

RECONTEXTUALIZING TERROR: ISIS NARRATIVES IN THE ENGLISH MEDIA

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Drawing upon the interdisciplinary approach of Baker's (2006) narrative theory-informed analysis, this paper analyses the English translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* which were published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) between the years 2013 and 2016. MEMRI is a Washington-based think tank that is largely quoted by the Western, mainly the US, prominent media outlets. This paper aims to investigate the role of the media in utilising translation as a vehicle of reconstructing and renegotiating the narratives in question. It also examines the effectiveness of contextual framing in altering narratives of the terrorist acts carried by *Daesh (the Islamic State)* which in turn communicates a distort image of Islam and Muslims to the Euro-Mediterranean officials and publics. The findings suggest that contextual framing is an effective device in redirecting the original narratives in media translations that function outside the immediate text. Reframing context is significant linguistic method in inserting particular ideologies and agendas in the target narrative in line with the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'. Thus there is a need to translate informatively and innovatively the contexts of unknown phenomena themselves due to the difference in culture of North-South and East-West publics of the Euro-Mediterranean.

Key words: Contextual framing, English media, Euro-Mediterranean, ISIS, Translation



INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (or most preferably its Arabic acronym *Daesh*) as we argue elsewhere (Hijjo & Kaur, 2017) is international in nature. However, the terrorist acts carried by *Daesh* chiefly impacts on the Euro-Mediterranean region. In this regard, *Daesh* triggered direct instability in the countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus resulting from the displacement of millions of Syrians and Iraqis who run away from *Daesh's* killing. Other Euro-Mediterranean countries are indirectly affected by means of the refugees who successfully reached their territories. *Daesh's* criminal acts have also triggered much Islamophobia and criticism of Islam (Croucher et al., 2013) under the claim that *Daesh* is a 'true' representative of Islam and Muslims and that it follows the teachings of Al-Quran and Prophet Muhammad¹. This in turn shifts the cultural and political discourse and communication especially in the West to either undermining or underlining some particularities of current rival narratives circulated about *Daesh* in line with the meta-narratives the 'War on Terror' and 'Terror and Islam'.

In this regard, think tanks such as the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) contribute to such discourse (Hijjo, Forthcoming). To further explain the current issue, the original Arabic editorials target the Arabic reader who shares the same language and culture of the source authors. Nevertheless, the MEMRI's English translations target the Western officials and public who largely depend on these translations to be informed about the current conflict in the Middle East.

On a daily basis, MEMRI "assists and lends support to all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, including over 200 different units, in carrying out the War on Terror. MEMRI continues to support members of academia on a daily basis. To date, over 500

1 <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/07/sorry-but-you-cant-take-the-islam-out-of-islamic-state/#> (published on 4 July 2015, accessed on 3 May 2017).



college and universities, in the United States and worldwide, have utilized MEMRI material.”²

Moreover, the notion of ‘context’ refers to the necessary elements required in understanding a word, a text or part of. The word ‘context’ is produced from the Latin ‘*contextus*’ of the meaning “connection, coherence” (Meibauer, 2012). Context as a resource is “something that we selectively and strategically construct as we engage in any act of communication, including the act of translation” (Baker, 2006b p. 332). Context is largely essential to determine the ‘intended’ meanings of words and texts exemplifying in the use of the English word ‘call’ (verb: give a name vs. make a phone call vs. shout vs. noun: a phone call vs. an invitation vs. a sound)³. The Arabic media editorials are, therefore, addressed to the Arabic-speaking audience. English translations of these editorials are readdressed to the English-speaking audience. The difference in the target audience suggests that what makes sense in the Arabic context may not be understood in the English translations due to several factors including, cultural, religious, political (ideological), social, linguistic and educational backgrounds. In other words, in discussing value-charged concepts and texts, political, ideological, cultural and religious similarities and differences between the source and target should be examined. The “specificity of context” is, therefore, “essential to the very existence of meaning” (Davis, 2001 pp. 2-3) “where context is understood as temporal, spatial, historical, and linguistic in nature” (Tymoczko, 2007 p. 47) and illustrates the ideological goals and positions of participants. The importance of identifying the contexts of both the source and the target texts is well explained by Eugene Nida in his Preface to *Contexts in Translating*:

“For a number of years I have been increasingly interested in the role of contexts in understanding and translating texts, because failure to consider the contexts of a text is largely responsible for the most serious mistakes in comprehending and reproducing the meaning of a discourse” (2001, p. ix).

2 <http://www.memri.org/about-memri.html> (Last accessed on 3 October 2016).

3 <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/call> (Last accessed on 7 April 2017).



Contextual framings are context-based framings that take place in space outside the immediate text and “implicitly’ function as background for determining recipients’ interpretation of a situation” (Al-Sharif, 2009 p. 66). These frames surround certain narratives and effectively shape their meanings and impacts. The difference in contexts between the source and the target texts does not only result from differences in cultural, historical, political, ideological, religious and educational backgrounds but also from the gap in time between the writing and publication of a text and those of its translation as Baker elaborates:

“With the passage of time, a literary or scholarly text will have accumulated critical response and resonances, and both it and its translation(s) will be read and interpreted in a different context—politically, culturally, socially, aesthetically” (2006b, p. 332).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS

The research corpus is 46 Arabic written political editorials on *Daesh* and their English translations in 25 articles. These translations were published by the Washington-based think tank the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) between the years 2013 and 2016. It is worth noting that MEMRI often compiles the translations of more than one Arabic editorial in a single article. This paper employs Baker’s (2006) interdisciplinary approach narrative theory-informed analysis to investigate the role of mass media translations in the context of the contemporary ideologically-laden conflict in the Middle East, and to examine the effectiveness of contextual framings as significant devices in the processes of reconstructing and renegotiating the original narratives on *Daesh*.

FINDINGS: CONTEXTUAL FRAMING

There are mainly three types of contextual framings (1) thematic and episodic framings which represent in the author/translator’s choice of whether to embed or not particular information, events and happenings in a given text (selection vs.



de-selection), (2) temporal and spatial framings which represent in the author/translator's recontextualizing of particular information, events and happenings in a given text which in turn invites the audience to build links among information and happenings thus redirect the interpretation of the whole narrative, and (3) relationality which overlaps with the first two types at points of selectivity, and also represents in the author's adoption/borrowing of a source word, along with its contextual settings, into the target text thus reframing the source context.

