	<b>Intelligence Reform</b>	secondary	not active	secondary	not active	-	not active
2014-2017			not active		not active		not active
2017-2019			not active		active		not active
2011-2014	<b>Defence Reform</b>	secondary	active	secondary	not active	primary	not active
2014-2017			not active		not active		not active
2017-2019			not active		active		not active
2011-2014	<b>Good Governance of the Security Sector</b>	secondary	active	secondary	not active	secondary	active
2014-2017			active		not active		active
2017-2019			active		active		active

Source: Author's own elaboration.



Consequently, following our comparison of the IGOs' stated SSR objectives and their effective implementation in Libya, it can be stated that only a fraction of the planned SSR programmes have actually been delivered despite the commitments contained in the IGO's SSR frameworks. Furthermore, in spite of the 10-year-long international cooperation and development programmes and some partially successful tasks, the SSR attempts were unsuccessful, leaving Libya in lasting chaos. In order to visualize the differences of theory and practice we decided to complement Table 2 about SSR field activities of international organizations (Table 2.1). As our results show it is mostly the UN that – at least – takes on SSR activities in Libya, even though results would have been more tangible had the Libyan situation been more stable. NATO participated actively in the military intervention, but ever since the fall of the regime its Libyan involvement has been merely rhetorical. We find the EU's involvement somewhere in the middle between the UN and NATO. As the most directly affected IGO the EU might have been more effective in the Libyan SSR had the member states' diverging interests not hindered progress. Regarding the EU it needs to be highlighted that the Union took on programmes and projects that are closely related to the Union's security. When we take into consideration the SSR concepts of the IGOs we need to highlight that even though the EU and NATO are officially engaged in the Libyan SSR they are not actively carrying out those activities that they consider of primary importance.

Reading: Left columns represent SSR activities based on the auto-definitions of the IGO-s, while right columns represent their actual activities in Libya. The triple division of right columns represent top-down the three periods analysed (2011-2014, 2014-2017, 2017-2019). "Primary" in bold in the left column represent the main SSR activity of the respective IGOs by their own-definition. Secondary in bold in the left column means that the respective IGO can carry out that specific activity as part of their SSR, but according to their own definition, it is not the most important. Dash in the left column means that the IGO does not offer to carry out that specific activity as part of its SSR. "Active" in the right column means that the

respective SSR is actively engaged in that activity in Libya, while “not active” means that even though the respective IGO offers to carry out that specific activity as part of its SSR definition, it does not do so in Libya.

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# INTERPRETING THE MEDITERRANEAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE THROUGH STAKEHOLDERS' PARTICIPATION – THE CASE OF VRSAR, CROATIA

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The paper deals with the interpretation of the Mediterranean archaeological landscape in the sustainable development of cultural tourism, as an important attractive factor for tourists visiting countries in the region. It reflects on the possibilities of sustainable tourism valorisation of archaeological sites through participative stakeholders' co-creation. The empirical research focused on the municipality of Vrsar, a typical Mediterranean destination characterised by mass tourism and high seasonality. The observed destination is also marked by an abundance of archaeological sites, which are still not adequately valorised, presented and interpreted. The empirical research, realised through workshops, interviews and questionnaires, has involved all relevant stakeholders (experts, local inhabitants, tourists). All key stakeholders agreed that the main sustainability issues could be improved through the sustainable valorisation of local cultural and natural resources





by creating innovative tourism experiences - attracting much interest in participating in this co-creation process. The conducted research indicated the possible models of presentation and interpretation of the local archaeological landscape through archaeological routes connecting the most important sites, participatory experiences such as interactive workshops and living history programmes, and the network of interpretation centres in the function of the future archaeological parks.

*Key words:* archaeological landscape, Mediterranean, cultural tourism, sustainable valorisation, Vrsar, Croatia

## INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean Basin is one of the most attractive regions in the global tourism market, constituting one third of international arrivals worldwide (UNWTO 2015). Many destinations in the region, until the current pandemic, were faced with over-tourism, high seasonality and pressures on local natural and cultural resources, as well as local communities. The pandemic crisis is an opportunity to reconsider the current tourism development model and to accelerate the transition towards more sustainable development models, which will take into consideration long-term economic, social and environmental impacts. The successful implementation of sustainable tourism development models requires the informed participation and collaboration of all relevant stakeholders.

This paper is focused on the interpretation of the Mediterranean archaeological landscape in the sustainable development of cultural tourism as an important attractive factor for tourists visiting countries in the region. It reflects on the possibilities of sustainable tourism valorisation of archaeological sites through participative stakeholders' co-creation. The authors analysed the situation and the potential for the sustainable valorisation of cultural and archaeological heritage in the Municipality of Vrsar in Western Istria, Croatia. The location is a typical Mediterranean tourist destination characterised by high seasonality, mass tourism concentrated on the coast, and



inadequately valorised cultural heritage, which is still not recognised as an important and valuable tourism resource.

Bearing in mind the mentioned challenges, the authors tried to identify the reasons for the inadequate valorisation of rich archaeological heritage, elaborating the role of key stakeholders in the sustainable tourism development, presentation and interpretation of archaeological sites. The previous research has shown that informed stakeholders' participation and co-operation, including public and local community involvement, are among the most important requirements to implement the sustainable development concept in archaeological landscape valorisation and interpretation. As emphasised by experts, coordination between sectors and successful collaboration between heritage and tourism management through stakeholder involvement helps to minimise conflicts between conservation and profit, establishing channels of communication, involving local stakeholders in decision-making and generating income for heritage conservation (Aas, Ladkin and Fletcher 2005). To understand and improve the local situation as an example useful for the broader region, it was important to define a conceptual framework and to analyse key policy documents by international organisations related to stakeholders' collaboration in the sustainable valorisation, presentation and interpretation of archaeological landscapes as part of the overall process of cultural heritage conservation and management. The concept of the archaeological landscape- preserved, managed and interpreted in such a sustainable and multidisciplinary way, which involves all key stakeholders- brings together both natural and human factors, and reflects on the interactions between people and their natural environment over space and time (Fairclough 2002). Such a holistic understanding is particularly important for Mediterranean archaeological landscapes, which are especially valuable due to their diversity, fragmentation, connectivity and richness, thus offering plenty of opportunities to study the long-term interaction between humans and their landscape. To indicate the importance of adequate communication and interpretation of the key values of unique Mediterranean landscape/s, the authors analysed important documents, such



as *The ICOMOS Charter for The Interpretation and Presentation of Cultural Heritage Sites* (2008), which proposed the most adequate interpretation and presentation models and infrastructure. Field research and the elaboration of recent publications and monographs related to specific models, as well as local, national and European best practice (archaeological parks and routes, site interpreters, informational panels, museum-type displays, formalised walking tours, lectures and guided tours, living history programmes and interactive workshops, multimedia applications and websites) were also very useful.

In order to analyse the role of key stakeholders in the sustainable valorisation, presentation and interpretation of the local archaeological landscape, the authors have tested the following key hypotheses:

- H1: special interest tourism, such as cultural, creative, archaeotourism and ecotourism, has the potential to involve key stakeholders in heritage preservation and resolve the main sustainability issues;
- H2: the archaeological landscape in Istria has the potential to be adequately valorised, presented and interpreted through sustainable cultural tourism;
- H3: the proper models of participatory heritage management of the archaeological landscape could contribute to sustainable tourism development in the Municipality of Vrsar.

In the next section, the authors elaborate on the conceptual framework of stakeholders' participation in sustainable archaeological tourism. This is followed by an overview of the Mediterranean archaeological landscape in Istria County. The next section presents the research methodology. The authors combined qualitative and quantitative methodologies involving all interested stakeholders (experts, the local community and visitors). The research was organised in three phases, the results of which will be summarised in this paper. results of all three phases.

The obtained results confirmed the great potential of the proper valorisation of the local archaeological landscape through sustainable cultural tourism by involving all key stakeholders.

The main contribution of the article would be in proposing a model of sustainable valorisation, presentation and interpretation of a typical Mediterranean archaeological landscape, adjusted to local cultural and creative resources.

#### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON STAKEHOLDERS' PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE VALORISATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE

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There is a broad literature on the importance of stakeholders' participation in sustainable cultural tourism development and heritage management. Informed stakeholders' participation and cooperation are among the most important requirements for the implementation of the sustainable tourism development concept (Mihalic 2015). This was also indicated by Byrd (2006), who applied stakeholder theory to sustainable tourism development, and analysed stakeholders' roles in policy development as well as types of stakeholder participation. The stakeholder theory, pioneered by Freeman (1984), was discussed later by numerous authors, among others by Sautter and Leisen (1999), as a normative tourism planning model. Recent research evaluated stakeholders' roles in governing sustainable tourism destinations, emphasising the importance of strengthened partnerships and collaboration among stakeholders in the framework of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and addressing concerns on sustainability, environmental conservation and local community involvement (Rocax, Riviera and Gutierrez 2020). Seminal works dealing with the partnership between tourism and heritage management (McKercher and du Cross 2002; Timothy and Boyd 2003), as well as heritage and archaeology (Carman 2002; Mcmanamon, Stout and Barnes 2008), elaborated different dimensions of stakeholders' collaboration and also engagement with the public.

Within the framework of the UNESCO stakeholder project, which focused on communication between the heritage and tourism groups, experts elaborated models for collaboration among stakeholders, by forming mutually beneficial alliances



that are both economically profitable and socially acceptable. They concluded that successful collaboration between heritage and tourism management through stakeholder involvement could minimise conflicts between conservation and profit, establish channels of communication, involve local stakeholders in decision-making and generate income for heritage conservation (Aas, Ladkin and Fletcher 2005). Collaborative processes can take many forms; from strong public engagement for binding decision-making by consensus, to different situations and cultural contexts requiring varied approaches (Myrers, Smith and Ostergren 2016). The role of stakeholders in sustainable tourism development, and the presentation and interpretation of archaeological sites is discussed in an extensive study on the conservation and management of archaeological landscapes (Agnew and Bridgland 2003). Challenges of sustainable management, conservation and presentation of specific Mediterranean archaeological landscapes in Italy, Greece and Turkey have been explored previously in de la Torre (1999). Stakeholders' participation in archaeological heritage management projects, with an emphasis on cultural tourism stakeholder value perceptions towards specific Mediterranean archaeological landscapes, was discussed in recent research, which used as a case study the Petra Archaeological Park in Jordan (Alazaizeh, Ababneh, Jamaliah 2019). Another recent analysis, focused on the place of archaeology in integrated cultural landscape management (Moore, Guichard and Sanchis 2020), mentions some key documents that recognise the importance of stakeholder participation in mutually dependent integrated management and landscape sustainability: the *European Landscape Convention*. It emphasised that all landscapes are a product of human and natural interaction and indicated the need to integrate a diverse range of stakeholders to ensure landscape sustainability – where the public is encouraged to take an active part in its protection, conserving and maintaining the heritage value of a particular landscape; in its management, helping to steer changes brought about by economic, social or environmental necessity; and in its planning, particularly for those areas most radically affected by change, such as peri-urban and coastal areas (Council of Europe,

2000). The 'principle of participation', reinforced by the 1998 *Aarhus Convention* and echoed in the right to heritage under the *Faro Convention*, stressed that diverse stakeholders should be integral to landscape and heritage management.

Stakeholders' collaboration in the sustainable valorisation, presentation and interpretation of archaeological landscapes, as part of the overall process of cultural heritage conservation and management, is also elaborated on through several key documents by the International Council on Monuments and Sites. *The Salalah Guidelines* emphasise the importance of stakeholder participation where archaeological sites should be under the rightful control of stakeholders residing in the region in which they are located. The sustainable management of archaeological sites that are open to the public requires an understanding of how public access and experience combine to help protect the sites concerned. It is indicated that a visit to an archaeological site can advance the wide spectrum of benefits - social, economic, and cultural - associated with heritage. The ongoing relationship and interaction between humans and nature, embodied in the diversity of archaeological landscapes, could enrich our understanding of the past, present and future through conscientiously presented heritage (ICOMOS 2017).

Preserved, managed and interpreted in such a sustainable way, which involves all key stakeholders, the archaeological landscape brings together both natural and human factors and reflects the interactions between people and their natural environment over space and time. Understood in this way, the archaeological landscape becomes a place where archaeology, geography, history and anthropology can join together and build links to biodiversity, ecology and artistic/associative views of the world (Fairclough 2002). The archaeological landscape could be defined as a layered landscape, with archaeological evidence and ruins from different ages. The archaeological landscapes have a high degree of representation or a large area of archaeological finds, which illustrate the way of organisation and life of a particular historical period. Unlike the archaeological site, which may be an unexplored area that is known, or presumed to have, a concentration of archaeological findings

- following research, such a site can become an archaeological landscape with explored and presented finds (as is the case with the ancient Salona). Starigrad plain on the island of Hvar was protected as an archaeological site, and was enrolled in the World Heritage List as a cultural/archaeological landscape (Dumbović Bilušić 2015).

According to Athanassopoulos and Wandsnider, recent studies of Mediterranean landscapes have emphasised their diversity, their fragmentation and their connectivity. Moreover, the Mediterranean landscape record is recognised for its length and richness, and the opportunity it offers to study long-term interaction between humans and their landscape (Athanassopoulos and Wandsnider 2004). The archaeology of Mediterranean landscapes thus enables the evaluation of the range of human-environmental interactions from the Neolithic to the Roman and later periods across the Mediterranean (Walsh 2014).

*The ICOMOS Charter for The Interpretation and Presentation of Cultural Heritage Sites* (2008) defines interpretation and presentation models, as well as activities intended to heighten public awareness and enhance understanding. This is in addition to the carefully planned communication of interpretive content through the arrangement of interpretative information, physical access and the interpretive infrastructure for archaeological landscapes. The information about the cultural significance of archaeological heritage could be conveyed through site interpreters, informational panels, museum-type displays, formalised walking tours, lectures and guided tours, as well as multimedia applications and websites. This Charter also established seven cardinal principles, upon which interpretation and presentation should be based, including: Access and Understanding, Information Sources, Attention to Setting and Context, Preservation of Authenticity, Planning for Sustainability, Concern for Inclusiveness as the result of meaningful collaboration between heritage professionals, host and associated communities and other stakeholders, Importance of Research, and Training and Evaluation (ICOMOS 2008).

*The International Cultural Tourism Charter - Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage Significance* (ICOMOS 1999) also defined

the principles of sustainable participatory management, conservation and interpretation programmes, which will present the heritage significance of a particular archaeological landscape, ensuring that the visitor experience will be worthwhile, satisfying and enjoyable. Host communities should be involved in planning for conservation and tourism and hence benefit from such activities. According to the *Charter for the Protection and Management of Archaeological Heritage*, active stakeholder participation must form part of the policies for the protection of archaeological heritage. The overall objective of archaeological heritage management should be the preservation of monuments and sites in situ, including proper long-term conservation and curation of all related records and collections etc. Local community participation should be actively sought and encouraged as a means of promoting the maintenance of archaeological heritage. Presentation and information should be conceived as a popular interpretation of the current state of knowledge, and it must therefore, be revised frequently (ICOMOS 1990).

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In previous research, the authors analysed best practice in the sustainable valorisation of archaeological landscapes in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Among the best presented prehistoric archaeological sites, we elaborated on the Megalithic Temples of Malta, Talayotic sites of Menorca, Spain, connected by an archaeological route, as well as the ancient fortresses on the Aran Islands in Ireland. In Croatia, Vučedol Culture Museum, or Museum of Krapina Neanderthals, were proposed as good practice examples of multimedial interactive presentation and interpretation of prehistoric sites. The period of classical antiquity is also well represented by eco-archaeological parks, open-air museums and interpretation centres in Greece (the Athenian Acropolis, Epidauros, Mycenae or Delphi), and Italy (Rome, Pompeii, Siracusa and Agrigento), Jordan (Petra), Turkey, Tunisia etc. Among the most important Croatian archaeological parks from the Roman Period, the Andautonia Archaeological Park and Eco Museum near the Croatian capital, Zagreb are mentioned, as well as the Sopot Archaeological Park near Vinkovci, Acqua Iasae near Varaždin, Naronia museum and Salona archaeological park (Afrić Rakitovac, Urošević, Vojnović 2018).





According to *The Salalah Recommendation*, the archaeological park should be seen “as a tool for conservation of archaeological sites on the one hand, and their presentation and interpretation as a means to understand the shared past of humanity on the other hand” (ICOMOS/ICAHM 2017). Besides visits to archaeological parks, museums and interpretation centres, archaeological tourism includes walks and travels on archaeological paths, re-enactments of historical events, festivals, theatres, and all those products connected with promoting archaeology to the public. It also involves participatory experiences, such as experimental archaeology, community digs and practical workshops, which could involve both the local community and their guests. Archaeological itineraries are created by amalgamating archaeological attractions or various elements that form the complex cultural, historical, archaeological and ethnographical heritage of a particular area and their presentation (Mihelić 2009). An increasingly popular form of interpretation of archaeological heritage are “living history” or “living museums” programmes, where visitors can experience and taste the way of life, gastronomy and leisure of ancient inhabitants. Recent research (Petrić, Rukavina, and Obad Šćitaroci 2016) indicated possible presentation and interpretation models of archaeological landscapes, designed with the aim of developing cultural tourism and integrating archaeological heritage into the life of the local community: an archaeological route linking archaeological sites with interpretation centres, using the existing traffic and tourist infrastructure along hiking and bike trails as well as by creating new thematic routes for recreation and education, with multimedia interpretive panels, replicas and reconstruction of finds and innovative sightseeing models for archaeological landscapes, such as hot air balloon tours. As Rodríguez-Hernández and González-Álvarez (2020) note, those programmes, in addition to their role in shaping contemporary identities, contribute to strengthening tourism and promoting public awareness of cultural heritage preservation. Heritage interpretation is here defined as a communication and education process, designed to reveal meaning and the relationship with local cultural and natural heritage, through involvement with objects, artifacts,



landscapes and sites, which could enable visitors to become more sensitive to the need to conserve and protect them (Klarić et al. 2021; Draženović and Smrekar 2020; HERCULTOUR 2018; Ludwig 2015; Binoy 2011; Tilden 1957).

