

TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM AND REGIONAL SECURITY: COOPERATION AND DIVERSITY BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

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The Arab Spring and related events have hit the Euro-Mediterranean region hard. In the words of James Derderian, 2011 was a “monster year,” with millions of people being forced to flee their home countries. One in 35 people on the planet is a migrant, and the number of migrants will reach 230 million people by 2050 according to United Nations forecasts. There are 60 million migrants in the European Union, and the countries of the global North are experiencing significant migration pressure. Relations in the Euro-Mediterranean region are based on the post-colonial settlements of the 1960s. This settlement was marked by a web of bilateral relationships between the metropolitan former imperial cores and the newly independent countries in the South. The Barcelona Declaration on the Development of Partnership was signed in 1995 and was meant to alter this pattern of relations and construct a cooperative institutional framework that included political cooperation, and thereby create a secure zone of economic, social and humanitarian relations. To its credit, this timely book addresses the painful consequences of the Arab Spring and related events in the Euro-Mediterranean region in terms of the integrative process.

The current climate of distrust between Morocco and the European Union over Spain’s hosting of a POLISARIO leader,



the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean and in the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, the ongoing and unresolved problems emanating from the Arab Spring, as well as the French decision to withdraw from the counter terrorist mission in the Sahel have given this book a new urgency and renewed relevance. The book touches upon the attempts to foster greater integration between the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean with Europe and the hopes that the integrative process would help prevent some of the very same problems that have given the book a renewed lease of urgency and relevance.

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But that hope failed to materialize. The European Union enlargement in 2004 subsumed the Barcelona Process under the neighborhood policy, leading to competition over priorities between the countries East of Europe and those South of the Mediterranean. Additionally, EU member states' diverging interests in the Southern Mediterranean, alongside differences over civilization and identity complicated the picture greatly. There was also controversy over democratization and its relationship to security both within the European Union and between the European states and their North African and Eastern Mediterranean partners. These factors acting together bled the Barcelona Process of its relevance.

The European Union's response to the Libyan crisis of 2011 marked a clear transition. Libya was an important oil supplier to the EU, but the latter-imposed sanctions and supported the anti-Gaddafi rebel movements in accordance with UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973. But in many ways, this was done without a clear consensus over military operations, and the EU instead concentrated on humanitarian efforts under the umbrella of EUFOR-Libya. Military operations became the purview of NATO only. The conflict in Syria displayed the same dynamics but in a harsher tone. Aside from freezing the association agreement with Syria, the European Union has failed to adopt a common narrative concerning the war against the people and government of Syria. With both countries in flames, the area was opened for intervention by external actors such as the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, as well as armed Islamist movements like Hezbollah, ISIS, and Al Qaeda. Refugees continue to



flee both countries to Turkey and Europe often at great risk. The Euro-Mediterranean region is now facing severe security challenges due to uncontrolled refugee flows, terrorism and instability as a result. The book adds to the academic debates that attempt to address this instability.

“Transnational Islam and Regional Security: Cooperation and Diversity between Europe and North Africa” consists of nine chapters including an introduction. The editor, Frederic Volpi, sets the tone for the book in the introduction. The book is written in the Copenhagen School tradition of international relations, which represents a “liberal social constructivist” trend within international studies theory. The chapters include: the NATO-Maghreb relations, the role of the Barcelona conference in 2005, the transformation of the terrorist state of Libya, radical Islam and inter-Mediterranean relations.

Volpi discusses the post-9/11 transformation of terrorism from targeting the state to targeting people, and the expansion of its geography from the Middle East and North Africa to the whole world. Volpi places the responsibility for this transformation on the policies of the states of the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Aside from addressing issues of identity and the construction of knowledge, Volpi highlights the dilemma felt by North African states, which generally cooperate on counter-terrorism with Europe, but see it as a source of their problems in terms of radicalization.

Michael Willis addresses “Containing Radicalism through the Political Process in North Africa.” Willis uses a liberal framework to analyze case studies in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. He argues that, in these countries, involving radical groups in the political process was meant to create an illusion of participation. The author argues that in Tunisia, this policy was successful, but the Islamist Ennahda party continues to be excluded. In contrast, Algeria chose to combat its Islamists, resulting in a bloody civil war. The military’s predominance in Algeria may have led to the different outcome in the country. Algeria was also unable to address its economic problems. Morocco, in contrast, has a long history of controlling radical groups through legal processes and through cooption. Combining both political and security



measures, the country was able to contain the Islamist movement. A key factor in the decision-making of all three states was the United States' post-9/11 counter-terrorism policy. Willis notes that the North African states focused on political control instead of modernisation. Citing the history of the United Kingdom, he argues that "liberalisation and democratic reforms should lead to greater political and social inclusiveness, which will lead to a decrease in support for radical agents." The author is however open to the idea that democracy can sometimes lead to undesirable outcomes. For example, Gaza voted for Hamas in 2006, and Iraq selected the Dawa party and related movements in 2003. Nonetheless, the author is correct to point out the link between illusory politics and radicalization.

