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Intercultural Dialogue and Human Rights: Prospects for a Euromediterranean Citizenship

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THE PAPER PROPOSES THE DEVELOPMENT of a new conception of citizenship (more inclusive, active and plural) for all the peoples living in the territory of the partner States of the Union for the Mediterranean, to be based on the sharing of common ontological values and the respect for cultural diversity. Because of its foundations, the prospective success of this proposal depends on the development of intercultural dialogue and on an equal protection of human rights in the region, while an evolution of the current institutional structure of the Union for the Mediterranean would be needed to enforce this and other contextual proposals which might be made in its framework.

INTRODUCTION

The mingling of cultures, traditions, languages and religions which has been characterising the Euromediterranean region for centuries – despite present conflicts and cultural stereotypes, political difficulties and socio-economical contradictions – allows forseeing the potential existence, among Euromediterranean populations, of a sense of belonging to a common civilization. This possibility sounds like a strong antidote to the threat posed by the *Clash of Civilizations* (Huntington 1993) and to many of the obstacles preventing today any substantial step towards the realisation of an area of peace, human security and welfare around the Mediterranean and not only there: because of the specificity and the complexity of this region – as Xuereb pointed out – 'if we find answers in the Mediterranean, we find them also for Europe and also for the whole world' (Xuereb 2007, 232).

How is it possible to reinforce this sense of belonging and make it overcome stereotypes and differences in the region? How may cultural

diversity be conciliated and interrelated with universal values towards the recognition of this common feeling? How may equal rights be granted to all citizens in the region? And yet, which would be the best institutional framework to undertake this process?

[164] This paper tries to give an answer to these questions, proposing as their solution the identification and codification of a group of specific citizenship rights for all the peoples living in the region to be included in a more general Euromediterranean Charter of Human Rights, adopted in the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

The first part of the paper analyses the relationship between intercultural dialogue and human rights and their position among the priorities of the Union for the Mediterranean. This chapter also introduces the concept of Euromediterranean Citizenship and its basic features, including its relation with the development of economic integration in the region.

The second part is dedicated to the definition of a Euromediterranean Charter for Human Rights, intended as a necessary tool to improve intercultural dialogue and human rights in the region while respecting the cultural diversity of its populations. Prospective advantages and the main obstacles brought by the proposed charter – which would act as home for specific Euromediterranean citizenship rights – are discussed within the second part, while in the third part and in the conclusions references are made to the principles which would characterise its contents and the institutional changes needed to enforce it.

Intercultural dialogue and human rights: a basis for the development of the Union for the Mediterranean?

Since the end of the 20th century, and especially following the 2001 terror attacks in New York, intercultural dialogue (or, according to the UN preferred lexicon, dialogue among civilizations) has been intended and promoted worldwide as the major tool to contrast the process of culturalization of conflicts and to promote a 'new humanism,' that is, a new universal vision open to the entire human community (Bokova 2010). Working in this direction, civil society organisations,

NGOs, local and regional authorities, national governments, regional and international organisations have contributed to transforming their efforts for the promotion of intercultural dialogue in a shared, global and universally promoted strategy.

It has been underlined that the final aim of intercultural dialogue is [165] to work together in order to share the common goods (Bekemans 2007; Mascia 2007; Papisca 2007a; Xuereb 2007). The challenge is, therefore, to provide true opportunities to all those living in a given society, not only in order to know and tolerate each other, but, above all, to do things together in the same socio-political community. The reciprocal knowledge obtained through dialogue is essential to identify what to do together, how to do it and to share responsibility about it, in other words, to identify the foundations of a feeling of common belonging among people living in the same community. For these reasons, the concept of intercultural dialogue is intimately related to those of democracy and citizenship. The process of inclusion promoted by dialogue is 'based on the active involvement of multiple social actors and usually emphasizes the participation of previously excluded citizens' (Karasinska-Fendler 2007, 90–91).

In the context of inclusive participation in the political, economical and social life of a community, it is clear that the present concept of national citizenship is not fit to respond to the challenges of multiculturality to which intercultural dialogue is addressed. The process of conceptually and concretely redefining citizenship then becomes urgent: '[...] the legal status of the human being does not stem from the anagraphical power of the state, it is a citizenship not octroyée but simply 'recognised,' for the holder is an 'original' holder, not the 'national' or the 'subject' of whatever state. All human beings, being formally recognised as born with dignity and rights, are by nature citizens of the planet earth.' (Papisca 2007a, 465.)