## THE MEDITERRANEAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE IN ISTRIA COUNTY

Istria is a border Euro-Mediterranean region with a unique transnational history and multiple layers of a wealth of archaeological heritage (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1: *Geographical location of Vrsar on the northern Adriatic littoral*



Source: Authors' work



Nowadays, there is an official regime of protection of more than 50 historical landscapes in Istria and many hundreds of individual localities and monuments. From an archaeological and cultural-historical point, the Istrian cultural landscape includes a variety of prehistorical hillforts (e.g. Monkodonja near Rovinj, Picugi near Poreč), as well as very valuable ancient heritage in Pula (the Amphitheatre, the Temple of Augustus, the Roman Theatre, the Arch of the Sergii et al.), the medieval and modern fortresses in central Istria (the Morosini-Grimani castle in Savičenta, Rota in Momjan, Pietrapeloza near Buje, Paz et al.), the fortified towns in central Istria (e.g. Sv. Lovreč Pazenatički, Motovun, Roč et al.), which could all represent the points of a network in a cultural landscape around which a narrative can be construed on the past and present. In 1997, the Euphrasian Basilica complex in Poreč was inscribed onto UNESCO's list of world heritage, and ancient monuments in Pula (Amphitheatre with the historical urban core) have been a candidate on more than one occasion (Buršić-Matijašić and Matijašić 2017).

The most important archaeological parks in Istria are Brijuni, Vižula and Nezakcij near Pula and Monkodonja near Rovinj. The Istrian peninsula features an exceptionally dense concentration of fortified, hillfort settlements, more than 300 sites from the Bronze Age, as well as very well-preserved monuments from the Roman times. The biggest archaeological park in Istria is the Brijuni Islands National Park, the only one for which a ticket is charged. The Islands are visited annually by more than 160,000 tourists (Afrić Rakitovac, Urošević and Vojnović 2018).

According to the Register of Cultural Goods in Croatia of the Ministry of Culture (2018), there were altogether 316 immobile cultural goods in Istria,<sup>1</sup> which are classified into seven groups (see Table 1). Most represented are sacral cultural goods, making up 28.98%, and profane heritage, which constitutes more than a quarter of cultural goods in Istria, among which most represented are fortified buildings, palaces, town lodges and town

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1 Istria is geographically equalized with the regional self-government unit of the Istrian County, which consists of 31 municipalities and 10 towns.

halls. Archaeological sites and landscapes<sup>2</sup> make up 22.93%, also including those underwater. Out of the 316 listed cultural goods, only seven of them are categorised as cultural goods of national significance. Among them are St. Mary's Church at Škriljine in Beram near Pazin, the Complex of the Euphrasian Basilica in Poreč, under UNESCO protection, as well as the five monuments in the Town of Pula: The Amphitheatre (Arena), the Temple of Augustus and the Roman Forum, the Double Gate, the Roman Scenic Theatre that is an archaeological site and the Arch of Sergii.

Table 1: *Classification of immobile cultural goods of Istria 2018*

<b>Classification</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Share (%)</b>
Sacral heritage	91	28.98
Profane cultural heritage	84	26.75
Archaeological sites	72	22.93
Cultural and historical entities	47	14.97
Sacral-profane heritage	9	2.87
Cultural landscape	2	0.63
Other	11	3.50
<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.00</b>


Source: Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Culture (2018), calculated by authors.

In Istria there are 72 archaeological sites, which are spatially distributed in 37 settlements in all parts of the region (Fig. 1). Among them, 15 archaeological sites are distributed on the seabed near the coastline. Underwater archaeological sites are distributed across 10 settlements of West, South and East Istria. By type, there are sunken war, passenger and merchant ships from various historical periods and underwater archaeological

2 Official name of archaeological site, according to the Register of Cultural Goods in Croatia of Ministry of Culture, is archaeological heritage.

zones. The highest concentration of archaeological sites is along the West Istria coast.

Figure 2: *Geographical distribution of settlements in Istria with archaeological sites*



Source: Adapted from Ministry of Culture (2018), created by authors

The geographical distribution of archaeological sites, including 15 underwater, points to the fact that, in Istria County, 21 municipalities have at least one archaeological site in their territory. (see Table 2).

Table 2: *Number and density of archaeological sites by municipalities and towns of Istria*

<b>Municipalities/ Towns</b>	<b>Archaeo- logical sites</b>	<b>Tourism microregion</b>	<b>Municipality/ town surface area (km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>km<sup>2</sup>/ site</b>
Umag	11	West Istria	82.2	7.5
Rovinj	10	West Istria	77.5	7.7
Brtonigla	7	West Istria	32.9	4.7
Medulin	6	South Istria	34.1	5.7
Vodnjan	6	South Istria	101.0	16.8
Pula	5	South Istria	53.8	10.8
Poreč	4	West Istria	111.7	27.9
Buje	3	West Istria	99.2	33.1
Kanfancar	3	Inland Istria	59.9	20.0
Bale	2	West Istria	82.1	41.1
Ližnjan	2	South Istria	68.1	34.0
Novigrad	2	West Istria	26.6	13.3
Marčana	2	South Istria	131.0	65.5
Vrsar	2	West Istria	36.5	18.2
Barban	1	Inland Istria	90.5	90.5
Cerovlje	1	Inland Istria	105.6	105.6
Kršan	1	East Istria	123.4	123.4
Labin	1	East Istria	72.3	72.3
Lanišće	1	Inland Istria	143.7	143.7
Raša	1	East Istria	80.4	80.4
Tar-Vabriga	1	West Istria	27.1	27.1
Total	72			

Source: Adapted from Ministry of Culture (2018), calculated by authors

The geographical distribution of archaeological sites by tourist microregions shows that the greatest concentration is in the microregions Western and Southern Istria (Table 2). Both microregions are the most developed tourist areas by number

of tourist beds, arrivals and overnights in Istria and Croatia (Vojnović 2018).

Due to its favourable geographical position in relation to the developed urbanised regions of Central and Western Europe and the diversity of natural and anthropogenic attractions, Istria County is today the leading tourist region in the Republic of Croatia, with a quarter of the tourist beds, a quarter of the tourist arrivals and almost a third of total tourist overnights of the Republic of Croatia. In the pre-stage of the sustainable tourism theory, Blažević (1984) in the case of Istria, Perkovac (1993) in the case of Poreč-Vrsar tourist region and Alfier (1994) noted the problems of the sustainability of the Croatian mass tourism model and extreme seasonal concentration in the summer months. That concentration threatened sociocultural, economic and natural resource dimensions of sustainable tourism as Baum and Lundtrop (2001) argued. Similar results were suggested in the research by Orsini and Ostojić (2018) for the Croatian tourism industry, including seasonality issues (Kožić, 2013; Afrić Rakitovac et al. 2018) as well as the case of Istria County, by Štoković and Kolić (1994). In 2016, a total of 10 Istrian coastal towns and municipalities individually realised more than a million tourist nights, seven of them in West Istria: Funtana, Novigrad, Poreč, Rovinj, Tar-Vabriga, Vrsar and Umag, two on the southern Istrian coast (Medulin and Pula) and the town of Labin on the eastern coast. In this area, a total of 235,531 beds were registered in commercial accommodation facilities (80% of all beds in Istria County). In the same year, there were 3,212,775 tourist arrivals (85.4% of all arrivals in Istria County) and 19,252,042 total overnights (83% of all overnight stays in Istria County). Furthermore, the most important Istrian tourist towns and municipalities are also characterised by a significant geographical and socioeconomic intensity, as well as by density, spatial, environmental and demographic impacts of the tourist activities (Vojnović 2018; Afrić Rakitovac et al. 2018).

Continuously inhabited since the earliest prehistory (Palaeolithic), and through all prehistoric and historical periods, the Municipality of Vrsar is today a typical Mediterranean destination, marked by the high tourism seasonality and the

geographical concentration on the coast. Besides the number of caves inhabited in prehistory with extremely valuable findings, located around the protected natural area of the Lim Bay, another important feature in the local archaeological landscape are Bronze Age hillforts and burial mounds, combined with later rural Roman villas, built on their foundations. This unique Mediterranean archaeological landscape is located in the most developed tourist area both in Istria and in Croatia, on the western Istrian coast, in the southern part of the tourist micro-region Poreč-Vrsar littoral. In this micro-region, tourism and supporting activities have most influenced the entire geographical and socio-economic transformation of the cultural landscape (Iskra 1991; Perkovic 1993; Hrvatin, 2006). Destination Vrsar, corresponding to the municipality of the same name, consists of nine settlements where the majority of the population and the largest number of central functions are localised in the settlement of Vrsar. According to the estimates of the Central Bureau of Statistics (2020), the municipality had 2,147 inhabitants at the end of 2019. Most of the inhabitants (82%) live in Vrsar settlement, where 99% of all beds are in commercial accommodation facilities of the municipality, including hotels and campsites. In the remaining settlements, there are individual facilities (apartments, rural villas) intended for a shorter holiday. Therefore, tourist development in the Vrsar destination shows a marked geographical orientation in the coastal area of Vrsar and a significant concentration in the summer season, with predominant activities related to stationary, restful tourism with stable growth of all indicators (see Table 3).

The unsustainability of the existing model of mass tourism points to the necessity for the revalorisation of the tourism supply and existing approaches to the natural and anthropogenic attractiveness, including valuable archaeological landscapes. The pressure on key resources could be reduced by developing special interest tourism that functions all year round and by creating specific products, such as thematic routes, which enable the dispersion of tourist demand in time and space through innovative interpretation programmes. In this process, stakeholder participation and public involvement would facilitate an

increase in successful tourism destination management and help to resolve key sustainability issues (Woodley 1993; Priestley et al. 1996; Hall and Lew 1998; Swarbrooke 2005; Mason, 2016).

Table 3: *Number of tourist beds, arrivals, overnights and average stay in Vrsar 2012-2019*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Beds</b>	<b>Tourist arrivals</b>	<b>Tourist overnights</b>	<b>Average stay</b>
2012	18,763	177,469	1,429,075	8.1
2013	18,911	175,668	1,387,941	7.9
2014	19,026	187,475	1,414,816	7.5
2015	19,610	201,649	1,461,433	7.2
2016	19,821	214,177	1,562,246	7.3
2017	18,071	210,829	1,588,420	7.5
2018	18,112	223,054	1,606,131	7.2
2019	17,843	218,887	1,589,671	7.3

Source: Calculated by the authors according to data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2013-2020

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The conducted research was part of the current scientific project ArchaeoCulTour, which connected the archaeological field research, analysis and systematisation of data on archaeological sites in the Municipality of Vrsar, and their use in making plans and developing the concept of cultural tourism development. Besides using the classic archaeological techniques and modern information tools (GIS) and prospection technologies (LIDAR) to evaluate the research potential of archaeological sites and models of preservation of archaeological heritage, the project aims at strengthening the sustainable valorisation of archaeological landscapes through researching the attitudes of local residents, professionals and tourists on cultural tourism development potential. The research results should help in awareness raising and capacity building processes, by suggesting



innovative models of presenting and interpreting the archaeological landscape, as well as the preparation of selected sites for presentation. The research methodology included an opinion survey and analysis of public attitudes towards the local archaeological landscape and its importance in the development of cultural tourism. The key idea was that the collaboration of archaeology and tourism can be a good model for elaborating the possible forms of symbiosis, on which new paradigms for use in other Mediterranean historical-geographical and economic environments can be tested (ArchaeoCulTour 2020).

Since the base of the archaeological heritage management process involves all interested stakeholders and a detailed situational analysis (Sullivan, 1999), our research started with workshops involving all key stakeholders. The main purpose was to define the current situation, main problems and development priorities. Interviews and focus groups with experts were supplemented by local community surveys and questionnaires for tourists, in which the attitudes towards the key attractions and development resources, as well as the most appropriate models of sustainable cultural and creative tourism development, were explored (Richards and Munster 2010). The first phase, conducted in April 2018, included interviews and focus groups with 15 experts, with the aim of defining key issues and collecting information for situational analysis. A local community survey was conducted from March to May 2018 and involved 182 inhabitants of Vrsar. The third phase of research, from May to September 2018, involved 881 tourists. This paper summarises the research results of all three phases. The results of the research were presented to local stakeholders at a workshop in May 2019, which included the second cycle of interviews with the same expert group, with a request to propose the most adequate solutions and models for the sustainable valorisation, presentation and interpretation of the local archaeological landscape, including specific sites with the most important finds that will be connected and presented by an archaeological interpretation route.



## RESEARCH RESULTS

### *Experts' views*

In the initial phase of the situational analysis, the authors conducted empirical research aimed at exploring the opinions of 10 relevant experts (representatives of the local municipality, the local tourist board, the largest hotel company in the destination, and experts and scientists in sustainable tourism and archaeology) regarding the actual situation and the potential for promoting and presenting archaeological sites through sustainable cultural tourism. The situational analysis results indicated the most important issues related to the current situation and potential for the more sustainable valorisation of unique local cultural resources through cultural and creative tourism. The results showed that, despite the very rich natural and cultural heritage resources, the local tourist offer is still characterised by high seasonality and mass tourism concentrated on the coast. Lack of strategic planning, collaboration and coordination between the key stakeholders, inefficient destination management and inadequate spatial planning are exacerbated by the inadequate valorisation of cultural heritage and local creative resources, which are still not recognised either as development potential or as a motive for visiting Vrsar. On the other hand, local stakeholders are aware of the opportunity for sustainable development of cultural tourism through creative valorisation and the interpretation of the unique and most valuable local cultural resources. The interviews, focus groups and workshops conducted with experts, as informed representatives of key local stakeholders, indicated key issues related to the (un)sustainability of the current model, which was very useful in situation analysis and preparing the next stages of the research. (Afrić Rakitovac, Urošević and Vojnović 2018).

### *Local community perceptions*

The second phase of the research has shown that the local community of Vrsar is aware of the problems referring to sustainable development, the importance of the proper valorisation of

cultural heritage and the potential for sustainable cultural tourism development.

As indicated in Table 4, the local population is mainly satisfied with tourism development in the municipality (arithmetic mean on Likert's scale higher than 4). The examinees expressed the highest levels of agreement with the following statements: tourists are welcome regardless of their country of origin (4.68), tourism contributes to higher levels of employment in the Vrsar Municipality (4.59), tourism is the most important economic activity in the municipality (4.47), tourism development benefits the majority of the population in Vrsar (4.47), and tourists' language(s) are not a barrier to communication (4.14). The examinees expressed the lowest levels of agreement regarding the possibilities of active participation of the local population in the tourism planning process (3.32), the contribution of tourism to environmental protection (3.45) and levels of satisfaction with the cultural offer in the municipality (3.24).

Table 4: *Local population's attitudes regarding the proposed statements*

Statements	Arithmetic mean	Std. dev.	Skewness
Tourism contributes to higher employment in the Vrsar municipality	4.59	0.706	-2.177
Tourism is the most important economic activity in Vrsar	4.47	0.733	-1.586
Tourism development benefits the majority of the population in Vrsar	4.47	0.798	-1.770
Tourists do not hinder daily life and work in Vrsar	3.59	1.127	-0.434
I actively participate in the tourism planning process in Vrsar	3.32	1.269	-0.275
Tourism contributes to environmental protection in Vrsar	3.45	1.085	-0.291
Tourists' language(s) are not a barrier to communication	4.14	0.880	-1.119



Tourists are welcome regardless of their country of origin	4.68	0.637	-2.586
Tourists contribute to the preservation of customs and cultural heritage	3.98	0.934	-0.573
Estimate of the level of satisfaction with the cultural offer in Vrsar	3.24	1.163	-0.089

Source: Authors' research

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Table 5 indicates the local population's perceptions of the proposed attractions of Vrsar as a tourism destination. As expected, considering the arithmetic mean scores on Likert's scale higher than 4, the local population has recognised the following natural factors as the most significant attractions: the vicinity of the Adriatic Sea, the beauty of the coast and nearby islands, the pleasant weather and climate, the Lim Bay, Vrsar's old city centre, etc. It is interesting to note that the local population considers local cultural resources as less attractive: Vrsar's mosaics, St. Michael's Church and the Monte Ricco archaeological site.

Besides the prevalence of classical Mediterranean mass tourism focused on the sun-and-sea tourist season, it is obvious that the main issue is the sustainability of such a development model, resulting in infrastructure problems and neglect of the key cultural resources. which should be the basis for the sustainable development of cultural tourism. Although the majority of the local population is professionally involved in tourism, they are not satisfied with the level of inclusion of residents in tourism planning and in heritage management. The residents are concerned with environmental issues as well. Fully aware of the unique characteristics of the local natural and cultural heritage, as well as the good geographical position and proximity to emissive markets as the most valuable attractiveness factors, our respondents emphasised the neglect of the infrastructure, the lack of high-quality cultural manifestations and the need for better presented and interpreted cultural attractions as the main problems in the planning of sustainable

cultural tourism. Our research has shown that local residents are well informed about the main cultural resources and the possibilities of their sustainable valorisation through innovative models of interpretation, such as cultural routes, living history programmes and workshops, which would include the local community and interpretation centres. The results of the community survey are in line with the results of interviews and focus groups with experts organised in the first phase of the research.