THEMATIC AND EPISODIC FRAMINGS

Thematic framings, following Baker (2006), refer to the coverage of an issue or event in a broader context rather than the presentation of a particular case (e.g. poverty vs. a given poor family). In other words, they are the zoom out picture. This type of framing largely cites sources especially interviews and analyses by experts and provides statistics on the subject-matter. It is represented in public narratives. Thematic framings appeal to the governmental policy and suggest future planning. They may be used by policy makers to frame the public opinion on a given subject-matter aiming to sway policy results (Crow and Lawlor, 2016). Episodic framings, on the other hand, refer to the coverage of an issue or event through a particular case (e.g. a given poor family vs. poverty). In other words, they are the zoom in picture. This type of framing relies more on the personal experiences and individual accounts rather than its general state. It is represented in personal narratives. Episodic framings attract the attention of human rights and activists and invite urgent actions. In this regard, human rights organisations may prompt an individual case in order to impose certain views or agendas on governments.

In the context of the media and terrorism, recent studies found that the media employs both thematic and episodic framings in their attempts to encourage undesirable stereotypes and military actions (Falkheimer and Olsson, 2015). The choice of the media of one contextual framing type rather than the other is largely "driven by ideology and prejudice" (Entman, 1993 p. 232). For example, in its Special Dispatches, MEMRI attempts to utilize



the contextual thematic framings of titles to broadening the individual cases. In other words, MEMRI employs thematic framings in its translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* in order to build links among irrelevant issues in terms of causes and effects such as refugees, terrorism, democracy, poverty and education in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The titles of MEMRI's Special Dispatches under analysis: "Saudi Journalist", "Jordanian Press", "Syrian Oppositionist", "Syrian Journalist", "Iraqi Ummah Party Leader", "Al-Hayat' Editor", "Senior Saudi Salafi Cleric", "Editor Of Iraqi Daily", "Al-Jazeera TV Host", "Arab Liberal", "Iraqi Columnist", "Egyptian Columnists", "Egyptian Writer", "Former Imam Of Mecca's Grand Mosque", "Senior Sunni Cleric", "Saudi Press", "Saudi, Qatari Press", "Articles In Saudi Press", "Iraqi Journalist", and "Conspiracy Theories In Saudi Government Press" indicate general, national and institutional, views rather than personal views as the case when using the author's name. The generalizations serve two functions: either negative image of the author(s) or the author'(s) subject-matter (*Daesh*, Arabs, Islam and/or Muslims). The only exception was MEMRI's title "*Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi's Efforts To Arrange Prisoner Exchange Deal To Free Jordanian Pilot*" in which MEMRI uses the subject's name instead of his nationality or religious affiliation. This usage of the subject's name is meant by MEMRI to avoid the generalization of the positive narrative represented in 'the subject's good efforts to free the Jordanian pilot' to others i.e. Arabs, Muslims and Islam.

Furthermore, titles are the initial framing devices that signal to the reframed narrative to come as Baker argues "The use of titles to reframe narratives in translation is often accompanied by subtle shifts in the texts themselves, in line with the narrative position signalled in the new title" (2006a p. 130). For example MEMRI's *Special Dispatch No. 5955*; "*Jordanian Press Reacts To ISIS Execution Of Jordanian Pilot: Now All Jordanians Feel Need For Vengeance*".



Table 1: SD 5955 – Contextual analysis

Item	MEMRI Translations (thematic)	Arabic editorials (episodic)
Titles	“Jordanian Press”	“الحساب مفتوح معكم.. أيها القتل” (Literally: The reckoning is open with you.. oh killers), “أرلني أصيل” (Literally: Original Jordanian) and “معلة أبو قونة” (Literally: Muath is a Jordanian icon)
Introductions/ Prefaces	“the Jordanian public” “In an official statement, Jordanian King Abdullah” “all Jordanian men and w omen” “the Jordanian press” “all-out war against ISIS”	No introductions/prefaces
Image and Captures	“ We are all Mu’adh”	No images and captures
Text	Selected excerpts Muath – 8 times ISIS	Full text Muath – 21 times killers, criminal gang, terrorists
Headings	Editorial In <i>Official JordanianDaily</i> : We Will Not Be Silent And Will Not Rest Until We Have Vengeance Former Jordanian Minister: No Room For Mercy With ISIS; Execute All Its Members Who Were Sentenced To Death 'Al-Ghad' Editor: Mu'adh's Death Will Only Strengthen <i>The Jordanian Front</i>	No headings
Endnotes	References to Arabic source texts including an additional source elsewhere than the original texts.	No references

Source: Authors’ own analysis.

In this Special Dispatch, MEMRI shifts from the episodic framing of the Arabic source texts into thematic framing. The selected excerpts that MEMRI translated here are mainly read as public and official agreement on the revenge from *Daesh*. However, reading the full source texts shows that the main focus is on the case of killing Muath Al-Kassasba and its negative impact on the Jordanians’ feelings. By selecting some passages to translate rather than others, MEMRI reframe the



Arabic source texts from episodic framing that shows sympathy with Muath to thematic framing that seeks to illustrate general agreement by the Jordanian public and officials on the revenge from *Daesh*. *Muath* was indicated directly by name in the Arabic source texts 21 times; however, he was indicated in MEMRI's translations 8 times only. The extensive repetition of the name 'Muath' in the Arabic source narratives grants more weight to the individual and earns more sympathy as a humanity case. MEMRI's reduction of this large repetition of the name 'Muath' grants the case less sympathy and steers the case to be a representative of official public policy and planning. The contextual reframing made here by MEMRI is well established in its preface where it cites official sources "*In an official statement, Jordanian King Abdullah*" and expresses public agreements "*shocked the Jordanian public*" "*The following day's editorials and columns in the Jordanian press... Many called for all-out war against ISIS*". In addition to the general introduction/preface placed before the translations, MEMRI introduces each translation of the selected passages of each of the three Arabic source articles with a sentence (see the translations of the first and third articles) or a paragraph (see the translation of the second article) as follows.