Thus, the development of intercultural dialogue is anchored to the principle of the equal dignity of every member of the human family, recognised and promoted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the two International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the other legal instruments – at universal and regional levels – constitut-

ing the International Human Rights Law. As a consequence, being its universal paradigm of reference, human rights play an essential role in the context of intercultural dialogue in what can be seen as a bidirectional process, since an effective dialogue needs to be rooted in the
[166] International Human Rights Law, contributing, at the same time, to its effectiveness. This relation works as a solid basis for the proposed conception of citizenship: 'assuming therefore that equal dignity of all the members of the human family is the founding principle of whatever legal system, the intercultural dialogue marked by human rights and by the tension of the telos, of 'what-to do-together-where,' the question that needs to be reopened as regards the traditional concept of citizenship in the sense of making it plural and extending the space it is exercised in' (Papisca 2007b, 35).

Rooted in the theoretical reflection on the relationship between intercultural dialogue, human rights and citizenship issues, briefly outlined in the previous paragraphs, the proposal for the development of a plural, active and inclusive Euromediterranean citizenship in the framework of the UfM finds its institutional anchorage in the official documentation at the basis of the new regional initiative. In the Paris Declaration (2008), Heads of State and Government of the 43 participating Countries have actually underlined 'their commitment to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and the embracing of all human rights and fundamental freedoms,' a commitment which was reiterated six months later in the Marseille Final Statement (2008). Moreover, they have declared 'their ambition to build a common future based on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in International Human Rights Law, such as [...] the advancement of cultural dialogue and mutual understanding' (Paris Declaration). This may be hopefully realised through cooperation with other regional bodies and institutions dealing with those issues in the same geopolitical framework.

In the Mediterranean – besides previous efforts made according to the third basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, in the context of the former Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP) – the main contribution to what was previously defined as a global strategy to pro-

mote intercultural dialogue has been given by the High Level Advisory Group (Group de Sages). This group, created in 2003 by the President of the European Commission, had as its main outcome the setting up, in 2005, of the Anna Lindh Euromediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Among Cultures, the 'key-institution' for taking new, practical action to foster intercultural dialogue in the region (Prodi 2004). A prior important step in this framework had been represented by the launch of the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in 2004, with an internal parliamentary commission on cultural issues. The complementary role of both to the UfM has been recognised either in the Paris Declaration or in the Marseille Final Statement, while the ALF innovative approach to intercultural issues was praised during the latest UN Alliance of Civilizations Forum held in Rio de Janeiro on 28 and 29 May 2010. Thus, with human rights and intercultural dialogue being clearly among the priorities of the Union for the Mediterranean, the position and actual cooperation of ALF and EMPA with the new Euromediterranean bodies in the path of the development of a new Euromediterranean citizenship should be taken into the highest consideration and improved.

Some Reflections about Euromediterranean Citizenship

A starting point of the reflection on intercultural dialogue, human rights and citizenship in the Euromediterranean region is that citizenship rights should be recognised to all people residing in the territory of one of the 43 partner States of the UfM. Being in possession of a national citizenship would not be considered a prerequisite, as it is, for example, in the European Union, where only citizens of member States can benefit from specific European citizenship rights. Conceptually speaking, therefore, the Euromediterranean citizenship is to be intended as something new and not only an extension of some rights, already recognised nationally, to a larger geographical area. It should be built in order to respond genuinely to citizens' needs and to participation requirements other than to the multicultural situations today characterising our societies.

The proposed conception moves in the direction of the notion of 'universal citizenship' (Konopacki 2007; Papisca 2007a) without, how-

ever, the ambition of fulfilling it. The challenge of Euromediterranean citizenship is rather to foster the development of a universally inclusive citizenship by building a valuable institutional precedent towards the redefinition of the concept of citizenship itself, working on deeply different perceptions, political systems and conceptions of society, on the basis of universally shared values, respect for cultural diversity and the principle of equality of every culture/civilization. For these purposes, the adoption of a Euromediterranean Charter of Human Rights (EMCHR) is proposed as an operative tool to codify and foster this approach to citizenship.

In order to reach so ambitious a goal, the will and the support of all peoples living in the area is needed. Indeed, this may be not enough: even the values on which the Euromediterranean Charter would be built should be shared and strongly felt as common by peoples, and their recognition and protection should be required by peoples in a single voice. Promoting this common feeling of belonging in an active way – work together to do together – is, as underlined, the final aim of the intercultural dialogue strategy. Its promotion can be highly encouraged and fulfilled through the efforts of civil society organisations – real 'civil forces to promote intercultural dialogue' (ERICarts 2008) –, and the contribution of local and regional authorities, especially in the cities – 'the natural environment of intercultural dialogue' (Bekemans 2007). The aim is thus to make the common feeling of these values manifest, beyond existing cultural stereotypes, and its benefits and consequences in daily life perceptible. A Euromediterranean human rights charter is only thinkable as the final result of the harmonious interaction of all these conditions which have to be realised and promoted together, even if, at present, admitting that the path to be walked is still very long sounds almost superfluous.