Table 5: *The importance of proposed attractions of Vrsar as a tourism destination*

Attractions	Arithmetic mean	Std. dev.	Skewness
The vicinity of the Adriatic Sea	4.58	0.675	-1.865
The weather and the climate	4.55	0.644	-1.379
The coast and islands	4.57	0.753	-2.407
Natural and rare land cover type	4.26	0.844	-1.023
The Lim Bay	4.53	0.710	-1.848
Parks	4.28	0.830	-1.210
The Kontija Forest	4.25	0.868	-1.130
St. Michael's Church	3.91	0.959	-0.506
Monte Ricco archaeological site	3.90	0.995	-0.777
Vrsar's mosaics	3.88	1.086	-0.674
St. Mary's of the Sea church	4.14	0.853	-0.754
Vrsar's old city centre	4.36	0.841	-1.389
Dušan Džamonja's Park of Sculptures	4.20	0.846	-0.0900
The culinary tradition	4.03	0.957	-0.946
Cultural, sports and entertainment manifestations	4.04	1.034	-1.088

Source: Authors' research



*Attitudes of tourists*

The third phase of the research, related to tourists' attitudes, has confirmed that the tourists visiting Vrsar are mostly motivated by the opportunity for rest and recreation in preserved nature. The data was collected in May and July 2018, where the research instrument was a questionnaire structured in five parts, consisting of 38 questions. The paper presents the most relevant questions and answers. When tourists were asked about their interest to explore the local archaeological heritage, more than a half of them expressed their interest (Table 6).

Table 6: *Tourists' interest in exploring the local archaeological heritage*

Answers	May		July	
	N	In %	N	In %
YES	169	<b>56.0</b>	194	<b>56.2</b>
No	133	44.0	151	43.8
Total	302	100.0	345	100.0

Source: Authors' research

In the next group of questions, those tourists who expressed interest in exploring the local archaeological heritage were asked about a potential activity they would be interested in, and if they were willing to pay for it. As indicated in Table 7, for tourists visiting Vrsar, the best way to explore the local archaeological landscape would be through cultural routes or archaeological parks, followed by events – living history programmes, interpretation centres and museums, as well as interactive workshops. Approximately three-quarters of tourists are ready to pay for such a creative, innovative experience.



Table 7: Preferred ways of exploring archaeological heritage for tourists visiting Vrsar

Activity	May			July			
	N	Willingness to pay		N	Willingness to pay		
		N	In %		N	In %	
Through interactive workshops		56	45	80.3	92	76	82.6
Archaeological parks	86	66	76.7	123	96	78.0	
Cultural routes	97	59	60.8	117	84	71.7	
Interpretational centres/museums	70	54	77.1	101	80	79.2	
Events – living history programmes	76	47	61.8	101	72	71.3	

Source: Authors' research

Although only a third of them could be defined as 'cultural tourists', since they planned a visit to a cultural attraction/exhibition during their stay, more than a half of them are interested in attending organised activities related to the local archaeological heritage, mostly through cultural routes and archaeological parks and, even more importantly, most of them are willing to pay for such an experience. This means that tourists are interested, but still not well informed, about the local cultural heritage and the possibilities of experiencing it through innovative products of creative and archaeological tourism.

The results of the third phase have confirmed those of the previous two research phases, related to the experts' attitudes and the local community survey, both oriented towards considering the current cultural tourism development trends in the observed municipality and its development potential (Afrić Rakitovac, Urošević and Vojnović 2019). All key stakeholders agree that the main sustainability issues in the Vrsar municipality, i.e., high seasonality, mass tourism, infrastructure problems, could be resolved through the sustainable valorisation of

the local cultural and natural resources by creating innovative tourism experiences through special interest tourism.

### *Experts' views*


The results of the research were presented to local stakeholders at a workshop in May 2019, as a second cycle of interviews with the same expert group. The experts and representatives of key local stakeholders were asked to propose the most adequate solutions and models for the sustainable valorisation and presentation of the local archaeological landscape, including specific sites with the most important finds that will be connected and presented through an archaeological interpretation route. The interviewed experts proposed the presentation and interpretation of five archaeological sites in the immediate hinterland of the Municipality of Vrsar: Monte Ricco hillfort and the Roman Villa, the ancient quarry Bišupovi Vrhi, Mukaba hillfort and tumulus, Milovići tumulus and the Monastery of St. Michael in Kloštar (interpretation centre), and the valorised archaeological sites in the settlement of Vrsar (see Figure 3). They also suggested connecting the most attractive archaeological sites with natural and cultural attractions in protected areas of the Lim Channel and Kontija forest through cultural routes and educational paths, as well as through a network of interpretation centres/eco-museums. Asked about sustainable alternatives for the current mass tourism model, they indicated the potential for development of special interest tourism focused on a combination of ecotourism, cultural and archaeotourism, as well as recreational, wellness and eno-gastronomic activities during the off-season by the inclusion of cultural and natural attractions in cultural routes. Analysing the existing infrastructure and available attractions, the authors proposed the route presented in the next figure, which connects the archaeological sites selected for presentation and which, for the most part, can fit into the existing bike route 171 "Magic Archipelago." This is the most popular circular bike route in Istria, and runs from Vrsar to St. Michael's Monastery in Kloštar (18.5 km), which connects the most attractive natural and cultural heritage sites along the Lim Channel, including the selected archaeological sites St. Romuald





Cave and the protected Kontija forest with the interpretation centre ZEC (which will also be used as the visitor centre for the route).

Figure 3: Archaeological landscape of Vrsar Municipality: sites selected for interpretation



Source: The field project team data

For the next phase, after creating the local archaeological route, which will connect the most important archaeological sites near Vrsar, the authors propose a wider route around the Lim Channel, from Vrsar to Rovinj. This would connect, present and interpret the rich archaeological landscape, but also the unique natural and cultural heritage, in the most proper way. Besides the most important local archaeological sites from the prehistoric and ancient Roman periods, the second phase of presentation would involve very attractive caves along the Lim Channel, but this will only be possible after the opening of Romuald's cave with its valuable prehistoric paintings for the public.

## DISCUSSION

Informed participation, collaboration and, when appropriate, networking of relevant stakeholders is among the most important requirements for the implementation of the concept of sustainable tourism in the valorisation and interpretation of archaeological landscapes. Stakeholder participation requires the implementation of different methods, i.e., interviews, surveys, focus groups, ongoing dialogue and reflections on each stage. It is a process in which no one's interest dominates and in which different, sometimes conflicting, interests are named, processed and resolved (Đokić et al. in: Kordej-De Villa et al. 2009). Different socio-economic, political and cultural contexts require different approaches. The participatory process faces a number of limitations: it takes time, many stakeholders have different perspectives and expectations, a consensus among stakeholders is often difficult to achieve, so it needs to be carefully planned and managed. As indicated in the paper, stakeholder collaboration in the sustainable valorisation, presentation and interpretation of archaeological landscapes, as part of the overall process of cultural heritage conservation and management elaborated in different documents from ICOMOS, UNWTO, the Council of Europe, etc., results in a wide spectrum of social, economic and cultural benefits and contributes to environmental protection and proper valorisation. Many previously mentioned best practice examples of the sustainable valorisation of archaeological landscapes in the Euro-Mediterranean area confirm the importance of participatory processes.

Empirical research was focused on the municipality of Vrsar, a typical Mediterranean destination characterised by mass tourism and high seasonality. The observed destination has an abundance of archaeological sites that have not yet been properly valorised, presented and interpreted. The research conducted in four phases through workshops, interviews and questionnaires included all relevant stakeholders (experts, local population, tourists). The initial situational analysis pointed to the most important issues related to the current situation and the potential for more sustainable valorisation of the unique



archaeological heritage through cultural and creative tourism. The results showed that, despite the very rich heritage, the local tourist offer is still characterised by high seasonality and mass tourism concentrated on the coast. Lack of strategic planning, cooperation and coordination between key stakeholders, inefficient destination management and inadequate spatial planning are exacerbated by the inadequate valorisation of cultural heritage and local creative resources. Local experts pointed out the possibilities of the sustainable development of cultural tourism through creative valorisation and interpretation of unique and most valuable local cultural resources. Although the local population, involved in the second phase of the research, was mainly satisfied with tourism development in the municipality, it is nevertheless interested in more actively participating in tourism planning processes. The members are well informed about major cultural resources and the possibilities of their sustainable valorisation through innovative models of interpretation, such as cultural routes, life history programmes, workshops involving the local community and interpretation centres. The results of the third phase, which has involved tourists visiting Vrsar, indicate that tourists do take an interest, but are still not well informed, about the local cultural and archaeological heritage. They are interested in experiencing it through innovative products of creative and archaeological tourism, i.e., cultural routes or archaeological parks, events – living history programmes, interpretation centres and museums, as well as interactive workshops. Approximately three-quarters of tourists are ready to pay for such a creative, innovative experience. In the fourth phase, the results were presented to the same expert group. They proposed the presentation and interpretation of five archaeological sites in the intermediate hinterland of the observed municipality, and to connect them with the natural and cultural attractions in the area through cultural routes, educational paths and a network of interpretation centres and Eco museums. The authors, considering the research results, the existing infrastructure and available attractions, proposed a new archaeological route, which connects the proposed archaeological sites with the most attractive natural and cultural heritage sites in the area.



The research confirmed the importance and benefits of stakeholder participation in the proper valorisation and interpretation of archaeological heritage. It has confirmed the readiness of local experts and residents to be more actively involved in the heritage management process and the interest of tourists to become more acquainted with the archaeological heritage in the host community. As previously mentioned, the proper valorisation and interpretation of archaeological heritage contributes to a better understanding of the complex historical heritage of a particular area, and its protection and preservation, for future generations.

## CONCLUSION

The obtained results confirmed the great potential of the proper valorisation of the local archaeological landscape through sustainable cultural tourism, in order to create innovative tourism experiences as a way to enrich the visitor experience by involving all key stakeholders in the participatory cultural tourism planning process, which could help to solve the main sustainability issues and extend the tourist season in the observed tourism destination. The research hypotheses, i.e., that specific forms of tourism, including the cultural and creative, as well as archaeotourism and eco-tourism, have the potential to resolve the main sustainability issues and involve key stakeholders in heritage preservation through the sustainable valorisation of archaeological landscape in the Vrsar municipality, have been confirmed. All stakeholders agree that the main sustainability issues in the Vrsar municipality, such as high seasonality, mass tourism and infrastructure problems, could be resolved using the sustainable valorisation of local cultural and natural resources by creating innovative tourism experiences.

Bearing in mind the local community commitment to sustainable and inclusive development, the Euro-Mediterranean best practice and the experts' recommendations, as well as tourists' preferences, the authors proposed the following models of sustainable valorisation of the local archaeological landscape: the archaeological route, which connects selected sites arranged

as eco-archaeological parks and open-air museums, interpretation centres as well as living history programmes, educational paths, community digs and practical workshops as models of participatory heritage management, which would involve the local community and their guests in the process of co-creation of innovative tourist experiences.

Our research showed that the necessary prerequisites for the improvement of cultural tourism, based on unique local cultural and creative resources, united in a unique Mediterranean archaeological landscape are:

- a participatory strategic planning model,
- information and education on all relevant stakeholders and
- the proper valorisation, presentation and interpretation of the local archaeological landscape through cultural tourism.

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# OLIVE OIL TOURISM IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

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This paper explores Extra Virgin Olive Oil (EVOO) as a common example of Euro-Mediterranean heritage and its potential in promoting innovative tourism development initiatives and cooperation in producing areas. The main aim of the work is to highlight the existing initiatives based on the olive oil heritage of the Euro-Mediterranean producing countries, including Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal as EU member states, and Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic as non-EU states (International Olive Oil Council 2018) with the additional consideration of Lebanon for its solid reputation as an olive oil producer. Through investigative research, this work tries to demonstrate the most outstanding initiatives, products and events related to olive oil and aimed at giving more visibility to its heritage and culture in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The initiatives found show new inputs for the modern tourism systems of the olive-growing areas. The initiatives also point



to EVOO being a common heritage that can offer important opportunities to inspire innovative proposals, capable of connecting the Mediterranean countries and of enhancing their common olive-growing identity with suggestive proposals addressed to modern tourists, increasingly interested in getting in contact with authentic heritages and the typical food of the destination they visit.

*Key words:* Olive-oil tourism, olive-oil culture, tourism management, sustainable tourism development

## INTRODUCTION

Extra Virgin Olive Oil (EVOO) is a distinct product for Euro-Mediterranean countries with both material and immaterial value. Euro-Mediterranean gastronomy is usually identified within the general context of the Mediterranean diet, where EVOO plays a distinctive role. Olive oil is a product resulting from the collective work of multiple agents and ancient techniques. Its cultural content is wide and includes ethnography, agronomy, chemistry, biology and gastronomy. Its value exceeds the culinary aspect until the point that, together with other important ingredients, EVOO featured heavily in the acknowledgement given by UNESCO in 2010, of the Mediterranean diet being an 'Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity'.

Due to its significant market value and distinctive utilitarian dimensions, olive oil is also increasingly appreciated in markets outside the Euro-Mediterranean. According to a report by the European Commission on the market situation of olive oil published in November 2020, EU27 exports of olive oil to third countries increased by 16% in 2019/2020 (European Commission 2020). The United States are the major recipients of these exports, accounting for 33% of the total, followed by Brazil (11%), United Kingdom (9%), Japan (8%), China (6%), Canada (4%), Australia (4%) and Others (24%) (European Commission 2020, 13).

Like the divisions of the county itself, the music of Croatia was subject to two major influences: Central European, predominant in central and northern parts of the country, and

Mediterranean, prevailing in the coastal regions of Dalmatia and Istria. The versatility of the musical culture of the broader Dalmatian area is a reflection of centuries of well-groomed and widely influenced folk, church and artistic musical performance. In order to clearly identify this complexity, it is necessary—besides recording and examining the spoken and live musical tradition—to collect and interpret the tangible musical heritage stored in churches, monasteries, museums, private or archival cultural institutions across the coast, which contain a large number of musical manuscripts and prints, as well as musical instruments and books about music that have been completely unexplored to date and are unknown to the public.

The focus of this paper will be on the representation of musical artefacts throughout the territory of Croatia today, and particularly in the historical province of Dalmatia. It will further analyse, as a case study, musical instruments kept in Dalmatian museums, aiming to discover new, previously completely unknown information about Dalmatian musical heritage, but also European musical heritage preserved in Dalmatia, which testifies to centuries of continuity of musical culture in the region and to the connection of Croatian musical sources to Central European and Mediterranean musical and cultural circles. As examples of intercultural interactions, instruments will be analysed in the broader cultural context of Croatian and European musical history.

However, olive oil is not just a product, but the full expression of a specific territory and an associated emblem of the producing community. This identifies as an intangible heritage made of tastes, techniques, customs and traditions, which characterizes communities and territories, thus encouraging a vibrant culture, deeply rooted in the Euro-Mediterranean areas (Papa 2000; Sanità 2016). Therefore, EVOO is not only suitable for fostering local economies and rural productive systems, but is rather a functional tool, inspiring a new tourism practice (Folgado-Fernández et al. 2019; Campón-Cerro et al. 2017). The rich heritage that EVOO boasts is a significant attraction for all those tourists who travel with a culinary motivation, and has now given birth to a new tourism typology known as oleotourism,



or olive oil tourism (Hernández-Mogollón et al. 2019; Pulido-Fernández et al. 2019; D'auria et al. 2020). Oleotourism is identified as a practice involving the visit to olive groves, olive oil tasting and cooking experiences the themes of which are based on the uses of olive oil, visits to olive oil museums, ancient and modern mills, and in general, everything that encourages a better knowledge of the olive oil culture- from landscapes to production processes, and tastings (Pulido-Fernandez et al. 2019).

88 | Olive oil tourism has initially been identified within the context of rural tourism or, more specifically, agritourism (Pulido-Fernández et al. 2019). However, the recent rise of gastronomic tourism, and its affirmation as an independent tourism typology, has offered the perfect conceptual background for oleotourism, which can be considered as a thematic expression of the broader category of “food and drink” tourism. The foodie travelers are those who want to grow acquainted with local cultures through tasting traditional ingredients, typical products and local cuisine, usually being the expression of the peculiarities of a certain territory: its geography, climate, economics, faith and beliefs. Olive oil tourism offerings are considered educative experiences which, beyond delighting tourists with pleasant flavours, inform them about the benefits of olive oil consumption on human health and educate consumers who already have an awareness. The educational component of oleotourism is an important strategic component of this practice, as it can be the starting point of a long-lasting commercial relationship between tourists and local producers (Hernández-Mogollón et al. 2020).

Therefore, olive-oil-based experiences set out to accomplish two goals: i) to offer rural olive-growing regions the chance to increase their profitability through tourism practices which, moreover, can give room to new market opportunities in the long term; ii) to harness the educational component of oleotourism to contribute to the safeguarding of the authentic and age-old heritage of Mediterranean people and thus disseminate the Euro-Mediterranean identity forged by olive cultivation and olive oil production.

The aim of this review is to show that together with the relevance that olive oil tourism is gaining in academic literature, there is a strong proliferation of practical initiatives defining a new scenario for olive growing areas. This implies, for many rural destinations, the chance to engage tourists and prolong their stays with several proposals, which are capable of adding value to the local tourism sector and providing more benefit for local economies and communities. Accordingly, the overall objective of this review is to highlight the most outstanding experiences, initiatives and institutions working around olive oil tourism development in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

According to Alonso and Krajsic (2013), in Western Europe, food is an institution that is deeply linked with social, cultural and traditional values. Visiting the destinations of this area provides tourists with the chance to get in contact with local cultures through food consumption.