Far less stable today than its four peers to the West, Libya is addressed by Luis Martinez' "Libya: Conversion of a Terrorist State." A strong case study, the chapter details how Libya emerged from the shadows of being a terrorist rogue state into an accepted member of the international community after 2001. Col. Gaddafi was keen on preserving his power and had a desire to avoid Saddam's fate. The country remains divided today into its ethnic, tribal and clan components, as well as by region and ideology. According to Martinez, the collapse of oil prices and economic sanctions forced Gaddafi to stop supporting terrorist movements. While the study is comprehensive, it needs to address the issue of governance, foreign intervention, and the use of terrorism as a tool of international political blackmail. In the same Copenhagen vein, Bicchi and Martin argue in their article, "Talking Tough or Talking Together? European Security Discourses towards the Mediterranean," that political Islam has been progressively securitised in the United Kingdom while Europe lacked a coherent policy towards it. 9/11 brought about difficult questions concerning the existence of a clash between the West and the Islamic World.

Using a historical method, the chapter looks at the policies pursued by European countries towards Islamist groups. The continued legality of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Europe is used as an example of a multi-factor approach. The group is not recognized as a terrorist movement in the United Kingdom, and the policy



towards it is offered as an example of a “new security game.” They add that the war in Iraq “soured relations between Western and Muslim countries.”

Focusing on the role of NATO in “NATO, Maghreb and Europe,” Benantar looks at NATO’s relationship with the countries of the MENA region. The author uses 9/11 to divide the chapter into two periods of time, and argues that 9/11 led to fundamental changes in the relationship, arguing that there were “competition and interference, rather than complementarity of various regional initiatives.” The states of the region have more or less written off regional integration, and instead focus on avoiding being listed as rogue states by the United States. This dynamic unspools itself in MENA countries efforts to prevent Washington from supporting internal opposition, and bolstering the legitimacy of their own internal struggle against terrorism, often over the efforts of regional rivals. Applying the Copenhagen approach directly, the author concludes that despite 9/11, the Euro-Mediterranean is not a “true regional security system,” and that current circumstances do not allow for the creation of a “Mediterranean strategic identity.” The Maghreb itself is far from being a “security community,” to use the words of Karl Deutsch, but it can be considered a “security complex” to use the words of Buzan, because there are common and competitive interests at the same time across the two shores. As for the West’s motivation for deepening relations with the southern countries of the region, the author lists several factors. Firstly, the security of NATO depends on the policy and state of the East and South. Secondly, after 9/11, there is a need to confirm that the South is not the enemy.

The centrality of Spain in the relationship is highlighted by Jordan and Horsburgh’s chapter, “Spain and Islamist Terrorism.” Zemni’s chapter stands out because it focuses on Islam rather than the politics, but it uses Morocco and Belgium as case studies for the threats used by Jihadis and the insecurity they engender in the Islamist movement. Collyer in contrast focuses on the effects of securitisation of the Migrants trying to make their way to Europe through Spain. Gillespie’s “Onward but not Upward: The Barcelona Summit of 2005” deals with the lasting



bitterness surrounding the definition of terrorism. This failure to reach a common definition of terrorism is labeled a “missed opportunity.”

The book makes a significant contribution towards understanding the relationships that cut across the Mediterranean and the challenges posed by radical Islamist movements to Europe and North Africa after 9/11. It outlines the successes and failures of cooperation between governments in the region. The work is theoretically rigorous and steeped in sound scholarly methods and techniques. The authors discuss the relationships between Islamist movements, states and societies. They also address the factors behinds political violence and radicalism. There are, of course, some minor weaknesses. The book does not include survey methods, therefore there is no thorough account of the views of the concerned population. The book concerns itself exclusively with policy-makers and elites and their role in constructing polities and identities. The book also lacks the voice of the victims of radical extremist violence and their views. Economic integration and the ongoing security coordination are also not deeply addressed. Given that the book was published in 2008, it would also be useful to consider a second edition that takes the last 8 years into account. “Transnational Islam and Regional Security: Cooperation and Diversity between Europe and North Africa” illustrates how the problems of the region, when not solved in time, become progressively harder to solve.

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