Euromediterranean Citizenship and Economic Integration: The Case of Tourism

An important factor to be taken into consideration in developing a Euromediterranean citizenship regards the relations between social improvements, strongly promoted by intercultural dialogue, and regional economic integration. Taking as reference the European Union, a brief

reflection on the reasons at the basis of European citizenship – the free movement of economically active persons and the members of their families – demonstrates that, at the beginning, the principal objective was economic and the rights which EU citizens enjoyed were firmly linked to the Community's economic issues (Konopacki 2007, 70). For [169] these reasons, considering the relationship between the two sectors is essential, as was clearly stated in the Barcelona Declaration (1995) – 'social development must go hand in hand with any economic development.'

Among the several aspects that are included in the second basket of the Barcelona Process – i. e. the economic partnership –, tourism is probably the one receiving today more increasing attention by partner States and Mediterranean institutions, therefore it has been chosen as an example to demonstrate the benefits of this relationship. The growing importance of this sector is demonstrated by the decision to convey a Euromediterranean tourism conference – the first on this issue since 1995 – in April 2008, while touristic issues were previously included in trade ministerial meetings. In the conclusions of the 2008 conference, besides underlining the central role of tourism in the economic development of the area, Ministers have considered that tourism is an excellent tool for cultural understanding, mutual respect and tolerance, and the stressed the importance of cultural tourism, as well as cultural routes, to best promote our Euromediterranean cultural heritage. Therefore, the strong link between intercultural dialogue, tourism and the aims of Euromediterranean citizenship is evident, since touristic development in the region supports 'the objective of achieving a common area of peace, stability and prosperity, in which cultural affairs and mutual respect and understanding between societies throughout the Mediterranean region are promoted' (Vizjak 2008).

Once adopted this approach, being Euromediterranean citizenship conceived on the reinforcement and institutionalisation of a common sense of belonging to the same civilization (our common heritage) and on respect for cultural diversity, an increase in the volume of tourism in the Mediterranean would, therefore, sensibly help this advancement. Efforts to improve tourism in the region have recently been undertaken by the European Commission, especially under the European

Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), and by the Union for the Mediterranean itself, which has set among its priorities major projects supporting the implementation of tourism in the region, namely the de-pollution of the Mediterranean and the creation of maritime and land highways. Initial results of this commitment are shown in recent statistics, which describe a substantial growth of annual tourist arrivals at borders in the Mediterranean countries and a general improvement in the percentage of travellers coming from the European Union (Eurostat 2009), while an important growth, compared with 2006 collected data, has been forecast in the number of tourist arrivals in Mediterranean countries, despite major differences among them (FEMIP 2008).

Summing up, the growth in tourism and trade integration plays a reinforcing role in the path of Euromediterranean citizenship. On the other hand, the process is bidirectional: if regional touristic and trade improvements constitute a practical prerequisite for the realization of citizenship rights, then improved intercultural dialogue promotion and human rights protection favour a sense of closeness, thus enhancing economic development. In the specific sector of tourism, this means that a stronger awareness of the cultural and artistic richness of the places of destination would improve the volume and the quality of travels to, from and between Mediterranean countries (increasing cultural tourism) and contribute to a stronger integration of the Euromediterranean economy.

A EUROMEDITERRANEAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (EMCHR)

The proposed charter is intended as a new (macro) regional human rights instrument aimed at including, promoting and protecting the ontological values of all the populations living in the Euromediterranean region, with full respect for their cultural diversities. It is not to be considered either as a starting or an arrival point, rather as a vector reinforcing previous efforts towards the promotion of intercultural dialogue in the region and – at the same time – giving new sap to this commitment, opening new paths and new perspectives. The charter is thought of as supplementary to existing regional treaties, which act,

however, as its starting points. The choice is justified by the fact that – being adopted in the framework of regional organisations, which base their political and cultural identity on the geographical area they originally represent (e. g. the Council of Europe or the Arab League) – regional charters on human rights reflect these characteristics and show a marked cultural connotation, which contributes towards constituting their specificity. Because of the inclusive nature of EMCHR, this specificity becomes essential to proceeding with the analysis.