Olive oil production is a peculiar activity, which strongly defines the olive growing areas at different levels. through landscapes, architecture, lifestyles, traditions and cultures that represent a distinctive footprint of a centuries-old practice (Martín-Vertedor and López-Caballero 2016). This aspect turns olive oil production and associated culture into a significant example of heritage for tourism development and for the preservation of a unique identity (López-Guzmán et al. 2016; Folgado-Fernández et al. 2020). Even if some other geographical areas worldwide are succeeding in importing olive-oil production, its natural environment is still clearly rooted in the Mediterranean basin. According to Sabbatini et al. (2016), the Euro-Mediterranean countries are responsible for almost the 90% of global olive oil production. Spain, Italy, Morocco and Turkey are the largest producers, with Spain producing the major part of the world's olive oil (D'auria et al. 2020).

From a tourism perspective, these data highlight the potentiality of the European countries in developing tourism proposals focused on products based on olive oil. However, it



has to be specified that the Euro-Mediterranean region has in olive oil a particularly valuable tourism potential due, not just to its leading position in global production, but rather, to the fact that olive oil production is a central activity for the economies and idiosyncrasies of Mediterranean communities since pre-Roman times (Martín-Vertedor and López-Caballero 2016). Considering this, in the Euro-Mediterranean area, this product can be considered “heritage”. According to Van Esterik (2006, 105), ‘heritage foods become the commodities through which national and regional traditions are identified and preserved’. Centuries of history in production techniques have determined that olive-oil growing areas of the Mediterranean basin see olive oil production as a core activity, defining the economic, social and environmental attributes that make this part of the world unique in comparison to others with historical and natural heritages of similar value (Paquete 2013).

This complex cultural background turns Mediterranean olive oil into an inimitable product which, beyond its outstanding organoleptic qualities, is enriched by the additional scent of passion employed by local communities in producing it from ancient olive groves that are more than a living resource, and rather, represent a human legacy (Kizos and Varoufakis 2013). Together with its uniqueness, olive oil products and production methods are particularly suitable as a backbone for innovative tourism systems in the Euro-Mediterranean region, as it enables tourism initiatives to be put forward and products to be placed in line with new trends in tourism consumption and the desires of modern travellers (Bezerra and Correia 2018).

Tourists are increasingly attracted by authentic and unique proposals, and a generalised *interest has been detected towards food and drinks as major attractions for an increasingly large portion of tourism consumers (Sanches-Pereira et al. 2017). Wine tourism is probably the most common example of this new tourism fad (Alonso and Krajsic 2013; Moral-Cuadra et al. 2017).*

*With the rise of this new tourist interest, it can be said that food, in whatever form it is produced, sold, consumed at the destination or taken home as a souvenir, plays a special role for tourists who are beginning to associate local cuisine consumption with a way to absorb*



*the culture and the identity of the destination visited (Altintzoglou et al. 2016). According to Tsai (2016), in recent years, culinary cultures and typical cuisines have been widely promoted using different communication means, such as TV programmes, magazines, blogs or social media. This exposed consumers to a large degree to gastronomic topics. It may have intrigued them and fostered their desire to enjoy local delicacies as a central activity in their holiday-time. Mason and Paggiaro (2009) argued that travellers see in local food a means to feel authenticity and have unique experiences. Therefore, authenticity and culture are central issues in culinary tourism (Long 2004) and define what foodies are looking for in a gastronomic trip/holiday, which draws on a higher level of requirements for food-based holidays.. Culinary experiences are expected to be tasteful and, at the same time, filled with cultural content. The tasting experience alone is not sufficient to satisfy the expectations of modern foodie tourists, who look for a deeper contact with local foodstuffs, which necessitates first-hand knowledge of producers, information about economic, social and environmental implications of the production, local communities, culinary cultures and cooking techniques, etc. (Di-Clemente et al. 2020).*

Therefore, not all food and drink are suitable resources for tourism use, but only those boasting a wide cultural context and authentic history. Euro-Mediterranean olive oil accomplishes this requirement and, together with new curiosity of tourists for traditional products, can be considered as a strategic common element for tourism revitalization in many rural areas within the Euro-Mediterranean region. Olive oil tourism is a way to add value to a unique resource, which can benefit the tourism sector, by diversifying its offerings and the fragile rural economies, thus presenting a business opportunity for producers to market their olive products directly to consumers (Alonso 2010; Alonso and Northcote 2010).

## MATERIAL AND METHODS

Based on the outstanding significance that olive oil production has carried for many Euro-Mediterranean countries, from both



an economic and cultural perspective, it seems important to look in detail at the actions that have been put forward with the aim of enhancing the value and profitability of olive oil groves and products by means of tourism initiatives. The present work aims at presenting a general report of the actual interest existing around olive oil tourism development in Euro-Mediterranean countries, which is made clear by the policies and projects undertaken to reach this goal.

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In this study, the geographical scope of the research has been limited to those producing countries that are responsible for the major part of global production. This includes EU and non-EU countries within the Mediterranean basin. According to data provided by the International Olive Council (IOC), these are: Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal, among the EU member states, and Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic, as non-EU countries (International Olive Oil Council 2018). According to these data, this review defined the aforementioned countries as its geographical focus, with the addition of Lebanon due to its olive growing reputation among the Middle-Eastern countries.

The methodological approach of this review is exploratory and descriptive. Investigative research has been carried out using selected keywords such as “Olive oil tourism” “Olive oil tour”, “Olive oil experience” and “Olive oil tourism in (name of the country)”. From a first search, the most relevant references to institutions, entities, public and private initiatives related to the olive oil world were identified in the selected geographical area. The relevant references were obtained among the first results appearing on the web and later, for the range of their actions and effectiveness in improving the olive oil culture at national or international level. The selection of the most significant results has been made considering the following criteria: i) the direct linkages of the institution/association/initiative with olive oil tourism promotion; ii) its relevance for the preservation of the environment of olive-growing areas and their economic well-being.



RESULTS

Based on a web enquiry, it is possible to identify the most active agents safeguarding olive oil heritages as a germane expression of Euro-Mediterranean culture, history and economics. Results have been organised into three categories: Transnational projects and institutions; National initiatives; and Thematic products, events and experiences.

At a European level, a strong interest has been detected regarding the preservation of olive oil culture. Several projects and institutions have gained strength in the last decades in Europe; however, it is worth noting that the recent interest gaining momentum in fostering the importance and value olive groves carry for the sustainable development of European regions is not a recent phenomenon, and in fact, dates back to the middle of the XX century.. In addition, some initiatives have been observed beyond European boundaries, pertaining to the following other Mediterranean countries: Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia.

Table 1: Most relevant projects, institutions, initiatives and products related to olive oil tourism development

	Name	Brief description
Transnational Institutions and Projects	<b>International Olive Council (IOC)</b>	Intergovernmental organization, which aims at bringing together the olive oil and table olive producing and consuming stakeholders.
	<b>OleoLife (1999-2002)</b> <b>ECOIL (2004-2006)</b>	European projects focused on identifying production models aimed at reducing the negative environmental impacts of olive cultivation and making olive-farming more profitable and efficient.
	<b>Oleoturismo (2003-2007)</b>	European project with the objective of fostering an interregional network for the preservation of olive oil culture.
	<b>Life. Olivares vivos (2015-2020)</b>	A European project based in Spain whose main goal is to qualify olive oil products and educate consumers.
	<b>Well-O-Life. The road to wellness (2016-2017)</b>	European project with the aim of diversifying the overall EU tourism offer by means of thematic tourism offerings focused on wellness and wellbeing across the Routes of Olive Tree.



	Name	Brief description
National initiatives about olive oil in Euro-Mediterranean countries	<b>CROATIA, Croatian Cities of Olive Oil;</b> <b>ITALY Italian Olive oil Towns Association;</b> <b>SPAIN, AEMO, Spanish Olive Oil Towns Association;</b> <b>PORTUGAL, ADEMO, Associação para o Desenvolvimento dos Municípios Olivícolas Portugueses.</b>	National associations, which aim at fostering the olive oil sector's interests by means of fruitful unions and partnerships. Members are identified in municipalities, provinces, commerce chambers, mountain communities and local governments.
	<b>ITALY, Olive oil and tree academy.</b>	A scientific and cultural academy whose main goal is to support the research and diffusion of knowledge about olive-farming and olive oil production, in general.
	<b>GREECE, Cultural foundation "The routes of the olive tree"</b>	A non-profit NGO, which defends olive oil culture, traditions and heritages from technological advances, globalization and oblivion.
	<b>SPAIN, Olearum. Olive oil Culture and Heritage Association.</b>	Its main purpose is to encourage research on and the dissemination of knowledge of the olive oil culture. Among its action lines, tourism occupies a central role as the association puts forward several activities of olive oil tourism, including conducting an inventory of heritage in order to figure out which resources can be of potential use for tourism strategies.
	<b>SPAIN, Olivar y Aceite (Olive grove and Oil)</b>	Interpretative centre offering several activities around olive oil, from a simple visit to a thematic museum, to unique participative experiences and tastings.
	<b>MORROCO, Plan Le Maroc Vert</b>	Plan Maroc Vert, launched in 2008, is a project with the aim of reinforcing the Moroccan agri-food sector, in which olive production plays a central role. The Project achieved the enlargement of the area dedicated to olive groves, modernising the sector, improving the quality of the product and its position in international markets.
	<b>MORROCO, Agro-pole Olivier</b>	An innovation centre specifically focused on the olive oil sector and its promotion at local and national level. Even if tourism is not its main goal, it can be considered as an indirect push for the development of the Moroccan olive oil sector and a support for future tourism initiatives.



	Name	Brief description
	<b>TUNISIA</b>	FOPROHOC is a governmental organisation with the aim of enhancing Tunisian olive oil production and exportation. Within its programme, it foresees oleotourism actions as a driving force to support the image of Tunisia in the tourist and agri-food markets.
Thematic Products/Events/Experiences	<b>“Routes of the Olive tree” - (Greece and Mediterranean countries)</b>	An intercultural itinerary on the themes of the Olive Tree and the Mediterranean crossing different countries, acting as a cultural bridge between Greece and other Euro-Mediterranean countries with an olive oil identity.
	<b>Thematic museums (Euro-Mediterranean area)</b>	There is a conspicuous number of thematic museums dedicated to the olive oil culture in Euro-Mediterranean countries, which represents a network of resources for olive-oil-based potential tourism proposals.
	<b>Frantoio aperti (Italy)</b>	A local initiative in the Umbria Region of Italy, held from October to November every year. Olive oil mills remain open to the public, showing the process of olive oil extraction from the fruits, and other educative and leisure activities.
	<b>Girolio tour (Italy)</b>	Italian tour from April to December. It intends to be an educative and enjoyable initiative aimed at bringing the olive oil culture closer to consumers.
	<b>Green ways of olive oil (Spain)</b>	128 km route crossing the provinces of Córdoba and Jaén in Southern Spain.
	<b>Olive oil Tours (Spain)</b>	Specialised tour operator in olive oil experiences in the province of Granada. It offers a complete tour among olive groves and mills, which represents a perfect chance to introduce the olive oil culture and increase awareness about consumption.
	<b>Zejd (Lebanon)</b>	A production enterprise, which offers olive-based tourism experiences such as: the Olive oil trail, olive oil tasting, cooking classes, etc.
	<b>Olive Oil Harvest (Lebanon)</b>	They offer the “Tour Lebanon” product, which is focused on knowledge and tastings of local olive oil.
	<b>Monumental Olive Oil Trees (Mediterranean/Argentina/Mexico)</b>	A list of 66 century-old olive trees spread out all over the Euro-Mediterranean area. Beyond the Euro-Mediterranean, some examples can also be identified in Argentina and Mexico.
	<b>Sa. (Tunisia)</b>	A production and mill enterprise with a clear focus on olive oil tourism. It offers harvesting experiences, picnics among the olive groves, tastings, etc...

	Name	Brief description
Thematic Products/Events/Experiences	<b>Kırkpınar Oil Wrestling Tournament (Turkey)</b>	Declared as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO in 2010, it is a traditional wrestling competition. Beyond being considered a gastronomic product, here olive oil is a symbol of power.
	<b>Tours, hotels, museums, restaurants (Turkey)</b>	Saltik (2017) presents a collection of businesses and events in Turkey themed around olive oil. This collection includes a number of museums, hotels, tours, events, etc.... located in major part in the western part of the country.

Source: Own Elaboration

As EVOO is gaining momentum in the tourism and hospitality industry, inspiring innovative paths for local tourism development and destination diversification - especially in rural areas (López-Guzmán and González-Fernández 2011; Millán et al. 2012) - this mini review has provided a preliminary insight into the types of initiatives related to oleotourism. In light of the presented results, it is possible to reach certain conclusions about olive oil tourism, which can represent the first step towards a more sophisticated conceptual development of this new tourism typology and its practical execution, as an innovative practice for Euro-Mediterranean rural destinations.

It can be concluded that there is a general awareness about the urgent need of innovation and qualification of the olive oil sector. Even if concern about preserving the traditional Mediterranean olive groves dates back to the sixties, when national (Olearum\_Spain) and international (IOC) associations were founded with this specific objective, it is only recently that there has been a common European concern about the preservation of the great value of the olive oil sector and the rich cultural heritage that surrounds it. Nowadays, the sector is at a crucial crossroads, struggling between the globalisation impulse, and



the need for maintaining traditional production techniques and high quality products.

The results in this review show a trend toward the protection of the wide cultural heritage embraced by olive oil and groves. Table 1 presented in this study illustrates a number of private and institutional initiatives undertaken with the aim of bringing to the surface the importance of fostering these groves and culture as a valuable support mechanism for the lasting profitability of Euro-Mediterranean economics and communities.

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From a tourism perspective, it has to be said that even if a growing interest in oliveoil- based proposals can be detected, there is still much work to be done in order to tie olive cultivation with tourism. According to the results of this research, few initiatives exist in Europe directly focused on pursuing new tourism systems framed around olive oil products. The initiative with the most international visibility is that put forward by Greece: The Route of the Olive Tree, which represents an important starting point. It acts as a first attempt to join together some of the Euro-Mediterranean olive-growing countries, sharing common issues and problems with regard to the tourism development of their rural areas. Oleotourism can be a suitable pushing impulse for such regions, capable of providing several advantages: economic diversification, unique and experiential offerings, social and cultural preservation, clear competitive positioning in the global tourism market, tourism proposals linked with a rooted authentic identity, and an easily identifiable destination image.

Besides the high potentiality of oliveoilbased tourism initiatives, the sector has many challenges to face in order to turn this actual trend into a solid and profitable tourism activity. Some of the challenges that emerged in this research include: the lack of durable cooperation among the involved stakeholders at transnational level, meaning the presence of solid ties beyond the temporary partnership in a European project; the lack of a unified brand, and promotion actions and strategies for Euro-Mediterranean tourism destinations specialising in olive oil offerings and products; the poor availability of infrastructure prepared to satisfy the specific target group of oleotourists



demanding open olive mills, well-packed olive-based experiences and well-designed itineraries; and finally, the lack of a permanent network of initiatives around oleotourism. Spain, Italy and Greece appeared to be the most active countries in olive oil tourism promotion; however, there are many other olive-growing regions in the Euro-Mediterranean area that, if linked together, can give birth to a dynamic cluster for the tourism development of Mediterranean olive-growing regions.

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In conclusion, olive oil tourism has great potential in the Mediterranean basin, as it can succeed in harmonising the multiple that exist in the olive oil sector and thus position this geographical area in the global tourism market with an innovative proposal, in line with the expectations of modern tourists. However, more efforts are required to make oleotourism a driving force for Mediterranean economic growth, the preservation of its identity, dissemination, and consumers' education. The limitations of this work have to be identified when drafting an exhaustive review of the initiatives on oliveoil tourism at Euro- Mediterranean level. As already pointed out, there exists a plurality of products, resources and initiatives on oleotourism, developed at local and national level, in the olive-growing countries. In addition, this work adopts a descriptive approach and employs a basic methodology in order to provide an initial overview of oleotourism in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In the future, it would be useful to keep exploring this research line in order to increase knowledge about oleotourism, and in particular, insightful to apply different methodologies, such as in-depth interviews addressed to selected agents of olive oil tourism development in the various Euro-Mediterranean countries.

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# WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE EU'S 'SCIENCE DIPLOMACY'? THE LONG MISSION OF EFFECTIVE EU-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND RESEARCH

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Across the policy discourse and academic literature, the popularity of the concept of 'science diplomacy' has overshadowed its utility. This article challenges the portrayal of 'science diplomacy' as a straightforward strategy through the examination of the foreign policy-scientific cooperation nexus in the EU-Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood. Through a policy documents analysis, the article traces the development of the external dimension of the EU's science policy, i.e. the shaping of the EU's science policy beyond its borders, and the inclusion of science into its foreign policy agenda in the South Mediterranean. The analysis reveals that the EU's enthusiasm for 'science diplomacy' can be related to the EU's internal political goals, rather than any significant change in the policy objectives or policy tools. Moreover, a strong cooperation in science and research between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours was contingent on friendly relations, rather than capable of improving conflicts and tensions. The conclusion suggests to focus on building the practical (civilian) impact of genuine scientific cooperation in the aftermath of an uncritical promotion of 'science diplomacy'.



*Key words:* EU foreign policy; Southern Mediterranean; external science policy; scientific cooperation; science, technology and innovation; Euro-Mediterranean.

## INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the notion of ‘science diplomacy’ has seen a rise, but recently also its demise. The term ‘science diplomacy’ describing any activity concerned with international aspects of scientific cooperation was introduced by the UK Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 2010, and quickly found supporters. A key one among them was the EU during the Juncker Commission in the period 2014-2019, particularly in its relationship with the Mediterranean region (EC, 2017). ‘Science diplomacy’ was used to both describe existing efforts and to aspire ambitions as diverse as those of increasing visibility of science globally, exerting economic influence on other major actors and using scientists to enhance peace. The scholarly literature engaging with the term has moved from endorsing and mapping the concept (Berg, 2010; Dolan, 2012; Turekian et al., 2015; van Langehove, 2016a; van Langehove, 2016b; López de San Román and Schunz, 2017; Ruffini, 2017) to gradually developing more nuanced appraisals of the rhetoric surrounding the concept (Copeland, 2016; Moro-Martín, 2017; Rungius and Flink, 2020; Flink, 2020). This recent literature has revealed the fuzziness of the term and the inaccurate assumptions enshrined in it, and has warned from expectations that science serves as an idealized cure to the multiple complexities shaping the world’s societal and socio-ecological interactions.

What has so far remained under-explored in the literature is an account of how (once) discrete fields of science policy and foreign policy interacted over time. This is valuable because it depicts the ‘operationalisation’ of science diplomacy and bridges the gap between the high-level policy statements propounding ‘science diplomacy’ and a conceptual analysis of its discourse. It contributes to the academic literature dealing with the policy nexus between foreign and science policy (Wagner, 2002; Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005; Flink and Schreiter, 2010; Geeraert and



Drieskens, 2016; López de San Román and Schunz, 2017; Ruffini, 2017), particularly by offering new findings on the causal relationship between the diplomatic efforts and international scientific cooperation, and highlighting the role of power, interests and norms in the types of foreign policy tools. This is all the more relevant, since the EU's cooperation between science and foreign policy has been far from systematic (Stein, 2002). Moreover, also the influential literature on the EU's Southern neighbourhood policy (Bicchi and Gillespie, 2011; Bicchi and Lavenex, 2015; Gillespie and Volpi, 2017) has so far paid only marginal attention to the role of scientific relations in political relations (Cf. El-Zoheiry, 2015).

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This article explores the evolution of 'science diplomacy' in the context of the cooperation between the EU and its Southern neighbourhood region.<sup>1</sup> It traces the development of the external dimension of the EU's science policy (the shaping the EU's science policy beyond its borders) and the inclusion of scientific cooperation into the EU's foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> The article focuses on

- 1 The region is composed of states surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. The coverage of Turkey is not as detailed in this article because while Turkey is part of the EU's foreign policy for the Mediterranean, it has also pursued a bilateral relationship with the EU. Its Accession negotiations started in 2005 and are currently stalled, subject to the EU's condition that Turkey applies the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus. In the context of this overview, it is interesting that the only chapter that has been closed is the one on Science and Research.
- 2 An examination of the EU's policy in the South Mediterranean is complex from the point of view of legal accuracy and terminology. The EU's institutions and legal basis have changed over time and so have competences in the area of relations with countries and actors outside the EU. The article is focussed on examining the relevance of science in the relationships between the EU and South Mediterranean, to which both the terms 'external relations' and 'foreign policy' should be applied, given the applicable legal base at the time. However, to enhance clarity in the context of the purpose of the article, a generic use of 'foreign policy' is applied (e.g. European Parliament. Fact Sheets on the European Union: Foreign policy: aims, instruments and achievements. Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/158/foreign-policy-aims-instruments-and-achievements>. The deployment of 'external science policy' relates to the implementation of a science policy outside the EU borders.

the Euro-Mediterranean region as a case in point, considering it as a foreign policy object of the EU (Bojinović, 2015) and acknowledging that it has been specifically targeted by the ambitions of the EU's science diplomacy (Moedas, 2017). The analysis examines the EU strategic policy documents relating to its internal science policy (mostly the Framework Programmes outlining multi-year plans for science and research) and to its foreign policy in the EU's Southern neighbourhood region, to discover how science was envisaged to be used for foreign policy purposes and how foreign policy was meant to be used to support science. More concretely, it seeks to identify references to an international dimension in the EU's science policy and remarks regarding science in the EU's foreign policy documents. The analysis of documents does not seek references to 'science diplomacy', but instead attempts to construct the meaning of it. It asks what place have policy domains of science, technology, research and innovation had in the EU's relations in its neighbouring region; how have they shaped or been shaped by the EU's foreign policy; and whether the ideas introduced by 'science diplomacy' have brought or promise to bring any novel approaches or progress to the agenda. It is appropriate to note that within the EU, the policy of science has undergone various transformations and marriages with other popular terms, such that references to science and technology (S&T), research and development (R&D) and science and innovation can all be found (Science and Public Policy 2002; Borrás 2002). Following this introduction, the next section (2) offers a narrative on the interplay between science and foreign policy in the EU-Mediterranean relationships. The subsequent section (3) reflects on the impact of the emergence of the term 'science diplomacy' on the incumbent interactions. The conclusion highlights the questions implied in the nexus between science and foreign policy that deserve more attention than they received so far.



## GROWING INTERPLAY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

### *A period of partnership*

The early attempts by the European Communities (now the EU) to coherently engage with the Mediterranean date to 1970s, when Global Mediterranean Policy encompassed a series of bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with most third Mediterranean countries. However, it was the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that represents a milestone for the EU's relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries.<sup>3</sup> The EMP was a foreign policy initiative running in parallel to the process of preparing Central and Eastern European States for accession, replacing bilateral relations between the EU Member States and the South Mediterranean countries with a multilateral policy and a common approach to the region. The EMP can be praised not only for conceiving 'neighbours' beyond those linked to the EU by land (Barbe, 1996), but also for its ambition of conducting friendly and truly cooperative Euro-Mediterranean relations. The principles of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation stood at the centre of the policy, with the objective of creating a Mediterranean region of peace, stability and shared prosperity (Barcelona declaration, 1995).

The ambition of the EMP encompassed scientific cooperation. The latter was part of the EMP both as a means for advancing science and socioeconomic development, and as conducive to bringing "peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other" (Barcelona declaration, 1995). Cooperation in science between the EU and the South Mediterranean countries was built, "taking account of the principle of mutual advantage", and envisaged instruments, such as "joint research projects". Although the then valid

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3 The intention to establish a new framework for its relations with Mediterranean countries was launched at the European Council in Lisbon in June 1992.



Framework Programme (FP4) was offering a platform for co-operation, the EMP states had no obvious preference for EU's instruments and appeared to leave the policy open to a joint vision. This is fully in line with the principle of "mutual benefit" which was central to the FP4 in relation to third countries and international organisations.

The EMP's conception of science both as an end in itself and as a medium to foster people-to-people relations is reflective of the optimistic political outlook at the time and was possible because of that context. A truly fruitful multilateral scientific cooperation, as could be read into the EMP, was dependent on and a product of a considerable political effort. The launch of the EMP coincided with the hopes for the Arab-Israeli reconciliation, attempted through the later ill-fated Oslo Peace accords. It was just then that the idea of the Arab-Israeli scientific collaboration was born, eventually leading to the region's first synchrotron light source – SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East)<sup>4</sup>, modelled after the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) (Sesame 2018).

The commitment to promote scientific and technological co-operation internationally, both to reinforce Community capacities and those of the partners, was scaled up in the subsequent Framework Programme (FP5, covering the period between 1998 and 2002) with more instruments, funds and vigour. The Mediterranean countries constituted a specific group among the EU's 'third countries' and science and technology represented the core of the EMP. The thematic priorities for research were selected through a dialogue between all the countries involved and encompassed themes, such as socio-economic modernisation, preserving and using cultural heritage and regional environmental sustainability. Expected outcomes of cooperation in this period were increased training opportunities for researchers,

4 SESAME is a partnership between Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey that aims to create top research career opportunities in the region and serves as a prime model for interstate scientific collaboration.

research in support of regional collaboration activities as well as tools and decision support systems, all geared towards a progress of the region as a whole.

*Development of an external science policy*

The EMP was supplanted by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003.<sup>5</sup> The introduction of the ENP presented more than a semantic change in the EU's foreign policy approach in preparation for the EU's internal changes, namely its biggest enlargement to come in 2004.<sup>6</sup> The stated ultimate objective of the ENP was similar to the one of the EMP: the new policy aspired to create in the neighbouring region 'a ring of friends' – sharing everything with the Union but institutions (Prodi, 2002), and creating a "zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood" (EC, 2003). With the exception of Turkey, which had the prospect of the EU's membership, the status of the countries in the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia) remained unaffected. Nevertheless, the ENP represented also a change in style.

The ENP's approach in accomplishing the same policy goals departed from one based on the principle of partnership. Heavily influenced by the security issues and political events in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the ENP was built on the premise that "[t]he EU has a *duty*, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours, to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism" (EC 2003). Contrary to the language of cooperation and dialogue propounded earlier, the tone reflects a stronger sense of EU's determination to deliver its pre-set goals and impose expectations on its partners. The

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5 In parallel with the ENP, the EU conducts bilateral policies with the neighbouring countries. They can be parties to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) (some of them to become parties to Association Agreements with the EU) or to Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA).

6 The enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania that followed in 2007, was also already foreseen.



EU's policy in the Mediterranean became much more prescriptive and more of a one-way process. While the principle of common ownership continued to underlie the drafting of the principal instrument in the ENP – the so-called “action plans”, there were effectively limited opportunities for their bilateral negotiation because the objectives and means of cooperation had to correspond to the options available in the EU's framework offer. In addition, the EU introduced a much contested ‘conditionality’ approach (known also as ‘more for more’ approach), on which better compliance was rewarded with more funds (Kelley, 2006).

Scientific cooperation within the ENP played a role of a tool in achieving regional and sub-regional cooperation, whose final purpose was to contribute to stability, security and sustainable development (EC, 2003), with the first two objectives increasingly taking the lead (EC, 2009). The primary tool for implementing the cooperation with neighbouring countries in the field of science and technology was the formation of the European Research Area (ERA). ERA was built as an EU internal tool and was also at the focus of the 6th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (RTD), covering the period 2002 to 2006. At the general level, support was to be concentrated on the structural and institutional capacity-building activities.

The implementation of the EU's ambition in scientific cooperation revealed its clear preference to deploy its own structures in that policy field and thereby to retain full control over that cooperation. The cooperation with the Mediterranean countries begun to be conceived within the extension of the EU's internal science policy – through making them eligible for funding in the new Framework programme and including them in the ERA. The ENP expressed a commitment to a common political language of ‘shared values’, namely “democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law” (EC, 2003). But the EU *presupposed* that the shared values underlied all of the actions and goals in the ENP, rather than seeking them through policies. Only gradually, the EU came to recognise that the achievement of ultimate objectives – political association, deeper economic integration, access to the EU internal market, increased mobility and more

people-to-people contacts – depended precisely “on the extent to which common European values [were] effectively shared by the neighbouring countries” (Petrov, 2015: 291). The potential role of scientists for advancing those shared values, however, went long unnoticed. Not even when the EU resorted to a more cooperative tone in the implementation of the ENP in 2004 (EC, 2004) that the EU recognised the scientists’ potential for building trust. Furthermore, when the EU sought alternative ways to ‘conditionality’ in order to advance fundamental reforms in countries that lacked political will, it relied on civil, economic and social actors as the more obvious partners (EC, 2015), but did not mention the scientists explicitly.

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During the process of bilateral negotiations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries during 2003–2005, research and development (or science and technology) were regularly flagged as a priority of the neighbouring countries. The EU committed to developing an ‘ambitious’ cooperation in this field with the ultimate goal being “sustainable and equitable economic development” (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). To achieve it, the priorities for the EU were the integration of the partner countries’ research entities in the ERA, education reform, university exchanges and scholarships (ibid.). Among those harmonising actions, a curious diplomatic plan can be found for “integrat[ing] former weapons of mass destruction scientists into the international science communities and support[ing] the civilian application of their sensitive knowledge” (ibid.). These can be seen as the first shapes of the EU’s active attempt to situate the scientific cooperation within its high politics and the security issue.

As the ENP progressed, the EU expressed the desire for the policy to move beyond being a matter for officials and politicians and to have also a ‘human face’. The idea was that the ENP should offer opportunities for citizens of the EU and of the neighbouring countries “to interact, and to learn more about each other’s societies and understand better each other’s cultures” (EC, 2006a). In the context of this more ‘popular’ policy approach, the main focus in implementing the ENP in science, research and innovation was in mobility of researchers and



academics (EC, 2010a). However, it is striking to note that the EU was focused only on ways of making “it easier, cheaper and faster for our neighbours to enter the EU” and on promoting those tools that attract the EU’s partners, rather than interested in pursuing any more balanced exchange to occur more equally in both ways (ibid.). The potential of mobility was conceived exclusively in terms of mobility *into* the EU, without this being problematized or even recognised.

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The consolidation of an expanding EU external science policy was the goal of the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme (FP7, adopted in 2005, covering the period 2007–2013). FP7 aimed at increasing the number of agreements in the fields of science and technology between the EU and neighbouring countries. It also sought to ensure a more comprehensive support of ‘scientific diasporas’ of European researchers abroad and foreign researchers within Europe. Overall, some years into the ENP and at the outset of the FP7, international research programmes gradually acquired new roles – those of expanding the interaction of the EU with the researchers from the third countries (both through a further opening-up to international cooperation and through dedicated actions), based on the belief that there is mutual benefit in addressing specific global or regional issues. Additionally, international research programmes with outreach beyond the EU borders were increasingly serving also the European research excellence and competitiveness, and bolstering the image of the EU as a global actor. The Lisbon Treaty (signed in 2007) constitutionally enshrined this ambition (TEU Arts 3.3 and 3.5) and defined the tools to attain it (TFEU Title XIX; Arts 179–190).

An expanding role for science in the EU’s foreign policy was not impacted by the establishment, in 2008/2009, of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as a focal point of the Euro-Mediterranean multilateralism through the interaction between the 28 European Union Member States and 15 countries from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Much more than the set-up of the UfM, it was the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 that constitute the next milestone in the implementation of the ENP. The Arab Spring was interpreted by the



EU as an opportunity “for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours [...] rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values” (EC, 2011a). Although the EU committed to “faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms” through the launch of the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” (ibid.), neither the pace of reform increased nor the change has been noticeable.

The most significant impact of the renewed approach was that the EU policy effectively became divided between one led in relation to the governments and another one in relation to the civil society (EC, 2011b). The EU's determination was to “curtai[l] relations with governments engaged in violations of human rights and democracy standards, including by [...] strengthen[ing] further its support to civil society” (EC, 2011b). Interestingly, the scientists – as a parallel sphere that is institutionalised but not authoritative – were not considered to form part of the civil society. Fostering science itself was not mentioned as a priority of the EU in the region, unlike democracy, growth, job creation, microfinance and also higher education (EU, 2011).

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*Growing expectations on science and emergence of 'science diplomacy'*

The process of mainstreaming international scientific cooperation was significantly accelerated by the launch of the Europe 2020 strategy (EC, 2010b), which situated research and innovation as sources of renewed growth out of the economic crisis (Ulnicane, 2016). The term 'science diplomacy' was introduced, and presented as an important instrument of soft power, a tool for improving relations with key countries and regions, and an accelerator of business opportunities as well as new market development (EC, 2012). Increased expectations of science were certainly reflected in the launch of the 8<sup>th</sup> Framework programme titled Horizon2020 (covering the period of 2014–20) (Regulation 1291/2013). The following tasks for international cooperation in science can be discerned: that it contributes to achieving the EU's internal strategy (strengthening the EU's





excellence), that it will resolve global societal challenges and also that it would support the EU's foreign and development policy objectives. More than any previous framework programmes, Horizon2020 demonstrated an ever-closer interplay between individual policies, and reconfirmed a commitment to cooperation with third countries and international organisations. Among the key activities to foster international cooperation was a full integration of four countries from the Mediterranean into Horizon2020 under the same conditions as EU Member States, namely Turkey, Israel, Algeria and Tunisia.

Interestingly, the EU's foreign policy perspective in that same period did not share the same perception of science. Both the 2015 ENP Review (EC, 2015) and the launch of the foreign policy strategy in 2016 (EEAS, 2016) not only do not use the term 'science diplomacy', but also reveal a marginal role for science as a platform for engagement, rather than a transformative factor in the accomplishment of the major goals. The renewed ENP portrays research, science and innovation as crucial in the creation of decent and sustainable jobs, but it reminds us that stabilisation remains "the most urgent challenge" and the "main political priority" (EC, 2015), to which science does not contribute in a significant way. The key factors affecting stabilisation in the EU's belief are poverty, inequality, a perceived sense of injustice, corruption, weak economic and social development and lack of opportunity (EC, 2015).

However, away from the strict domain of foreign policy, the discourse on 'science diplomacy' also started developing a competitive nature, alongside a cooperative one. The EU did not shy away from promoting to its neighbours its own concepts (such as 'smart specialisation')<sup>7</sup>, initiatives (such as the Enterprise

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7 The EU's concept 'smart specialisation' was developed in the EU's regional policy as a tool for designing innovation and investment strategies of regions, relying on an entrepreneurial and bottom-up collaboration between various sectors where they have competitive advantages. European Commission (EC) Regional Policy contributing to smart growth in Europe 2020, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 6. 10. 2010, COM (2010) 553 final.