1. In its editorial, the official Jordanian daily *Al-Rai* threatened ISIS, warning that its members would pay a heavy price wherever they were, and adding that the Jordanians are now united around their regime. While the Arabic source article threatens '*the killers*' of Muath Al-Kassasba, it does not name *Daesh* (ISIS) as indicated in MEMRI's introduction.

2. Samih Al-Ma'aita, head of the official *Al-Rai* daily's board of directors and former Jordanian communications minister, stressed that Jordanians were entitled to demand the blood of ISIS activists in revenge for the murder of *the pilot*, and called for executing terrorists condemned to death in Jordan so that ISIS could taste the pain that they had inflicted on the Jordanians.

This introduction names *Daesh* (ISIS) twice while *Daesh* was not named in the Arabic source article. Muath Al-Kassasba the



subject of the Arabic source article was not called by his name, MEMRI rather calls him “*the pilot*” in an attempt to shift the readers’ attention from Muath to *Daesh*.

3. Jumana Ghunaimat, editor-in-chief of the Jordanian daily *Al-Ghad*, also called for executing the terrorists incarcerated in Jordan, and emphasized that *the pilot’s death* had united the Jordanian public and given all Jordanians the right to demand *revenge*.

Table 2: *Special Dispatch No. 6067; Saudi, Qatari Press: U.S. To Blame For ISIS Capturing Al-Ramadi– Contextual analysis*

Item	MEMRI Translations (thematic)	Arabic editorials (episodic)
Titles	Saudi, Qatari Press: U.S. To Blame For ISIS Capturing Al-Ramadi	الرمادي وخطر الانهيار الأمريكي على السعودية “والأردن” (Literally: <i>Ramadi and the danger of the collapse of America on Saudi Arabia and Jordan</i>), “المستفيدون من” “انقراط الرمدادي” (Literally: <i>Beneficiaries of the collapse of Ramadi</i>) and “بل” “المنطقة كلها برميل من البارود” (Literally: <i>But the whole region is a barrel of gunpowder</i>)
Introductions/ Prefaces	<p>“airstrikes by the U.S-led international coalition”</p> <p>“the Islamic State (ISIS) won another strategic victory”</p> <p>“the American efforts to sign a nuclear agreement with Iran in the near future”</p> <p>“causes Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to fear”</p>	No introductions/prefaces
Image and Captures	ISIS fighters in Ramadi (image: the-newkhalij.com, June 4, 2015)	No images and captures
Text	Selected excerpts	Full text
Headings	<p>‘Al-Quds Al-Arabi’: <i>The Fall Of Al-Ramadi</i> Has Proven That Continuing To Rely On <i>The U.S. Is Suicidal</i></p> <p>Former ‘Al-Sharq Al-Awsat’ Editor: U.S. Has Given <i>Iran</i> Free Reign In Iraq</p> <p>‘Al-Hayat’ Columnist: U.S. Recognizes <i>Iranian</i> Role In Iraq</p>	No headings
Endnotes	Three references to the Arabic source texts	No references

Source: Authors’ own analysis.



In the Arabic source article, the emphasis is on the inhumanely killing of Muath Al-Kassasba rather than MEMRI's emphasis on the unity of Jordanian on revenge.

It is noticed that MEMRI's introductions zooms out from the focus picture of the humanitarian case of burning to death the Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kassasba to a ideologically-framed bigger picture that illustrates an agreement status of the Jordanian official and public on taking a quick reaction by revenging from *Daesh* and executing its prisoners in the Jordan.

The narrative reported in MEMRI's translations depends largely on thematic framings in contrast to the original Arabic authors who episodically frame their narratives. MEMRI's thematic framings begin with its titles as discussed earlier. In SD 6067 title, a thematic framing is illustrated in the generalisation of the three editorials as "*Saudi, Qatari Press*". According to this SD, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* is "the London-based *Qatari* daily", *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* is "the London-based *Saudi* daily" and *Al-Hayat* is "the London-based *Saudi* daily". However, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* is "an independent pan-Arab daily newspaper"⁴, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* is "the world's premier pan-Arab daily newspaper"⁵, and *Al-Hayat* is "the world's independent political pan-Arab daily newspaper"⁶. It is noticed then that none of these newspapers acknowledge being a Saudi or Qatari. They rather emphasise of being pan-Arab and independent. MEMRI, therefore, attempts to convey a different message than the original by steering the attention from the fall of Al-Ramadi city under *Daesh* control to the Saudi and Qatari official views as claimed to be represented in these three articles. Al-Ramadi is thus placed last word in MEMRI's title. MEMRI continues applying its thematic framing in its general introduction to the translations to come. It started by illustrating a wider picture of the scene: "*despite airstrikes by the U.S.-led international coalition, the Islamic State (ISIS) won another strategic victory when it captured the city of Al-Ramadi, the capital of*

4 http://www.alquds.co.uk/?page_id=521704 (last accessed on 18 April 2017).

5 <http://english.aawsat.com/about-us> (last accessed on 18 April 2017).

6 <http://www.alhayat.com/AboutWebsite> (last accessed on 18 April 2017).



Al-Anbar governorate, which is home to a Sunni majority". MEMRI also challenges the Arabic narratives especially when the U.S. is accused and calls the readers to thematically read its narrative as follows: "Al-Quds Al-Arabi *claimed* that the reason for ISIS's appearance in Iraq was the country's occupation by the U.S.", "The reason for this, he *claimed*, was *the U.S.'s hesitance*" and "Al-Hayat, *claimed* that Iraq faces a dual danger from ISIS and from Iran, which seeks to take it over with *American backing*".

In the context of thematic and episodic framings, MEMRI's overall delivery of its translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* tends to apply thematic framing by adding extra details from external sources, calling readers to doubt the Arabic narratives under translation and decontextualizing the Arabic narratives through selection/deselection of passages to translate. This thematic framing aims to shift the readers' attention and links the happenings to larger narratives i.e. the 'War on Terror' and 'Jihad and Terrorism' which were not linked in the original narratives.

TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL FRAMINGS

Temporality, of time, and spatially, of space, are integrated parts rather than independent. They are significant framing devices of context that operate without the translators' direct intervention in the text. The sequence of narrative elements either temporally or spatially represents its contextual framing that guides the audience to the preferred interpretation. This type of contextual framings is constructed by selecting a story or a part of from a particular context in a given time and place and relocated it in new settings of different time and place. Following Baker's (2006), this study understands that the sequence of placing elements of narratives is more significant in the presentation of temporality than the correct order of chronological 'real' time of events. Thus spatiality is an integrated feature within temporality. Temporality achieves its framing effects through the insertion of some events in "a sequential context and in a specific temporal and spatial configuration that renders them intelligible" (Baker, 2006 p. 51). For examples, MEMRI employs



(de)selective translation of particular articles, passages and sentences, and assembles its (de)selective translations of more than one article which are usually of a different storyline in achieving temporality effects as follows:

Table 3: Special Dispatch No. 6239; Egyptian Columnists: Egypt Needs To Fight ISIS In Libya – Unilaterally If Necessary– Contextual analysis

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Item	Source Narrative 1	Source Narrative 2	MEMRI's Narrative
Events	1. Increasing pressures on <i>Daesh</i> in Iraq and Syria.	As of ST 1.	As of ST 1.
	2. <i>Daesh</i> attempts to control Libya.	As of ST 1.	As of ST 1.
	3. <i>Daesh</i> fully control the Libyan city of Sirte.	As of ST 1.	As of ST 1.
	4. <i>Daesh</i> is trying to control the Libyan city of Ajdabiya.	As of ST 1, the city of Benghazi.	As of ST 1.
	5. United Nation warns the international community of <i>Daesh's</i> attempts in controlling Libya.	-	As of ST 1.
	6. Egypt warns the international community of the dangerous situation in Libya.	-	As of ST 1.
	7. France Minister of Defence warns the Europeans of <i>Daesh</i> in Libya.	-	Deselected.
	8. Europeans limited their military response in Libya.	As of ST1.	As of ST 1.
	9. Western and American refusal of arming the Haftar, the authorized Libyan commander of army.	As of ST1.	As of ST 1.
	10. Call for official Egyptian strategic planning of defence against <i>Daesh</i> in Libya.	As of ST1.	As of ST 1.



Justification	1. Russian attacks against <i>Daesh</i> in Syria and Iraq.	As of ST1.	Deselected.
	2. (a) To use Libya as a base of its attacks against Egypt and other neighbouring countries of north Africa and Mediterranean Europe, as well as it's the best alternative to be its headquarter.	As of ST1.	As of ST1.
	(b) <i>Daesh</i> was encouraged to control Libya by the unstable situation raised after the NATO's ending of Al-Gadhafi's ruling in 2011 that left Libya to the vandalism of some military gangs.	As of ST1.	Deselected.
	3. (a) Sirte is a strategic city designed by Al-Gadhafi in a hope to be the capital for the African Union after the hope of Arabian Union faded.	As of ST1, the city of Benghazi.	Deselected.
	(b) Sirte has the port and the largest air base as well as convention centres which were built by Al-Gadhafi as the potential capital of the African Union.	-	Deselected.
	4. Ajdabiya is Libya's largest petroleum resource. <i>Daesh</i> lost 75% of its petroleum in Syria due to the Russian attacks which was sold in the black markets of Turkey.	-	Deselected.
	5. 800 fighters of <i>Daesh</i> have reached Libya to enhance the military attempts in controlling Ajdabiya.	-	Deselected.
	6. <i>Daesh's</i> increasing power in Libya threatens the security of Egypt including <i>Daesh's</i> attempts to control Sinai.	-	Deselected.
	7. There is high possibility of <i>Daesh</i> establishing a terrorist base in Libya.	-	Deselected.
	8. To give support to the United Nation Envoy efforts in structuring a Libyan unity government.	As of ST1.	As of ST1.
9. Implicitly, to preserve <i>Daesh</i> in Libya.	As of ST1.	Deselected.	
10. <i>Daesh</i> possible attacks against Egypt and controlling Sinai from Libya.	As of ST1.	As of ST1.	

Source: Authors own analysis.



In supporting its narrative signalled in its title “Egyptian Columnists” rather than MEMRI’s norm of generalization as “Press” that elaborated in the first introductory paragraph, “... *two columnists for the Egyptian daily Al-Watan have called for Egypt to launch a preemptive offensive against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya...*” (italics in original, bold added), and in the second introductory paragraph where it cites a source⁷ elsewhere not included in the originals “...*the Fatwa Monitoring Observatory... has recently issued a report warning of the influx of foreign ISIS fighters to the city of Sirte in Libya. The report likewise warned of ISIS expansion in Libya and its use as a base for attacks on neighboring countries*” (italics in original, bold added), MEMRI deselects a large text to translate in the two original articles and the other supporting citation elsewhere. These deselected texts function as temporal configuration of the text and their deselection illustrates a different causal-effect relationship (causal emplotment) than suggested in the originals by reframing the morality of the source narratives. In this SD, MEMRI deselects extensively any justification of action against *Daesh* in Libya including its potential and serious threat represented in the connections with Boko Haram in Africa and Ansar Al-Maqdis in Sinai and Gaza. MEMRI also deselects the text of the European intervention in this story as well as the story of Al-Gadhafi who tried to establish the Arabian Union and the African Union which faded by the NATO attack against Al-Gadhafi regime in 2011 leaving Libya to some gangs. MEMRI also deselects *Daesh*’s major intention of controlling the petroleum in Libya as well as the Russian role in eliminating *Daesh* power in Syria and Iraq. Through this major deselection of justification of events, MEMRI attempts to reframe the temporal configuration of the Arabic narratives illustrating that the call of the two columnists does not represent the official view in Egypt and that any action against *Daesh* in Libya is ‘offensive’ and baseless.

7 <http://aawsat.com/home/article/518506/> (Last accessed on 23 April 2017).



Another example that illustrates temporal and spatial framing is MEMRI's Special Dispatch No. 5970. In this SD, MEMRI compiles selective translations of four Arabic editorials, the following sequence follows MEMRI's presentation.

SOURCE NARRATIVE 1 (SN 1)

The first selectively translated Arabic editorial entitled "استمرار داعش وصمة عار في جبين الإنسانية" (Literally: The continuous of *Daesh* is a smirch on humanity forehead) was published on 4 February 2015. The editorial states that the execution of the Jordanian pilot by burning to death is inhumane, unreligious and unethical, and it is *merely an episode* in *Daesh* series that claimed to apply Islamic law but its crimes are at variance proof. Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate *Daesh* at all levels. *The continuous of Daesh represents a serious danger that requires the confrontation of Daesh and suing its supports at the international courts as well as the requirement of the United Nation to find ways to eliminate the organisation.* It is also necessary to locate a ground military force particularly in Syria to remove all causes of *Daesh* establishment.