Prior to analysing which may be the contents (principles and rights) of the charter, two preliminary issues regarding the document enforceability will be addressed: the formal 'aptitude' of UfM partner States to adopt human rights treaties, and the possibility to realistically adopt a human rights charter in the present institutional framework of the Union for the Mediterranean.

The Formal 'Aptitude' of UfM States towards Human Rights

A first evaluation of the possibilities to adopt a Euromediterranean human rights charter is to be traced in the adherence level of UfM member States to international legal instruments regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms; although the stimulus and the will for drafting this document shall hopefully come from peoples, civil society associations, academic and religious representatives and 'enlightened' politicians, Governments remain the final point in the ratification and enforcement *iter* of any treaty. Clearly, what is called here 'aptitude' is only one (and probably the most formal) of the several indicators which could be used to study the situation of human rights in one or more countries (others being, for example, the existence of National Human Rights Institutions, national laws and policies about minorities and vulnerable groups, collaboration with international organisations on human rights issues, etc.), but it shows the existence of a minimal requirement by States, which is essential for the track followed in this paper. The analysis can be undertaken at two levels, the international and the regional one.

A glance at the two UN covenants of 1966 – the most 'general' universal human rights treaties – reveals that all the 43 UfM members (plus Libya, the only observer) have ratified both of them, excluding

the Palestinian Authority. This should not be seen as a major obstacle, for the PA is not yet a member of United Nations, and – in Article 18 of the third project of Constitution of the State of Palestine, drafted according to the obligations included in the 2003 Quartet's Road Map for Peace – it is clearly anticipated that the new State, besides abiding by the Universal Declaration of 1948, shall seek to join other international covenants and charters that safeguard human rights.

Regarding the regional level, the situation is much less homogeneous. Taking into consideration the four major legally binding instruments on human rights in the area – the European Convention of Human Rights (1950), the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter, 1981), the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (Nice Charter, 2000) and the Arab Charter of Human Rights (in its emended version, 2004) – partner States place themselves in different geometries. Through the review of the status of ratifications of these treaties it is possible to identify at least four categories: (1) States which are party to two treaties. This group includes all EU States, which are simultaneously members the Council of Europe, and a small group of Southern States – Algeria and Libya, at present – which have ratified both the African and the Arab charters; (2) States which are party to one treaty. The second category includes the members of the Council of Europe which are not member of the EU (Turkey, Monaco and part of the Balkans) and southern partners which have ratified one charter, even if some of them – the northern African States – may have ratified two of them. The group includes Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania for the Banjul Charter, and the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia for the Arab Charter; 3) States which are not party to any treaty but, being member of one or more regional organisations, might adhere to one of the quoted charters. This category includes Lebanon and Morocco; 4) States which are not party to any regional organisation and, therefore, to any regional treaty. This group includes only the State of Israel.

This classification, although variegated, demonstrates the existence of a formal, solid, starting base on which to build the Euromediterranean Charter. Clearly it also highlights problems which should be resolved before proceeding, the most manifest being the absence of

Israel from any regional organisation and charter. Neither Israel nor the other Arab or African States participating in the Union for the Mediterranean should be excluded from the process which is being proposed. As underlined before, the EMCHR will be based on respect for cultural diversity and on the sharing of common values among Euromediterranean peoples and, in order to match this prerequisite, it will be rooted in existing regional charters on human rights. It is going to be an inclusive effort to promote peace and stability through intercultural dialogue in the area, and it must include the cultural specificity and the human rights approach of every State and population contributing to it.

Unfortunately, the discussion about the 'Israel issue' cannot be addressed in the few pages of this paper, but it is possible to list at least three possible exit strategies from this apparent deadlock: referring to international legal instruments ratified by the State of Israel; rethinking its accession possibilities to the Council of Europe or to the European Union, and referring to national legislation, especially to the Basic Laws of Israel on human rights, human dignity and citizenship, and to its Declaration of the Establishment of 1948, thus artificially considering the Country as a single-member regional system. Clearly another essential prerequisite to proceed with the drafting of the charter is the conclusion of the ratification process by the States, which, while having the possibility of doing it, have not done so yet.

Union for the Mediterranean, a Full Regional Organisation?

Before and after the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean, politicians and scholars have given their definition of the new entity, the latter often proposing alternative ideas for its evolution: among others, the UfM has been defined as an international intergovernmental organisation (Aliboni and Ammor 2009), as a deep strategic partnership between 43 countries (European Law Monitor 2010), as a Union of projects based on the principle of cooperation (Sarkozy 2007), while alternative proposals ranged between a Privileged Regional Partnership (Khader 2008) and an Alliance based on co-development (Amato 2008).