Europe Network) and tools (Framework programmes). While mutual interest and mutual ownership are advocated, and sustainable development represents the overarching goal, these goals are matched, if not overridden, by the EU's concerns "to reinforce, widen and extend the excellence of the Union's science base and [...] secure Europe's long term competitiveness and well-being" (CEU, 2013). There is a clear expectation that "activities at international level enhance the competitiveness of European industry by promoting the take-up and trade of novel technologies, for instance through the development of world-wide standards and interoperability guidelines, and by promoting the acceptance and deployment of European solutions outside Europe" (EU, 2013b). The EU's concern for its own influence in global policy and economic relations are just as important to highlight as its expectations over cooperation.

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The EU's approach has not changed significantly with the latest science and foreign policy documents, albeit with a scarcer a reference to 'science diplomacy'. The most recent Framework programme titled Horizon Europe (covering the period 2021-27) retains a commitment to an ever-closer international cooperation beyond the EU borders. It also assumes that synergies between different EU programmes and instruments, including those relating to foreign policy, take place in the context of effective science-policy interface (EC, 2018). At similar tone and expectations are set in the new foreign policy document for the region titled *A renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean* (EC and HR, 2021). This sees research and innovation as having benefits for the achievement of more resilient and inclusive growth, as well as the creation of sustainable employment opportunities. It promises to step up the dedication to innovation and science as a way to creating a knowledge society and economy, mostly through the Framework Programme Horizon Europe.

A notable exception from the scientific cooperation between the EU and Southern Mediterranean being limited to the EU's tools, is the existence of the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) – a €400 million partnership between some EU and certain non-EU

Mediterranean countries.<sup>8</sup> PRIMA exists since 2017 (but with negotiations dating to early 2010s) and aims at supporting research and innovation actions that will result in sustainable water management and food production. PRIMA is devoted to the principles of mutual benefit, equal-footing partnerships, co-ownership, co-decision, and co-financing, as well as excellence and added value (EC, 2018). It is a role model of co-financing, as it is financed in just under 50% from the EU's Horizon 2020 funds, while the rest comes from all other participating countries. These themes for cooperation had been selected jointly as being of common interest and mutual benefit. The participating states recognised the initiative's significant potential for enhancing the stability of the region and its sustainable economic and social development (Council of the European Union, 2014).

## UNDERSTANDING 'SCIENCE DIPLOMACY'

The EU's promulgation of 'science diplomacy' can be related to a specific period, rather than any significant change in the course of policy. The period corresponds to launch of the growth-centred strategy Europe2020 in 2010 and the subsequent mandate of the Juncker Commission and more particularly, its Commissioner of research, science and innovation Carlos Moedas (Moedas, 2014; Moedas, 2016; ERC 2016; EC, 2017). The term was introduced and popularised without any significant change in the use of the policy tools. None of the established approaches, such as mobility and cooperation on joint research projects, had been replaced; no new approaches had been introduced and the objectives of policies had effectively not changed. The new policy discourse laid claims to existing and running cases of effective science cooperation, such as SESAME or PRIMA, and relabelled these as 'science diplomacy'.

Rather than by introducing a new phenomenon, the enthusiasm for 'science diplomacy' as a term can be explained by the

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8 There were initially 14 countries participating, but the number has since grown to 19.



political motivation to highlight that science has a place in relations with the neighbourhood. Cooperation in science and research were constitutive to the EU integration and were driving the interaction between the European and national dimensions especially in the early years of the integration (Guzzetti, 1995). Some decades later, science had been promoted as a driver of the EU's progress, for example through the concepts of "knowledge society" (introduced by the 2000 Lisbon Strategy) or "Innovation Union" (associated with the launch of Europe 2020 Strategy in 2010). As the policy field of science came to be positioned to the heart of today's EU integration project and its ambitions, this has spilled into its foreign policy. Furthermore, the rise of 'science diplomacy' is likely to be part and parcel of the Juncker's Commission's effort to create a more political role for itself: mainstreaming science into 'high politics' was a useful instrument for empowering the Commission vis-à-vis member states and the EU vis-à-vis other global players.

The political motivation in the EU to highlight the importance of science has come after years of an ever-closer connection between science and foreign policy as spontaneous developments. Pursuing excellent science has always led to international activities (Wagner, 2002). The people's attitudes were increasingly more open to international cooperation (Bucham, 2009). While science policy was initially an internal policy, this has gradually become externalised and research objectives became integrated into the EU relations with its neighbourhood, including through the expanding EU's external competence (Bretherton and Vogler, 2004). The EU's aspiration for a coherent foreign policy is not only its political preference (CEU, 2001; EC, 2006b; EEAS, 2016), but also its legal obligation (Arts 3 and 13, TEU). This requires that research and technological development should contribute towards the economic goals of a more competitive industry (179 TFEU). These instructions are consistent with the EU's growing ambition of becoming a global actor (Ginsberg, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Koehler, 2010; Godzimirski, 2016; Adelle et al., 2017). As such, the use of 'science diplomacy' in regional political discourses was politically driven and is a manifestation of the EU's ambition and power to influence them.



## CONCLUSION

This article has set off to discover the usefulness of ‘science diplomacy’ as a proxy to describe highly dissimilar efforts at the intersection between foreign policy and science, and has examined its value in the context of the EU-South Mediterranean relations. It depicted different phases of the EU’s engagement with its Mediterranean neighbours in the area of science, and showed how they were impacted by the EU’s growing external science policy as well as an attempt to use science as a foreign policy tool. The EU’s promotion of ‘science diplomacy’ had a limited lifespan, after which the goals and instruments of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships remain as relevant as ever, albeit influenced by a more assertive attitude to attain the EU’s competitive advantage. This article has suggested to limit the understanding the ‘science diplomacy’ predominantly to a rhetorical innovation.

A closer overview of the expectations of “science diplomacy” nevertheless reveals some insights into its operation in the Mediterranean region. The analysis has confirmed that cooperation in science and research between the EU and the Mediterranean countries appeared to be highly susceptible to the political relations: strong cooperation in science was contingent on politics, rather than capable of impacting it. At the multilateral and bilateral level, cooperation in science was best and thriving when political climate in the region was good or relations stable. To the contrary, in case of an intricate political situation in a country, such as with Libya after 2011, or across the region, such as after the 2001, cooperation among scientists was scarce and fell short of easing the tensions. The proposition that international cooperation in research and innovation have improved relations with key countries and regions, enshrined in the ‘science diplomacy’ discussions (RS/AAAS 2010), is difficult to confirm in the present case study.

An immediate policy implication of this finding is the acknowledgement that ‘science diplomacy’ may risk not delivering on the promise and may induce political expectations in the work of scientists, which in turn can invoke a backlash



(Moro-Martín, 2017). Instead of propounding the mantra, we would do better to promote more realistic expectations of science and research and exploration of the means that enable us to continue benefitting from science across a region. Does the EU's emphasis on the significance of science impact on the perceptions of the political actors and civil society, who influence the policies? (Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta, 2009) How to better ensure that scientific cooperation, in which the EU is involved, positively impacts people's everyday lives in the neighbouring countries without resolving the political tensions? How to expand, perhaps also beyond energy, water management and food production, the mutually beneficial forms of technical cooperation with practical impacts for citizens (which justifies the advancement of science)? An obvious opportunity for effective science cooperation is the response to the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has generated an extremely dynamic and rapidly developing research landscape. Data and results sharing, including in the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, offer a lot of scope for effective cooperation. This certainly re-opens the questions of (how to create) co-ownership, co-funding and genuine cooperation (El-Zoheiry, 2015), in place of assistance, prescriptiveness, and competition that have marked periods of the EU's past engagement with the region. These difficult questions have survived the era of enthusiasm over 'science diplomacy'.

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# TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM AND REGIONAL SECURITY: COOPERATION AND DIVERSITY BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

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BY FRÉDÉRIC VOLPI (ED.)

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US\$9.21 [kindle]*

The Arab Spring and related events have hit the Euro-Mediterranean region hard. In the words of James Derderian, 2011 was a “monster year,” with millions of people being forced to flee their home countries. One in 35 people on the planet is a migrant, and the number of migrants will reach 230 million people by 2050 according to United Nations forecasts. There are 60 million migrants in the European Union, and the countries of the global North are experiencing significant migration pressure. Relations in the Euro-Mediterranean region are based on the post-colonial settlements of the 1960s. This settlement was marked by a web of bilateral relationships between the metropolitan former imperial cores and the newly independent countries in the South. The Barcelona Declaration on the Development of Partnership was signed in 1995 and was meant to alter this pattern of relations and construct a cooperative institutional framework that included political cooperation, and thereby create a secure zone of economic, social and humanitarian relations. To its credit, this timely book addresses the painful consequences of the Arab Spring and related events in the Euro-Mediterranean region in terms of the integrative process.

The current climate of distrust between Morocco and the European Union over Spain’s hosting of a POLISARIO leader,



the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean and in the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, the ongoing and unresolved problems emanating from the Arab Spring, as well as the French decision to withdraw from the counter terrorist mission in the Sahel have given this book a new urgency and renewed relevance. The book touches upon the attempts to foster greater integration between the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean with Europe and the hopes that the integrative process would help prevent some of the very same problems that have given the book a renewed lease of urgency and relevance.

But that hope failed to materialize. The European Union enlargement in 2004 subsumed the Barcelona Process under the neighborhood policy, leading to competition over priorities between the countries East of Europe and those South of the Mediterranean. Additionally, EU member states' diverging interests in the Southern Mediterranean, alongside differences over civilization and identity complicated the picture greatly. There was also controversy over democratization and its relationship to security both within the European Union and between the European states and their North African and Eastern Mediterranean partners. These factors acting together bled the Barcelona Process of its relevance.

The European Union's response to the Libyan crisis of 2011 marked a clear transition. Libya was an important oil supplier to the EU, but the latter-imposed sanctions and supported the anti-Gaddafi rebel movements in accordance with UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973. But in many ways, this was done without a clear consensus over military operations, and the EU instead concentrated on humanitarian efforts under the umbrella of EUFOR-Libya. Military operations became the purview of NATO only. The conflict in Syria displayed the same dynamics but in a harsher tone. Aside from freezing the association agreement with Syria, the European Union has failed to adopt a common narrative concerning the war against the people and government of Syria. With both countries in flames, the area was opened for intervention by external actors such as the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, as well as armed Islamist movements like Hezbollah, ISIS, and Al Qaeda. Refugees continue to

flee both countries to Turkey and Europe often at great risk. The Euro-Mediterranean region is now facing severe security challenges due to uncontrolled refugee flows, terrorism and instability as a result. The book adds to the academic debates that attempt to address this instability.

“Transnational Islam and Regional Security: Cooperation and Diversity between Europe and North Africa” consists of nine chapters including an introduction. The editor, Frederic Volpi, sets the tone for the book in the introduction. The book is written in the Copenhagen School tradition of international relations, which represents a “liberal social constructivist” trend within international studies theory. The chapters include: the NATO-Maghreb relations, the role of the Barcelona conference in 2005, the transformation of the terrorist state of Libya, radical Islam and inter-Mediterranean relations.

Volpi discusses the post-9/11 transformation of terrorism from targeting the state to targeting people, and the expansion of its geography from the Middle East and North Africa to the whole world. Volpi places the responsibility for this transformation on the policies of the states of the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Aside from addressing issues of identity and the construction of knowledge, Volpi highlights the dilemma felt by North African states, which generally cooperate on counter-terrorism with Europe, but see it as a source of their problems in terms of radicalization.

Michael Willis addresses “Containing Radicalism through the Political Process in North Africa.” Willis uses a liberal framework to analyze case studies in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. He argues that, in these countries, involving radical groups in the political process was meant to create an illusion of participation. The author argues that in Tunisia, this policy was successful, but the Islamist Ennahda party continues to be excluded. In contrast, Algeria chose to combat its Islamists, resulting in a bloody civil war. The military’s predominance in Algeria may have led to the different outcome in the country. Algeria was also unable to address its economic problems. Morocco, in contrast, has a long history of controlling radical groups through legal processes and through cooption. Combining both political and security

measures, the country was able to contain the Islamist movement. A key factor in the decision-making of all three states was the United States' post-9/11 counter-terrorism policy. Willis notes that the North African states focused on political control instead of modernisation. Citing the history of the United Kingdom, he argues that "liberalisation and democratic reforms should lead to greater political and social inclusiveness, which will lead to a decrease in support for radical agents." The author is however open to the idea that democracy can sometimes lead to undesirable outcomes. For example, Gaza voted for Hamas in 2006, and Iraq selected the Dawa party and related movements in 2003. Nonetheless, the author is correct to point out the link between illusory politics and radicalization.

Far less stable today than its four peers to the West, Libya is addressed by Luis Martinez' "Libya: Conversion of a Terrorist State." A strong case study, the chapter details how Libya emerged from the shadows of being a terrorist rogue state into an accepted member of the international community after 2001. Col. Gaddafi was keen on preserving his power and had a desire to avoid Saddam's fate. The country remains divided today into its ethnic, tribal and clan components, as well as by region and ideology. According to Martinez, the collapse of oil prices and economic sanctions forced Gaddafi to stop supporting terrorist movements. While the study is comprehensive, it needs to address the issue of governance, foreign intervention, and the use of terrorism as a tool of international political blackmail. In the same Copenhagen vein, Bicchi and Martin argue in their article, "Talking Tough or Talking Together? European Security Discourses towards the Mediterranean," that political Islam has been progressively securitised in the United Kingdom while Europe lacked a coherent policy towards it. 9/11 brought about difficult questions concerning the existence of a clash between the West and the Islamic World.

Using a historical method, the chapter looks at the policies pursued by European countries towards Islamist groups. The continued legality of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Europe is used as an example of a multi-factor approach. The group is not recognized as a terrorist movement in the United Kingdom, and the policy

towards it is offered as an example of a “new security game.” They add that the war in Iraq “sour[ed] relations between Western and Muslim countries.”

Focusing on the role of NATO in “NATO, Maghreb and Europe,” Benantar looks at NATO’s relationship with the countries of the MENA region. The author uses 9/11 to divide the chapter into two periods of time, and argues that 9/11 led to fundamental changes in the relationship, arguing that there were “competition and interference, rather than complementarity of various regional initiatives.” The states of the region have more or less written off regional integration, and instead focus on avoiding being listed as rogue states by the United States. This dynamic unspools itself in MENA countries efforts to prevent Washington from supporting internal opposition, and bolstering the legitimacy of their own internal struggle against terrorism, often over the efforts of regional rivals. Applying the Copenhagen approach directly, the author concludes that despite 9/11, the Euro-Mediterranean is not a “true regional security system,” and that current circumstances do not allow for the creation of a “Mediterranean strategic identity.” The Maghreb itself is far from being a “security community,” to use the words of Karl Deutsch, but it can be considered a “security complex” to use the words of Buzan, because there are common and competitive interests at the same time across the two shores. As for the West’s motivation for deepening relations with the southern countries of the region, the author lists several factors. Firstly, the security of NATO depends on the policy and state of the East and South. Secondly, after 9/11, there is a need to confirm that the South is not the enemy.

The centrality of Spain in the relationship is highlighted by Jordan and Horsburgh’s chapter, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism.” Zemni’s chapter stands out because it focuses on Islam rather than the politics, but it uses Morocco and Belgium as case studies for the threats used by Jihadis and the insecurity they engender in the Islamist movement. Collyer in contrast focuses on the effects of securitisation of the Migrants trying to make their way to Europe through Spain. Gillespie’s “Onward but not Upward: The Barcelona Summit of 2005” deals with the lasting

bitterness surrounding the definition of terrorism. This failure to reach a common definition of terrorism is labeled a “missed opportunity.”

The book makes a significant contribution towards understanding the relationships that cut across the Mediterranean and the challenges posed by radical Islamist movements to Europe and North Africa after 9/11. It outlines the successes and failures of cooperation between governments in the region. The work is theoretically rigorous and steeped in sound scholarly methods and techniques. The authors discuss the relationships between Islamist movements, states and societies. They also address the factors behinds political violence and radicalism. There are, of course, some minor weaknesses. The book does not include survey methods, therefore there is no thorough account of the views of the concerned population. The book concerns itself exclusively with policy-makers and elites and their role in constructing polities and identities. The book also lacks the voice of the victims of radical extremist violence and their views. Economic integration and the ongoing security coordination are also not deeply addressed. Given that the book was published in 2008, it would also be useful to consider a second edition that takes the last 8 years into account. “Transnational Islam and Regional Security: Cooperation and Diversity between Europe and North Africa” illustrates how the problems of the region, when not solved in time, become progressively harder to solve.

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# CAPACITY BUILDING FOR HEALTHY SEAS: SUMMER SCHOOL ON SUSTAINABLE BLUE ECONOMY IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN

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## BLUE SKILLS AND CAREERS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SUSTAINABLE BLUE ECONOMY

The need for an urgent transformation of all maritime and coastal activities in line with the objectives of the UN Sustainable Development Goals - sustainable resource use, climate change mitigation and adaptation, protection of marine and coastal ecosystems and biodiversity, improved livelihoods and social inclusion - is currently among the key areas of common interest in the Euro-Mediterranean region. This is confirmed both at the level of the Union for the Mediterranean (which adopted a Ministerial declaration on Sustainable Blue Economy on 2 February 2021) and at the level of the EU (which confirmed the important role for marine and maritime sectors for the accomplishment of the EU's internal strategy *European Green Deal*, and for its external cooperation with its Mediterranean neighbours; see Communication by the Commission *Transforming the EU's Blue Economy for a Sustainable Future* (COM(2021) 240 final) and *Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighborhood: New Agenda for the Mediterranean* (JOIN(2021) 2 final)).