SN1 AS NARRATED BY MEMRI

"An editorial published in the *government* daily Al-Sharq on February 4, 2015, *one day after the burning of the Jordanian pilot*, stated that this event was "further proof of the need to eliminate this organization [ISIS], militarily and ideologically." It also stated that "placing *troops on the ground*, especially in Syria, has now become a pressing necessity, in order to eliminate [ISIS] along with all the elements that caused it to emerge and to spread."

MEMRI SD states that this editorial represents the *government* of Saudi Arabia a member of the international coalition to counter *Daesh*, as suggested in its introductory paragraph. However, the daily Al-Sharq is not a government daily⁸. MEMRI

8 <http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2017/03/18/1660009> (Last accessed on 25 April 2017).



also selected only two sentences out of five to translate in any attempt to reframe the Arabic narrative into its own *Daesh* burned the Jordanian pilot to death thus the Saudi government calls upon a ground forces to eliminate *Daesh*, rather than “*the continuous of Daesh represents a serious danger that requires the confrontation of Daesh and suing its supports at the international courts as well as the requirement of the United Nation to find ways to eliminate the organisation*”. To further reframe the temporal configuration of the Arabic editorial, MEMRI states “An editorial published in the government daily Al-Sharq on February 4, 2015, *one day after the burning of the Jordanian pilot, stated that...*”.

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SOURCE NARRATIVE 2 (SN 2)

The second selectively translated Arabic editorial entitled “*الغارات الجوية لا تكفي للقضاء على داعش*” (Literally: Air strikes are not enough to end *Daesh*) was published on 10 February 2015 and states that the international coalition to counter *Daesh* performed nine airstrikes against *Daesh*, and that in a response to the killing of its pilot, the Jordanian forces alone performed 56 air raids against *Daesh* *killing tens of Daesh members and destroying their weapon stores*. The international coalition announced its supports to *the Iraqi forces ground attack against Daesh*. However, the *Syrian regime refuses any intervention by foreign forces in Syria* believing that the elimination of *Daesh* means the end of the illegitimate regime and the reveal of its crimes. The problem of *Daesh* is unsolvable but with military ground intervention that is in parallel to the airstrikes. *This thought was perceived by the international coalition realized in its support to the Iraqi forces*. Since *Daesh* members hide among the civilians who the international coalition avoids to strike. The Syrian regime attracted extremist and terrorist organizations that are against all including the international community and neighbouring countries and that are too difficult to eliminate due to *the failure of reaching real solutions to eliminate these organisations on the ground*.



SN2 AS NARRATED BY MEMRI

“An editorial published *one week later*, on February 10, in the *government* daily Al-Watan, also complained that the numerous airstrikes against ISIS were ineffective and *called for boots on the ground*: “The predicament of ISIS’s presence and expansion cannot be solved without *a military ground intervention*, accompanied by ongoing airstrikes... ISIS members have managed to infiltrate cities and regions and hide among the residents of the areas they control. *Airstrikes alone are useless in eliminating this organization*, since the coalition tries to avoid [harming] unarmed civilians in these areas, and [therefore] makes do with attacking key [ISIS] targets. *That is not enough in a war of this sort...*”

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It is noticed that MEMRI tries to reframe the temporal configuration of the Arabic editorial by deselecting the following parts: “the Jordanian forces alone performed 56 *air raids* against *Daesh killing tens of Daesh members and destroying their weapon stores*.”, “The international coalition announced its supports to *the Iraqi forces ground attack against Daesh*”, and “the *Syrian regime refuses any intervention by foreign forces in Syria* believing that the elimination of *Daesh* means the end of the illegitimate regime”. These deselected parts set the Arabic narrative in a temporality of an average success of the air strikes as understood in the killing of tens of *Daesh* members by the Jordanian air forces, in the existing of a ground attack against *Daesh*, and in the rejection of such by the Syrian regime. MEMRI’s narrative, on the other hand, suggests a strong links between the calling of a ground attack – which already exists - and the burning to death of the Jordanian pilot as stated in its framed temporal settings “An editorial published *one week later*”, and compiled under the subheading “*Saudi Editorials: Airstrikes Alone Are Ineffective, A Ground Campaign Is Necessary*” (emphasis added).

SOURCE NARRATIVE 3 (SN 3)

The third selectively quoted Arab editorial entitled “*We need Arab boots on the ground to defeat ISIS*” was published in English on 10 February 2015. A large part of the editorial was paraphrased by MEMRI removing *some* events. The sequence of events of the



Arab editorial that represents its temporal configuration, therefore, was reframed in MEMRI's translation. Here is an excerpt of the original narrative followed by its reframed version in MEMRI's translation.

“*After the burning alive of Jordanian fighter pilot Moaz Al-Kasasbeh by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a strong response— international in nature, but Arab at its core—is needed, not as retaliation for this abominable crime, but to finally defeat ISIS and rein in the other evil forces wreaking havoc in Syria and Iraq, namely Bashar Al-Assad and Iran.*

Months ago I wrote in this paper that the fight against ISIS was at heart a Sunni one, and I believe recent events now prove this to be true. There are a number of reasons as to why I conceive this as a Sunni battle. One is that the lack of a prominent Sunni presence fighting ISIS will leave the door open for Iran and sect-based militias to fill the vacuum in Syria and Iraq. This will seriously threaten the unity of these countries, helping Assad to turn Syria into a country of militias, or bringing about more Nuri Al-Maliki-style sectarian politics in Iraq—or a scenario in either country along the lines of the Houthi takeover of Yemen.

The international anti-ISIS coalition now needs to shift gear and put Arab boots on the ground in Syria and Iraq, bolstering these forces with aerial bombardment. This is the only way to contain and eventually destroy ISIS”.

SN3 AS NARRATED BY MEMRI

“Some Arab writers presented more detailed proposals for a *ground campaign* against ISIS. For example, Tariq Alhomayed, formerly the editor of the London-based Saudi daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* and now a columnist for the daily, wrote that the war against ISIS must be a Sunni Arab one, and called to form a *coalition of Sunni Arab ground troops* to fight this organization in Syria and Iraq. He added that the war must be aimed not only at eliminating this organization but also at preventing Iran and Bashar Al-Assad from taking over the areas from which ISIS is expelled.