The role of capacity building in that agenda is clearly acknowledged, but it is only slowly being rolled out. The documents mention the need for building up the pool of qualified people to develop the prospective sectors of the blue economy, a task



that includes the retraining and reskilling of the existing workforce, and improving the public perception of careers in the blue economy. Furthermore, the high potential of research and innovation for the sustainable development of the blue economy is recognised in the region. Yet, the implementation of that commitment is also gradual at best. Only a handful of programmes have been developed in the past years with a significant surge foreseen for the period after 2021 at both the EU and the Euro-Mediterranean level.

While widely mentioned, the notion of “blue skills” is fraught with questions over what these really entail and how to effectively build them. There has been no agreement over the content of a kind of a blue economy competence framework that would enable individuals to fill the positions across sectors that are being mapped with increasing accuracy (see UfM, 2021). Such a competence framework could outline the required knowledge, skills and attitudes as well as contribute to fostering the employability of individuals possessing them.

This note reports on an implemented training that seeks to contribute to the required “blue skills” and the deliberations over how to train individuals at the level of youth, specifically master’s and PhD students. The approach taken in the described training could be a useful starting point for future trainings and educational initiatives designed in this domain, and a reference point for the adjustment of existing programmes. As such, this note aims to contribute to a more targeted and goal-oriented capacity building in the domain of the blue economy in the Mediterranean.

## SUMMER SCHOOL 2021 DESIGN AND EXPERIENCE

The training described here is the Summer School on Sustainable Blue Economy, jointly organised by the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI), Slovenia and National Institute of Oceanography and Applied Geophysics (OGS), Italy in June 2021.<sup>1</sup> This was the third time that the two institutions have joined

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1 I thank Giulia Massolino from OGS for revising this note to ensure a valid presentation of the event.

forces to organise a summer school on the blue economy, apart from each conducting its own activities in the related areas. For EMUNI, the summer school took place within the framework of its three-year project BLUES (Jean Monnet Module, co-financed by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union) and for OGS, the summer school is a result of its project BlueSkills, co-funded by the Italian Ministry for University and Research, with the support of the Central European Initiative (CEI), and labelled by the Union for the Mediterranean. Various funding opportunities, carefully combined to seek synergies and avoid duplication, have allowed the summer school to open a call for a programme that is fully free of charge for about 25-30 selected participants, covering not only the costs of a programme of about 60 hours of online and face-to-face teaching and field trips, but also the costs related to travel and accommodation.

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Due to ongoing restrictions related to travel and the conduct of activities, the organisers took a decision after the selection process was concluded and just a few weeks before the planned launch of the summer school, to not host any parts of the summer school in person in Trieste and Piran respectively, but rather, to re-adjust the programme to take place fully online. This allowed for a slightly larger number of participants, amounting to 38 confirmed participants from 18 different countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The selection process paid attention to the merit of candidates and their motivation, while also ensuring a wide geographical representation.

The overall goal of the summer school is to support the creation of stable and attractive career pathways and skilled talents that will be needed to support the expansion of marine and maritime sectors. The specific objectives of the summer school were:

- to improve professional skills and competences relevant for the development of the marine and maritime sectors, and ocean governance, in support of the Sustainable Development Goals;
- to gain knowledge of challenges and opportunities in specific marine and maritime sectors;
- to foster networks and partnerships that can help to scale-up activities in support of the sustainable blue economy,



including research, entrepreneurial and communication actions; and

- to stimulate an attitude of active contribution to positive change for the conservation and sustainable use of the Mediterranean Sea.

With the summer school eventually unfolding in the online mode only, the selection of objectives was not affected, but their scope certainly was. The personal experience of places and people would have carried a more positive impact, particularly on the third and fourth objectives, i.e. on the intensity of friendships and professional partnerships, the desire to use them, and on the participants' relation to the sea. There is certainly a limitation to fostering interpersonal skills and emotional experiences in the online environment. A significant weakness of the switch to online mode was also the inability to carry out the specially tailored field trips, which have in the past editions of the training proven to be an important source not only of local-specific knowledge, but also of the application of context-dependent knowledge to new situations.

To address the first and second objectives, the course consisted of a combination of asynchronous and synchronous online learning. The introductory session in the asynchronous mode examined the discourse over "blue economy" in policy literature, the objectives of the legal framework relating to the seas and oceans, and also the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Contrary to the popular discourse on "blue economy", many students were for the first time familiarised with the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, which aimed to establish a legal order that would "facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment." These ultimate goals of applying effort at sea and in the oceans, and the principles of "a just and equitable international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing

countries, whether coastal or land-locked” are all too often forgotten in the fervor to develop blue economy opportunities.

The core of the course consisted of synchronous, non-recorded sessions held over five days, each of which was dedicated to one of the five thematic areas: marine spatial planning, climate change, the seabed, fisheries and plastic pollution. These themes were selected not to indicate priorities, but merely to organise the course around some focus points, and to ensure a number of cross-references among topics and approaches. For the large part, the lecturers were academics and researchers, who introduced their knowledge from their scientific fields and experience from applicative projects. Inevitably, many relevant themes were left out. It seemed important to be transparent about the selected themes with the participants. Interestingly, several themes were picked up by participants in the time dedicated to mentoring. For instance, the concept of multiuse at seas was not discussed in the lecture on marine spatial planning, but was presented through a case study developed by the students themselves.

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As the notion of blue economy cuts across ecological, socio-cultural and economic systems and requirements, interdisciplinarity is believed to be a key defining principle in the teaching of this field. However, true interdisciplinarity is very rarely accomplished among individual lecturers. Instead, the aim of the summer school was to involve in the programme a variety of lecturers, from different backgrounds. In practice, this meant paying particular attention to balancing the predominant profiles of physical and life scientists with those of social scientists and humanities, which tend to be less visible in the perceptions of science underlying the blue economy. By way of example, the discussion on fisheries combined not only ecological modelling, but also the results of fieldwork studying fishing communities in the Northern Adriatic (Istria region) over time. Another valuable method for accomplishing interdisciplinarity in the teaching of blue economy is to encourage academic staff to listen to other lectures outside their field and reflect on them together with participants. Finally, the role of moderation is significant and involves foremost, explaining the intended purpose of the



lecture in the overall programme and stimulating discussion not only after the lecture, but also across the programme.

The interactive lectures held in the mornings were succeeded by a mentoring session, in which students met in smaller groups and developed, under the guidance of the faculty, an output of their choice, related to a research proposal, an entrepreneurial idea or an educational activity. The groups additionally aligned their work independently before presenting a final project on the last day of the summer school. Teamwork resulted in short group presentations, which primarily reflected an awareness of diversity (of challenges) across the Mediterranean, creativity of participants and an understanding of profound interconnections between ecosystems and human activities, including links and conflicts among various human interests at sea. Understandably, the students' output was less proficient at resolving the conflicts and presenting the implementation details. These are inherent in real-life situations and trouble the advancement of a sustainable blue economy.

## MANDATE FOR THE FUTURE

As the seas, which are a fundamental source of ecosystem services, are undergoing intense developmental transformation, capacity building for their sustainable development has become an exigency. This need has been recognised very clearly at the global level, particularly through the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030), and also in the Euro-Mediterranean region. It is time for countries, higher education institutions, vocational education and training (VET) providers, networks of VET providers, international institutions and many other actors to deliver on that need. This note has provided an experience from one concrete training to generate ideas on how it can be done.

Capacity building will include various target groups, from students to the existing labour force, and will have to be particularly inclusive of women. Regardless of the beneficiaries however, it needs to be transnational and interdisciplinary, in line with the nature of the challenges at sea. The educational and reskilling efforts need to cover an awareness of the technology potential at

the global level as well as an awareness of the socio-ecological specificities of the local environments and populations.

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# ABSTRACTS

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN LIBYA

*Anna Molnár, Ivett Szászi, Lilli Takács*

In our paper we aim to examine the three IGOs' contribution to Libyan SSR by providing case studies of their activities carried out in Libya. The starting point of our analysis is the military intervention of 2011 based on UNSCR 1973, since it contributed greatly to the regime change. Even though it is not part of the SSR, its dynamics must be displayed. We identified three stages in the evolution of the Libyan crisis (2011-2014, 2014-2017, 2017-2019), thus the activities of our IGO's are examined separately within each time period. In our paper we build on Law's (2013) guide on SSR field activities and we seek to apply that specifically to the case of Libya. Our aim is to evaluate the variance of SSR activities by comparing the IGOs' theoretical SSR activities to those that were allowed to occur by the circumstances in Libya. Analysing the SSR activities of three different international organizations (European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations) we find that their actual activities and commitments are lagging behind their theoretical commitments towards SSR. Libya has not experienced a truly peaceful period ever since the protests of the Arab Spring broke out in early 2011. The international community contributed significantly to the regime change by intervening militarily. Nevertheless, the military intervention was not followed by a successful state building process. Even though several international organizations are active in Libya and committed to reform the country's security sector, a striking success is still missing.

*Key words:* Security Sector Reform, Libya, United Nations, European Union, North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

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## INTERPRETING THE MEDITERRANEAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE THROUGH STAKEHOLDERS' PARTICIPATION – THE CASE OF VR SAR, CROATIA

*Kristina Afrić Rakitovac, Nataša Urošević, Nikola Vojnović*

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The paper deals with the interpretation of the Mediterranean archaeological landscape in the sustainable development of cultural tourism, as an important attractive factor for tourists visiting countries in the region. It reflects on the possibilities of sustainable tourism valorisation of archaeological sites through participative stakeholders' co-creation. The empirical research focused on the municipality of Vrsar, a typical Mediterranean destination characterised by mass tourism and high seasonality. The observed destination is also marked by an abundance of archaeological sites, which are still not adequately valorised, presented and interpreted. The empirical research, realised through workshops, interviews and questionnaires, has involved all relevant stakeholders (experts, local inhabitants, tourists). All key stakeholders agreed that the main sustainability issues could be improved through the sustainable valorisation of local cultural and natural resources by creating innovative tourism experiences - attracting much interest in participating in this co-creation process. The conducted research indicated the possible models of presentation and interpretation of the local archaeological landscape through archaeological routes connecting the most important sites, participatory experiences such as interactive workshops and living history programmes, and the network of interpretation centres in the function of the future archaeological parks.

*Key words:* archaeological landscape, Mediterranean, cultural tourism, sustainable valorisation, Vrsar, Croatia

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## OLIVE OIL TOURISM IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

*José Manuel Hernández-Mogollón, Elide Di-Clemente, Ana María Campón-Cerro, José Antonio Folgado-Fernández*

This paper explores Extra Virgin Olive Oil (EVOO) as a common example of Euro-Mediterranean heritage and its potential in promoting innovative tourism development initiatives and cooperation in producing areas. The main aim of the work is to highlight the existing



initiatives based on the olive oil heritage of the Euro-Mediterranean producing countries, including Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal as EU member states, and Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic as non-EU states (International Olive Oil Council 2018) with the additional consideration of Lebanon for its solid reputation as an olive oil producer. Through investigative research, this work tries to demonstrate the most outstanding initiatives, products and events related to olive oil and aimed at giving more visibility to its heritage and culture in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The initiatives found show new inputs for the modern tourism systems of the olive-growing areas. The initiatives also point to EVOO being a common heritage that can offer important opportunities to inspire innovative proposals, capable of connecting the Mediterranean countries and of enhancing their common olive-growing identity with suggestive proposals addressed to modern tourists, increasingly interested in getting in contact with authentic heritages and the typical food of the destination they visit.

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*Key words:* Olive-oil tourism, olive-oil culture, tourism management, sustainable tourism development

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## WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE EU'S 'SCIENCE DIPLOMACY'? THE LONG MISSION OF EFFECTIVE EU-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND RESEARCH

*Jerneja Penca*

Across the policy discourse and academic literature, the popularity of the concept of 'science diplomacy' has overshadowed its utility. This article challenges the portrayal of 'science diplomacy' as a straightforward strategy through the examination of the foreign policy-scientific cooperation nexus in the EU-Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood. Through a policy documents analysis, the article traces the development of the external dimension of the EU's science policy, i.e. the shaping of the EU's science policy beyond its borders, and the inclusion of science into its foreign policy agenda in the South Mediterranean. The analysis reveals that the EU's enthusiasm for 'science diplomacy' can be related to the EU's internal political goals, rather than any significant change in the policy objectives or policy tools. Moreover, a



strong cooperation in science and research between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours was contingent on friendly relations, rather than capable of improving conflicts and tensions. The conclusion suggests to focus on building the practical (civilian) impact of genuine scientific cooperation in the aftermath of an uncritical promotion of 'science diplomacy'.

*Keywords:* EU foreign policy; Southern Mediterranean; external science policy; scientific cooperation; science, technology and innovation; Euro-Mediterranean.



# RÉSUMÉS

## RÉFORME DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ PAR LES OIG EN LIBYE

*Anna Molnár, Ivett Szászi, Lilli Takács*

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Dans notre article, nous visons à examiner la contribution des trois OIG à la RSS libyenne en fournissant des études de cas de leurs activités menées en Libye. Le point de départ de notre analyse est l'intervention militaire de 2011 basée sur la RCSNU 1973, car elle a grandement contribué au changement de régime. Même s'il ne fait pas partie du RSS, sa dynamique doit être affichée. Nous avons identifié trois étapes dans l'évolution de la crise libyenne (2011-2014, 2014-2017, 2017-2019), c'est pourquoi les activités de nos OIG sont examinées séparément au sein de chaque période. Dans notre article, nous nous appuyons sur un guide de Loi (2013) concernant les activités de terrain de la RSS et nous cherchons à l'appliquer spécifiquement au cas de la Libye. Notre objectif est d'évaluer la variance des activités de la RSS en comparant les activités théoriques de la RSS des OIG à celles qui se sont produites avec les circonstances en Libye. En analysant les activités de la RSS de trois organisations internationales différentes (Union européenne, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, Nations Unies), nous constatons que leurs activités et engagements réels sont en retard par rapport à leurs engagements théoriques envers la RSS. La Libye n'a pas connu de véritable période de paix depuis que les manifestations du printemps arabe ont éclaté début 2011. La communauté internationale a contribué de manière significative au changement de régime en intervenant militairement. Néanmoins, l'intervention militaire n'a pas été suivie d'un processus de construction de l'État réussi. Même si plusieurs organisations internationales sont actives en Libye et se sont engagées à réformer le secteur de la sécurité du pays, il manque encore un succès évident.

**Mots clés :** Réforme du secteur de la sécurité, Libye, Nations Unies, Union européenne, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord

IJEMS 14 (1) : 7 – 48



## INTERPRÉTER LE PAYSAGE ARCHÉOLOGIQUE MÉDITERRANÉEN À TRAVERS LA PARTICIPATION DES PARTIES PRENANTES – LE CAS DE VRSAR, CROATIE

*Kristina Afrić Rakitovac, Nataša Urošević, Nikola Vojnović*

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L'article traite de l'interprétation du paysage archéologique méditerranéen dans le développement durable du tourisme culturel, en tant que facteur attractif important pour les touristes visitant les pays de la région. Il réfléchit aux possibilités de valorisation touristique durable des sites archéologiques à travers la co-crédation participative d'acteurs. La recherche empirique s'est concentrée sur la commune de Vrsar, une destination typiquement méditerranéenne caractérisée par un tourisme de masse et une forte saisonnalité. La destination observée est également marquée par une abondance de sites archéologiques encore insuffisamment valorisés, présentés et interprétés. La recherche empirique, réalisée à travers des ateliers, des entretiens et des questionnaires, a impliqué tous les acteurs concernés (experts, habitants, touristes). Toutes les parties prenantes clés ont convenu que les principaux problèmes de durabilité pourraient être améliorés grâce à la valorisation durable des ressources culturelles et naturelles locales en créant des expériences touristiques innovantes - susciter beaucoup d'intérêt pour participer à ce processus de co-crédation. Les recherches menées ont indiqué des modèles possibles de présentation et d'interprétation du paysage archéologique local à travers des itinéraires archéologiques reliant les sites les plus importants, des expériences participatives telles que des ateliers interactifs et des programmes d'histoire vivante, et le réseau de centres d'interprétation en fonction des futurs parcs archéologiques.

*Mots clés* : paysage archéologique, Méditerranée, tourisme culturel, valorisation durable, Vrsar, Croatie

IJEMS 14 (1) : 49 – 84

## LE TOURISME DE L'HUILE D'OLIVE DANS LA ZONE EURO-MÉDITERRANÉE

*José Manuel Hernández-Mogollón, Elide Di-Clemente, Ana María Campón-Cerro, José Antonio Folgado-Fernández*

Cet article explore l'huile d'olive extra vierge (EVOO) en tant qu'exemple courant du patrimoine euro-méditerranéen ainsi que son potentiel pour promouvoir des innovantes initiatives de développement touristique et la coopération dans les zones de production. L'objectif principal du travail est de mettre en évidence les initiatives existantes basées sur le patrimoine oléicole des pays producteurs euro-méditerranéens, dont l'Espagne, l'Italie, la Grèce et le Portugal en tant qu'États membres de l'UE, et la Tunisie, la Turquie, le Maroc et la République arabe syrienne en tant qu'États non membres de l'UE (Conseil oléicole international 2018) avec la considération supplémentaire du Liban pour sa solide réputation en tant que producteur d'huile d'olive. En s'appuyant sur une démarche d'investigation, ce travail tente de présenter les initiatives, les produits et les événements les plus remarquables liés à l'huile d'olive et vise à donner plus de visibilité à son patrimoine et à sa culture dans la zone euro-méditerranéenne. Les initiatives trouvées montrent de nouveaux apports pour les systèmes touristiques modernes des zones oléicoles. Les initiatives indiquent également que l'EVOO est un patrimoine commun qui peut offrir d'importantes opportunités pour inspirer des propositions innovantes, capables de connecter les pays méditerranéens et de renforcer leur identité oléicole commune avec des propositions suggestives adressées aux touristes modernes, de plus en plus intéressés à entrer en contact avec les patrimoines authentiques et la cuisine typique de la destination qu'ils visitent.