After establishing a connection between the Arab editorials call for a ground troops and the burning to death of the Jordanian



pilot in its introductory and translations of SN1 and SN2, MEMRI disregarded the SN3 “After the burning alive of Jordanian fighter pilot Moaz Al-Kasasbeh by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a strong response— international in nature, but Arab at its core—is needed”. This skip illustrates MEMRI’s intention behind the translations under analysis i.e. a mandatory and public and official request of “a ground campaign against ISIS [(in) Syria]”. It is also noticed that MEMRI’s reframed temporal configuration removes the reason behind the call for Sunni Arab ground troops that is the fearing of “more Nuri Al-Maliki-style sectarian politics in Iraq—or a scenario in either country along the lines of the Houthi takeover of Yemen”. This temporal reframing of the events of the original narrative shifts in turn the sequence of events. This shift is represented as follows.

Table 4a: SD 5970 – Contextual analysis

SN3	SN3 as narrated in MEMRI
<p>1. <i>The burning alive of Jordanian fighter pilot</i>”.</p> <p>2. A suggestion for “a strong response — international in nature, but Arab at its core”.</p> <p>3. <i>A serious threat by Iran and Bashar Al-Assad of sectarian scenario in Syria following the Iraqi and Yemeni.</i></p> <p>“seriously threaten the unity of these countries... bringing about more Nuri Al-Maliki-style sectarian politics in Iraq—or a scenario in either country along the lines of the Houthi takeover of Yemen”.</p> <p>4. A suggestion of “a prominent Sunni presence fighting ISIS”</p> <p>5. <i>The necessity of “containing and eventually destroying Daesh.</i></p> <p>6. A suggestion to “put Arab boots on the ground in Syria and Iraq”.</p>	<p>1. “The war against ISIS must be a Sunni Arab one”.</p> <p>2. “And called to form a coalition of Sunni Arab ground troops to fight this organization in Syria and Iraq”.</p> <p>3. “Eliminating this organization [Daesh] but [and] also at preventing Iran and Bashar Al-Assad from taking over”.</p>

Source: Authors’ own analysis.

SOURCE NARRATIVE 4 (SN 4)

The fourth selectively translated Arabic editorial entitled “احراق الطيار الاردني سيسغل فتيل النهاية” Literally : Burning the Jordanian



pilot will light the end wick) was published on 6 February 2015. Similar to the SN3, MEMRI eliminated some events of the Arabic original narrative and reframed its temporal configuration by re-sequencing its events as follows.

Table 4b: SD 5970 – Contextual analysis

SN4	SN4 as narrated by MEMRI	Change
<p>1. <i>"The killing of the Jordanian pilot by Daesh"</i>.</p> <p>2. "The international coalition against <i>Daesh</i>... achieved so little".</p> <p>3. "<i>Daesh</i> is a threat on Islam, Muslims and mankind".</p> <p>4. "airstrikes alone are insufficient... similar to the liberation of Kuwait".</p> <p>5. "the American does not acknowledge such... instead it supports the Iraqi army that is unable to achieve this difficult mission [eliminating <i>Daesh</i>]".</p> <p>6. <i>"The Kurdish army... may contribute in a solution and confrontation on the ground... but the case is greater... The Syrian opposition... is one reason of enabling Daesh..."</i>.</p> <p>7. "There is no solution but a ground confrontation..."</p> <p>8. <i>The Jordanian example of confronting the extremist ideologies and groups in Jordan.</i></p> <p>9. <i>In conclusion, this crime [burning to death of the Jordanian pilot by Daesh] is a strategic turning point that requires a [military] ground confrontation eliminating its ideological and financial resources.</i></p>	<p>1. "called to form a coalition of armies similar to the one formed in 1990 to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait".</p> <p>2. "the war against ISIS must take place not only in Syria and Iraq but also in Egypt, Libya and Yemen".</p> <p>3. "criticized Obama's plan to rely primarily on the Iraqi army to defeat ISIS".</p> <p>4. "The international coalition against ISIS and its ilk...very few achievements on the ground".</p> <p>5. "ISIS is a threat not only to Islam and the Muslims but to all of mankind".</p> <p>6. "Clearly, airstrikes alone are insufficient, and there is no choice... but to fight [ISIS] on the ground with a coalition of armies, like the coalition that liberated Kuwait".</p> <p>7. "But the Americans, who are leading the [present] coalition, do not want to recognize this... Instead, he [the American] is trying to support the Iraqi military, arm it and train it...looking for a political solution... But clearly, the Iraqi army, which is fragmented and exhausted".</p> <p>8. "There is no solution but a ground war, not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and in every place where the Salafi-jihadi movement is present and its culture has spread".</p>	<p>1. Omission of SN4-1.</p> <p>2. Re-sequence of the SN4-2 into MEMRI-4.</p> <p>3. Re-sequence of the SN4-3 into MEMRI-5.</p> <p>4. Re-sequence of the SN4-4 into MEMRI-1 and 6.</p> <p>5. Re-sequence of the SN4-5 into MEMRI-3 and 7.</p> <p>6. Omission of SN4-6.</p> <p>7. Re-sequence of the SN4-7 into MEMRI- 2 and 8.</p> <p>8. Omission of SN4-8.</p> <p>9. Omission of SN4-9.</p>

Source: Authors' own analysis.



It is noticed that MEMRI attempts to eliminate any part of the narrative that signals or proposes to any alternatives of a military ground intervention in Syria such as the Jordanian example in uniting against the ideology of *Daesh* in Jordan, the support of Kurdish army against *Daesh* and/or the elimination of the ideological and financial supports to *Daesh*. This attempt in turn explains the intention behind MEMRI's temporal framing of the Arabic narrative.

In re-sequencing the events of the original articles, MEMRI employs the tactic of salience in which it “mak[es] a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (Entman, 1993 p. 53). The following equation illustrates the full picture of the narrative elaborated in MEMRI's SD under analysis:

Daesh's burning to death of the Jordanian pilot = Saudi official call for a ground force

To further demonstrate the significance of temporality here, consider the effect of placing the shared storyline of the four original editorials at once and compare it with their translations by MEMRI. In this case, a different narrative would emerge resulting from the temporal framing of the sequence of events as follows.