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*Mots clés* : tourisme oléicole, culture oléicole, gestion du tourisme, développement touristique durable

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## QU'EST-IL ARRIVÉ À LA «DIPLOMATIE SCIENTIFIQUE» DE L'UE ? LA LONGUE MISSION D'UNE COOPÉRATION EURO-MÉDITERRANÉENNE EFFICACE DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA SCIENCE ET DE LA RECHERCHE

*Jerneja Penca*

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Dans le discours politique et la littérature universitaire, la popularité du concept de « diplomatie scientifique » a dissimulé son utilité. Cet article remet en question la représentation de la « diplomatie scientifique » conçue comme une stratégie claire et sans d'obstacles, à travers l'examen du lien entre politique étrangère et coopération scientifique entre l'UE et le Sud de la Méditerranée. À travers une analyse de documents politiques, l'article retrace l'évolution de la dimension extérieure de la politique scientifique de l'UE, c'est-à-dire l'élaboration de la politique scientifique de l'UE au-delà de ses frontières, et l'inclusion de la science dans son agenda de politique étrangère dans le sud de la Méditerranée. L'analyse révèle que l'enthousiasme de l'UE pour la « diplomatie scientifique » peut être lié aux objectifs politiques internes de l'UE, plutôt qu'à un changement significatif dans les objectifs politiques ou les outils politiques. De plus, une coopération solide dans le domaine de la science et de la recherche entre l'UE et ses voisins méditerranéens était subordonnée à des relations amicales, plutôt qu'à la capacité d'améliorer les conflits et les tensions. La conclusion de l'article suggère qu'il serait plus pertinent de se concentrer sur la construction de l'impact pratique (civil) d'une véritable coopération scientifique au lendemain d'une promotion non critique de la « diplomatie scientifique ».

*Mots-clés* : politique étrangère de l'UE; Méditerranée du Sud ; politique scientifique extérieure; coopération scientifique; science, technologie et innovation; euro-méditerranéen

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# POVZETKI

## REFORME VARNOSTNEGA SEKTORJA S STRANI MEDNARODNIH ORGANIZACIJ NA PRIMERU LIBIJE

*Anna Molnár, Ivett Szászi, Lilli Takács*

V članku analiziramo prispevek treh mednarodnih organizacij pri reformah varnostnega sektorja na primeru Libije. Kot izhodišče za analizo nam služi vojaška intervencija leta 2011 na podlagi Resolucije Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov 1974, ki je pripomogla k spremembi režima. Kljub temu, da Resolucija 1974 ni del reforme varnostnega sektorja, jo je potrebno analizirati v sklopu širšega razumevanja trenutnega stanja varnostnega sektorja v Libiji. V članku identificiramo tri obdobja libijske krize (2011–2014, 2014–2017, 2017–2019), znotraj katerih preverjamo učinek mednarodnih organizacij. V članku gradimo na tipologiji reform varnostnega sektorja kot jo predlaga Law (2013), in na podlagi tega osvetlimo delovanje treh mednarodnih organizacij (Evropska unija - EU, Organizacija severnoatlantske pogodbe - NATO, Združeni narodi). Libija od začetka Arabske pomladi leta 2011 namreč ni doživela obdobja miru. Mednarodna skupnost je sicer uspešno prispevala k spremembi režima, a takšni vojaški intervenciji ni sledil uspešen proces izgradnje države. Kljub temu, da so mednarodne organizacije še naprej aktivne v Libiji in zavezane reformam varnostnega sektorja v državi, so ti naporji še naprej daleč od uspeha.

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*Ključne besede:* reforme varnostnega sektorja, Libija, Združeni narodi, Evropska unija, Organizacija severnoatlantske pogodbe

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## RAZUMEVANJE SREDOZEMSKÉ ARHEOLOŠKE KRAJINE PREK VEČDELEŽNIŠKEGA SODELOVANJA – PRIMER VRSARJA, HRVAŠKA

*Kristina Afrić Rakitovac, Nataša Urošević, Nikola Vojnović*

Članek se ukvarja z razumevanjem sredozemske arheološke krajine v kontekstu trajnostnega razvoja in kulturnega turizma kot privlačnega dejavnika za turizem v regiji. Takšen turizem odpira možnosti za trženje sredozemske arheološke krajine prek večdeležniškega



sooblikovanja. Empirični del raziskave je osredinjen na občino Vrsar, tipično sredozemsko destinacije, ki je znana po množičnem turizmu in visoki stopnji sezonskosti. Vrsar je prav tako znan po raznoliki arheološki krajini, ki pa še ni ustrezno ovrednotena, predstavljena in interpretirana. Empirična raziskava, ki je temeljila na delavnicah, intervjujih in vprašalnikih, je vključevala različne deležnike (strokovnjake, lokalno prebivalstvo in turiste). Deležniki so bili enotni v tem, da bi lahko ključne vidike trajnostnega razvoja izboljšali s pomočjo trajnostnega vrednotenja lokalnih kulturnih in naravnih virov ter na takšen način ustvarili inovativno turistično izkušnjo. Na takšen način bi namreč privabili veliko interesa pri samem procesu večdeležniškega soustvarjanja. V članku avtorji predstavijo potencialne modele predstavljanja in interpretiranja lokalne arheološke krajine prek arheoloških poti, ki povezujejo najpomembnejša mesta. Ugotovitve prav tako kažejo na to, da bi lahko večdeležniško soustvarjanje kot so inovativne delavnice in živi zgodovinski programi ter mreža interpretacijskih centrov delovali kot bodoči arheološki parki.

*Ključne besede:* arheološka krajina, Sredozemlje, kulturni turizem, trajnostno vrednotenje, Vrsar, Hrvaška  
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## OLJČNI TURIZEM NA EVRO-SREDOZEMSKEM OBMOČJU

*José Manuel Hernández-Mogollón, Elide Di-Clemente, Ana María Campón-Cerro, José Antonio Folgado-Fernández*

Namen članka je predstaviti ekstra deviško oljčno olje kot primer skupne Evro-sredozemske dediščine, ki prispeva k promociji inovativnega turizma. Osrednji cilj prispevka je predstaviti obstoječe pobude, ki temeljijo na oljčnem turizmu, in jih najdemo predvsem v Španiji, Italiji, Grčiji in Portugalski kot državah članicah EU, in Tuniziji, Turčiji, Maroku, Siriji in Libanonu kot državah nečlanicah EU (International Olive Oil Council 2018). Avtorji predstavijo najbolj vidne pobude, produkte in dogodke, ki so povezani z oljčnim oljem, s katerimi države in lokalne skupnosti skušajo predstaviti oljčno olje kot del skupne dediščine in kulture Evro-sredozemskega območja. Vse te pobude namreč kažejo na to, da imajo območja, kjer je proizvodnja oljčnega olja prisotna, že razvite sodobne turistične sisteme. Prav tako vse te pobude kažejo na to, da je ekstra deviško oljčno olje skupna zapuščina, ki ponuja priložnost za razvoj inovativnih pobud, ki bi povezovale sredozemske

države in krepile njihovo identiteto kot proizvajalke oljčnega olja. Ugotovitve kažejo, da bi takšno sodelovanje privločilo predvsem moderne turiste, ki so vse bolj zainteresirani za lokalno pridelavo in izdelke ter lokalno kulinariko.

*Ključne besede:* oljni turizem, kultura oljčnega olja, turistični menedžment, trajnostni turistični razvoj

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## KAJ SE JE ZGODILO Z 'ZNANSTVENO DIPLOMACIJO' EU? DOLGA POT UČINKOVITEGA ZNANSTVENEGA IN RAZISKOVALNEGA SODELOVANJA MED EU IN SREDOZEMLJEM

*Jerneja Penca*

Priljubljenost koncepta "znanstvene diplomacije" v političnem diskurzu in akademski literaturi zadnjega desetletja je zasenčila njegovo uporabnost. Ta članek zanika prikaz "znanstvene diplomacije" kot jasne in neproblematične strategije, na primeru preučevanja povezave zunanjepolitičnega in znanstvenega sodelovanja med EU in južnim Sredozemljem. Z analizo političnih dokumentov članek prikazuje postopen razvoj zunanje razsežnosti znanstvene politike EU, tj. oblikovanje znanstvene politike EU onkraj njenih meja, in vključevanju znanosti v zunanje politični program EU v južnem Sredozemlju. Analiza razkriva, da je navdušenje EU nad „znanstveno diplomacijo“ prej povezano z notranje-političnimi cilji EU kot pa s kakršno koli bistveno spremembo ciljev politike ali njenih orodij. Ugotavlja, da je bilo tesno sodelovanje na področju znanosti in raziskav med EU in njenimi sredozemskimi sosedami prej posledica prijateljskih odnosov v regiji, kot pa instrument, ki bi bil sposoben izboljšati konflikte in napetosti. Sklep članka predlaga, da se v regiji osredotočimo na nadaljno gradnjo praktičnega (civilnega) učinka znanstvenega sodelovanja namesto nekritičnega spodbujanja „znanstvene diplomacije“.

*Ključne besede:* zunanja politika EU; južno Sredozemlje; zunanja dimenzija znanstvene politike; znanstveno sodelovanje; znanost, tehnologija in inovacije; Evro-Sredozemlje.

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## إصلاح قطاع الأمن من قبل المنظمات الحكومية الدولية في ليبيا أنا مولنار ، إيفيت سزاري ، ليلي تاكاكس

في ورقتنا ، نهدف إلى دراسة مساهمة المنظمات الحكومية الدولية الثلاث في إصلاح قطاع الأمن الليبي من خلال تقديم دراسات حالة عن أنشطتها المنفذة في ليبيا. نقطة البداية في تحليلنا هي التدخل العسكري عام 2011 بناءً على قرار مجلس الأمن 1973 حيث ساهم بشكل كبير في تغيير النظام. حددنا ثلاث مراحل في تطور الأزمة الليبية (2011-2014 ، 2014-2017 ، 2017-2019) ، وبالتالي يتم فحص أنشطة كل فترة زمنية بشكل منفصل. في ورقتنا البحثية، نبنى على دليل القانون (2013) حول الأنشطة الميدانية ونسعى لتطبيق ذلك على وجه التحديد في حالة ليبيا. هدفنا هو تقييم التباين في أنشطة (SSR) لإصلاح القطاع الأمني من خلال مقارنة أنشطة المنظمات الحكومية الدولية النظرية لإصلاح القطاع الأمني بتلك التي سمحت بحدوثها بسبب الظروف في ليبيا. من خلال تحليل أنشطة إصلاح قطاع الأمن لثلاث منظمات دولية مختلفة (الاتحاد الأوروبي، الناتو، الأمم المتحدة) وجدنا أن الأنشطة والالتزامات الفعلية تتخلف عن الالتزامات النظرية. لم تشهد ليبيا فترة سلمية حقيقية منذ اندلاع احتجاجات الربيع العربي في أوائل عام 2011 .

ساهم المجتمع الدولي بشكل كبير في تغيير النظام من خلال التدخل العسكري. ومع ذلك، لم يتبع التدخل العسكري عملية بناء دولة ناجحة. على الرغم من أن العديد من المنظمات الدولية نشطة في ليبيا وملزمة بإصلاح قطاع الأمن في البلاد، إلا أن نجاحها مدهلاً لا يزال مفقوداً.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** إصلاح قطاع الأمن، ليبيا ، الأمم المتحدة ، الاتحاد الأوروبي ، منظمة حلف شمال الأطلسي

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## تفسير المناظر الطبيعية الأثرية للبحر الأبيض المتوسط من خلال مشاركة أصحاب المصلحة (حالة VRSAR كرواتيا)

كريستينا أفريتش راكيتوفاتش، ناتاشا أورو سيفي، نيكولا فوينوفي

تتناول الورقة تفسير المشهد الأثري المتوسطي في التنمية المستدامة للسياحة الثقافية كعامل جذب مهم للسياح الذين يزورون دول المنطقة. إنه يعكس إمكانيات ترميم السياحة المستدامة للمواقع الأثرية من خلال المشاركة في إنشاء أصحاب المصلحة. ركز البحث التجريبي على بلدية فرسار ، وهي وجهة متوسطة نموذجية تتميز بالسياحة الجماعية والموسمية العالية. تتميز الوجهة المرصودة أيضاً بوفرة من المواقع الأثرية، والتي لا تزال غير مُقدّمة ومُقسّرة بشكل كافٍ. شمل البحث التجريبي، الذي تم إنجازه من خلال ورش العمل والمقابلات والاستبيانات، جميع أصحاب المصلحة المعنيين (الخبراء والسكان المحليين والسياح). انفق جميع أصحاب المصلحة الرئيسيين على أنه يمكن تحسين قضايا الاستدامة الرئيسية من خلال التقييم المستدام للموارد الثقافية والطبيعية المحلية من خلال خلق تجارب سياحية مبتكرة - جذب اهتمام كبير بالمشاركة في عملية الإبداع المشترك هذه. أشار البحث الذي تم إجراؤه إلى النماذج الممكنة لعرض وتفسير المشهد الأثري المحلي من خلال المسارات الأثرية التي تربط أهم المواقع، والخبرات التشاركية مثل ورش العمل التفاعلية وبرامج التاريخ الحي، وشبكة مراكز التفسير في وظيفة الحدائق الأثرية المستقبلية.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** المشهد الأثري، البحر الأبيض المتوسط ، السياحة الثقافية، الترميم المستدام، فرسار ، كرواتيا

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## سياحة زيت الزيتون في المنطقة الأورو-متوسطية

خوسيه مانويل هيرنانديز مونغولون، إيدي دي كليمنتي، أنا ماريا كامبون سيرو، خوسيه أنطونيو فولغادو فرنانديز

تستكشف هذه الورقة زيت الزيتون البكر الممتاز كمثال مشترك للتراث الأورومتوسطي وإمكاناته في تعزيز مبادرات التنمية السياحية المبتكرة والتعاون في مجالات الإنتاج. الهدف الرئيسي من العمل هو تسليط الضوء على المبادرات الحالية القائمة على تراث زيت الزيتون في البلدان الأوروبية المتوسطية المنتجة، بما في ذلك إسبانيا وإيطاليا واليونان والبرتغال كدول أعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي، وتونس وتركيا والمغرب والجمهورية العربية السورية كدول غير أعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي (المجلس الدولي لزيت الزيتون) مع إيلاء اعتبار إضافي للبنان لسمعته الراسخة كمنتج لزيت الزيتون. يحاول هذا العمل من خلال البحث الاستقصائي إظهار أبرز المبادرات والمنتجات والأحداث المتعلقة بزيت الزيتون والتي تهدف إلى إبراز تراثه وثقافته في المنطقة الأورومتوسطية. تظهر المبادرات التي تم العثور عليها مدخلات جديدة لأنظمة السياحة الحديثة في مناطق زراعة الزيتون. تشير المبادرات أيضاً إلى أن زيت الزيتون البكر الممتاز هو تراث مشترك يمكن أن يوفر فرصاً مهمة لإلهام مقترحات مبتكرة، قادرة على ربط بلدان البحر الأبيض المتوسط وتعزيز هويتها المشتركة في زراعة الزيتون من خلال مقترحات موحية موجهة إلى السياح المعاصرين، المهتمين بشكل متزايد بالتواصل مع التراث الأصيل والطعام. نموذجي للوجهة التي يزورونها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: سياحة زيت الزيتون، ثقافة زيت الزيتون، إدارة السياحة، تنمية السياحة المستدامة

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## ماذا حدث لـ "دبلوماسية العلوم" في الاتحاد الأوروبي؟ المهمة الطويلة لتعاون فعال بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والمتوسط

يرنيا بنسا

عبر الخطاب السياسي والأدبيات الأكاديمية، طغت شعبية مفهوم "دبلوماسية العلوم" على فائدتها. تتحدى هذه المقالة تصوير "دبلوماسية العلوم" كاستراتيجية مباشرة من خلال فحص العلاقة بين السياسة الخارجية والتعاون العلمي في دول الجوار بين الاتحاد الأوروبي وجنوب البحر الأبيض المتوسط. من خلال تحليل وثائق السياسة، يتتبع المقال تطور البعد الخارجي للسياسة العلمية للاتحاد الأوروبي، أي تشكيل السياسة العلمية للاتحاد الأوروبي خارج حدوده، وإدراج العلم في أجندة السياسة الخارجية في جنوب البحر الأبيض المتوسط. يكشف التحليل أن حماس الاتحاد الأوروبي لـ "دبلوماسية العلوم" يمكن أن يكون مرتبطاً بالأهداف السياسية الداخلية للاتحاد الأوروبي، بدلاً من أي تغيير مهم في أهداف السياسة أو أدوات السياسة. علاوة على ذلك، كان التعاون القوي في العلوم والبحوث بين الاتحاد الأوروبي وجيرانه المتوسطيين مرهوناً بالعلاقات الودية، بدلاً من أن تكون قادرة على تحسين النزاعات والتوترات. يقترح الاستنتاج التركيز على بناء "التأثير العملي (المدني) للتعاون العلمي الحقيقي في أعقاب الترويج غير النقدي لـ "دبلوماسية العلوم".

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Büyükada (Princes Islands), Istanbul, 2018, photograph by Orhan Ceka

Away from the buzzing sound of Istanbul's traffic, Büyükada offers an escape on an island where vehicles are prohibited and visitors can explore the place either by renting a bike or riding on horse-drawn carriages.



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