A. THE SHARED STORYLINE OF THE FOUR ORIGINAL EDITORIALS:

1. *Daesh* burned to death the Jordanian pilot.
2. *Daesh* does not represent Islam and Muslim and it is a terrorist group that threatens the world.
3. There is a necessity to eliminate *Daesh* at military, ideological and financial levels.
4. The international coalition against *Daesh* does so little in eliminating *Daesh*.
5. The airstrikes are not enough alone to eliminate *Daesh*.
6. A ground operation is suggested to support the efforts of eliminating *Daesh*.
7. A rejection of this suggestion by Obama's administration and the Syrian regime.



8. There is already a ground operation against by the Iraqi Army, the Kurdish army and the Syrian opposition with limited success.
9. A military ground operation would not be effective without the elimination of *Daesh's* ideology, culture and financial resources not only in Syria but elsewhere.

B. MEMRI'S STORYLINE IN ITS TRANSLATIONS OF THE FOUR EDITORIALS:

1. "ISIS's execution of the Jordanian pilot".
2. "Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have *questioned* the effectiveness of *airstrikes* in defeating this organization".
3. "articles in the Saudi *press*, which attacked the coalition's policy and called upon it to dispatch *ground forces*".
4. "Some articles also *slammed* the Middle East policy of U.S. President Barack Obama".
5. "the need to eliminate this organization [ISIS], militarily and ideologically".
6. "funding and arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA)".
7. "ISIS is a threat not only to Islam and the Muslims but to all of mankind".
8. "U.S. President Obama... is trying to support the Iraqi military".
9. "There is no solution but a ground war, not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and in every place where the Salafi-jihadi movement is present and its culture has spread..."

It is noticed that MEMRI places additional events as in points 2, 3 and 4 in a temporal reframing of the originals as understood in "questioned, attacked and slammed". The effectiveness of airstrikes and the need to a ground operation were prioritized in MEMRI's narrative and placed in points 2 and 3 while they are placed in points 5 and 6 of the original.

RELATIONALITY

Contemporary, newspapers and TV channels among other media outlets are employed as sites not only for negotiating



ideologically-loaded political concepts and views but also for negotiating and assessing socially, culturally and religiously-loaded terminologies. Following the examples of racism and discrimination, circulated narratives of Islam and Muslims and their relations to terrorism are marketed by some media outlets and undermined by others. In their efforts to undermine or market this idea, media outlets draw their narratives largely using the narrativity feature relationality. Recalling the functionality of relationality as discussed by Baker, relationality is used “to inject a target text or discourse with implicit meanings derived from the way a particular item functions in the public or meta-narratives circulating in the target context, thus obscuring or downplaying its relational load in the source environment” (2006 p.66). In translating Islamic concepts, relationality is mainly drawn through the borrowing of the ST term in the TT. Two issues, therefore, emerge in leaving value-laden terms of the ST untranslated. These issues are the background knowledge of the reader of the ST versus of the TT, and the intention of using such terms by the original author versus the translator. In other words, as Friedman puts it: a text is “a site for negotiating meanings that might well function both regressively and progressively, *depending on who is doing the reading and for what purpose*” (1995 p. 27) (italics added). An interesting example that illustrates the effectiveness of framing relationality in translation is presented in MEMRI’s borrowing of the Arabic word ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*) in its translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh*. In the context of the current research data, the Arabic word ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*) was left untranslated in MEMRI SD Nos. 5575, 5718, 6159, 5969, 5970, 6288 and 5911.

Special Dispatch No. 5575; Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda

The notion of ‘*jihad*’ presented in the original Arabic narrative entitled “لا بد من «عنوان آخر» و «أمن» للراغبين بالجهاد في سورية” ([there] should be ‘another address’ and ‘security’ for whom willing to fight in Syria) and in its English translation by MEMRI entitled ‘*Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda*’ is of difference. MEMRI adopts the Arabic word ‘*Jihad*’ in its translation as an equivalent suggesting



that both the Arabic and the English semantic sense of '*jihad*' is the same, although *jihad* has several meaning depending on the context including struggling and striving. According to Oxford Dictionaries, 'Jihad' is defined as "(Among Muslims) a war or struggle against unbelievers"⁹. However, according to the Islamic Supreme Council of America, the Arabic world '*Jihad*' is not an equivalent to the English 'war' which has the Arabic equivalent 'الحرب' (al-harb). The Council further explains that "*Jihad* is not a violent concept" and "*Jihad* is not a declaration of war against other religions". The Council elaborates as follows¹⁰:

"In a religious sense, as described by the Quran and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (s), "*jihad*" has many meanings. It can refer to internal as well as external efforts to be a good Muslims or believer, as well as working to inform people about the faith of Islam. If military *jihad* is required to protect the faith against others, it can be performed using anything from legal, diplomatic and economic to political means. If there is no peaceful alternative, Islam also allows the use of force, but there are strict rules of engagement. Innocents - such as women, children, or invalids - must never be harmed, and any peaceful overtures from the enemy must be accepted".

Nevertheless, the well-established meta-narrative on '*Jihad*' across nations especially in the West, links the concept '*jihad*' to 'terror acts' by individual Muslims as seen in the Oxford Dictionaries definition of 'Jihad' and MEMRI's project "Jihad and Terrorism (JTTM)"¹¹. This narrative promotes a completely different narrative of the concept '*Jihad*' based on the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Baker 2010). Accordingly, the English concept 'Jihad' is not the equivalent of

9 <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/jihad> (accessed on 23 February 2016).

10 <http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9> (accessed on 23 February 2016).

11 <https://www.memri.org/jttm> (MEMRI's project of Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, accessed 29 March 2017).



the Arabic ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*) but a misleading concept. By utilizing the narrativity feature of relationality, MEMRI reconstitutes the source narrative by the ideologically loaded concept of ‘*jihad*’ in the target society i.e. the West whom its translations are dedicated to.

Special Dispatch No. 6159; Iraqi Columnist: Why Aren’t Muslim Clerics Calling For Jihad Against ISIS?

Another example of the strategic use of framing relationality in MEMRI’s translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* is its borrowing of the Arabic “شَيْخ” (*sheikh*) as in its SD Nos. 5575, 5846, 5872, 5969, 6063, 6159 and 6288. MEMRI attempts to suggest links between the Arabic word ‘شَيْخ’ (*sheikh*) and what it calls ‘Islamist/Salafi-extremists’ such as its SD Nos. 5575, 5846 and 5872. In addition, MEMRI also attempts to draw a relation between the Arabic word *sheikh* and ‘terrorists’ representing in *Daesh*’s leader Abu-Baker Al-Baghdadi in SD No. 5969 and Al-Qaeda then leader Osama Bin Laden in SD No. 6288. The Arabic word *sheikh* was not defined and/or explained in any of MEMRI’s translations under analysis, rather it was left ambiguously untranslated. In the Arabic dictionary, *sheikh*, plural ‘شيوخ’ *sheiukh*, means “A venerable old man. A man above fifty years of age. A man of authority” (Al-Khudrawi, 2004 p. 281) and *sheikh fani* is translated to “very old man” (Alkhuli, 1989 p. 61). *Shaykh* or *Sheikh* or *Sheik* “شَيْخ”, according to the Glossary of Islamic terms in Arabic¹² of The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), is:

“A honorific term in the Arabic language that literally means “elder”. It is commonly used to designate an elder of a tribe, a revered wise man, or an Islamic scholar. It also refers to a person when they have completed their undergraduate university studies in Islamic studies and are trained in giving lectures”.

12 http://www.iman.co.nz/glossary_of_islamic_terms_in_arabic.php (last accessed on 29 April 2017).

Shaykh (plural shuyukh) is a general term that is called for “someone who is over fifty, or the patriarch of the tribe or family, a title of respect” (Bewley, 1998 p.21).

Sheikh, therefore, as an honour title especially for ruling family members in the Arabian Gulf countries is commonly preferred to be transliterated rather than translated following other titles such as Dato, Datuk, Dato Seri, among others¹³, in Malaysia, Hári and Datu, among others¹⁴, in the Philippines, and Sir and Dame/Lady, among others¹⁵, in England. However, *sheikh* when refers to an elder man over fifty is suggested to be translated into ‘old’, as in the translation of Ernest Hemingway’s (1952) *the Old Man and the Sea*. The Arabic *sheikh* is also suggested by Oxford English Dictionary¹⁶ to be translated into ‘senior’ or ‘leader’ when it refers to a man with degree in Islamic studies in the Muslim community as well as to a patriarch of the tribe or family.

In the Arabic article under analysis, the Arabic word “شيخ” (*sheikh*) is used in its plural form ‘شيوخ’ (*sheiukh*) in a genitive case to the word ‘Islam’ suggesting the meaning ‘leaders of Islam’ as follows: “العلمانيون والكفار اكثر غيرة على الاسلام من شيوخه” (Secularists and non-believers of Islam are more zealous for *Islam* than its leaders), “نرى ان شيوخ الاسلام ورجالته يعيشون حالة من الهدوء النفسى” (we notice that *leaders of Islam* and its men live in a state of psychological calmness), “ما يدعو للاستغراب هو ان بعضا من (شيوخ الاسلام)”, (what is surprising is that some of *leaders of Islam*), “وما يدعو للاستغراب ايضا ان قسما من هؤلاء الشيوخ” (what also is surprising is that part of *those leaders*), and “فاما ان يكون شيوخ الدين الاسلامي ودعاته جناء”

13 https://darswiki.bsp.ox.ac.uk/index.php?title=Malaysian_Honours_Titles (last accessed on 30 April 2017).

14 https://www.know.cf/enciclopedia/tab/en/Filipino_styles_and_honorfics/77a44fbcaac742a77a9d5a4e1b49d5df5db1a5d0 (last accessed on 30 April 2017).

15 <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/HnrSystm.html> (Last accessed on 30 April 2017).

16 <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sheikh> (Last accessed on 30 April 2017).



(either *leaders of the religion of Islam* and its preachers are coward). In MEMRI's translation under analysis, the Arabic word *sheiukh* was left untranslated suggesting that the Arabic *sheiukh* has only one meaning and it is largely and correctly understood by English-speaking. In addition, similarly to the Arabic *jihad*, MEMRI attempts to grant a negative sense to the Arabic/Islamic term *sheiukh* by leaving it intentionally untranslated. MEMRI neutralizes its attempts by adding the definition article 'the' and the plural marker 's' to the Arabic *sheikh* as follows: "Secularists and Infidels Are More Zealous for Islam than the Sheikhs", "we see Islam's sheikhs and clerics living in enviable peace", "It is strange that some of the 'sheikhs of Islam'", "It is also strange that some sheikhs", and "One – the sheikhs and preachers of Islam are cowards".

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have explained the notion 'context' and its significant function as a configuration set by the author for his/her text or part of in order to construct the overall meaning as well as its particularities and directing its interpretation. In other words, context plays a vital role in avoiding any ambiguity for text interpretation as we illustrated in the example of the English word 'call'. In the process of translating a given text within a defined context into another language/target audience, the context is more likely to alter which in turn "requires a fresh literary-linguistic invention" (Bruner, 1991 p. 14). Context is a dependent variable governed by several factors including culture, politics, religion, education and ideology of a particular group of people, a society. These factors represent the thematic and episodic settings of a narrative. The passage of time between the publication of the source text and its translation is also a significant factor in the reconstruction of the source context since different elements emerge to the scene. This factor represents the temporality of a narrative. Relationality, moreover, represents another factor in framing context by suggesting relations between un-explicitly related elements of the narrative. In the context of the translations under analysis, MEMRI



systematically reframes the contextual configuration of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* through the use of different contextual framing strategies. Among these various framing devices of context are its generalization of one to few opinions as public and official, selecting and deselecting certain text or part of to translate, adding information that do not exist in the original, providing biographic information about the author and subjects of the source narrative, omission of some events, and adopting a value-loaded term from a context and inject it in a totally different context. The power of these reframing devices of context lies on the fact that they do not need to intervene in the immediate text thus the translation would seem neutral at first glance. The findings of this study agrees with Bratož (2014) who emphasises on the dynamic role of the translators' preferences of certain conceptualisation in translating political discourse across different cultures and languages specially those among the Euro-Mediterranean and the West.

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