Although the architecture, the functions and the relations of the

new (UfM), older (EMP) and complementary bodies (EMPA, ARLEM, ALF) will need time to be totally run in and clarified, what it is evident, is that, at present, the UfM cannot be considered a proper regional organisation on the model of the Council of Europe or the Arab League. [174] If institutionally the Union for the Mediterranean is in possession of 'executive bodies' (the summit of Heads of State and Government, the Joint Secretariat and the Inter-Ministerial Conference), a parliamentary dimension (the EMPA), a local and regional body (the new born ARLEM) plus other pillars – a cultural one, represented by ALF and EMUNI University, and a more general non-governmental pillar made up by the Euromed Civil Forums and their Platform – it lacks a formal statute where standard setting and follow-up functions are recognised and clearly specified. In other words, this reflection leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to think about the adoption of a legally binding treaty on human rights in today's Union for the Mediterranean framework.

At this point two directions may be taken into consideration: the adoption of a political binding document on the model of the (not yet adopted) Euromediterranean Charter on Peace and Stability, or promoting an institutional evolution of the Union for the Mediterranean towards the structure of a full regional organisation. According to the first proposal, the document should be adopted by consensus by the 43 members of the Union for the Mediterranean. If compared to the Charter on Peace and Stability, whose project was essentially based on political and security dialogue among partners, the proposed document would concentrate on less conflictual topics, therefore there may be interstices for an agreement on its contents, despite the fact that the number of participating countries has sensibly increased in the last years. Notwithstanding, in the context of the definition of Euromediterranean citizenship rights the second choice is favourable. In order to improve the possibility of adopting a human rights charter, to safeguard and implement citizenship rights of all peoples in respect of their cultural and religious diversity and to spread further the practice of intercultural dialogue throughout the region, the Union for the Mediterranean should work at all its levels towards both a clear reorganisation of its functions (including the adoption of a formal statute) and an empowerment of the complementary bodies and institutions

in its framework, especially the EMPA and the ARLEM, while the ALF and the other civil society networks should have a more effective consultative role.

THE CHARTER AND EUROMEDITERRANEAN CITIZENSHIP

This short paper is not proposing the draft of the EMHRC or a detailed catalogue of human and citizenship rights to be included in the document. It rather delineates some of the peculiarities the Charter should have in order to satisfy the required functions. These characteristics can be divided into a group of principles serving as framework references to express the *ratio* and the interpretation of the charter contents and a list of human rights, which will include specific citizenship rights for all people living in the region.

Framework Principles: A Prospective Preamble of EMCHR

It is in the preambles of the various regional human rights charters that the heart of their specificity come to surface. Thus, Arab Countries recognise the 'Arab nation's belief in human dignity since God honoured it by making the Arab World the cradle of religions and the birthplace of civilizations which confirmed its right to a life of dignity based on freedom, justice and peace' (Arab Charter, 2004), while in the African Union 'the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights' (African Charter, 1981) are underlined; at the same time the EU declares itself 'conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage' (European Union Charter, 2000), while, at its origin, the fathers of the State of Israel, declared that it 'will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the Prophets of Israel' (Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948).

From these short excerpts it is evident that, in every charter, the recognition of human rights is deeply rooted in different cultural and religious approaches: every treaty explains on these bases the reasons justifying the recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms as shared and inviolable values of the people they are called on to protect. This conception should be extended to the Euromediterranean

Charter in an inclusive way: the EMCHR is not supposed to eliminate these references, but to improve them and to identify common values starting from them: the specificity of the Euromediterranean civilization should be identified in the equal contribution of all cultures of
[176] the Mediterranean basin to the promotion of humanity values during their common history.

Other common elements to all the preambles of the cited human rights treaties are the recognition of the inviolable rights of every human person and a clear reference to International Human Rights Law (especially to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Going deeper with the comparative analysis, other principles and common references can be found in the texts, as well as obstacles and oppositions. However, the aim of this paragraph is to show how it could be possible to proceed in order to identify a balance between universal values and cultural specificity. The core of these principles may be summed up in the following list:

- the recognition of the Mediterranean basin as the cradle of a great civilization to whose realisation every people residing in the region have historically contributed – at the same level and according to their own specificity – with their cultures, languages, technological and scientific innovations and traditions;
- the recognition of the importance (without any hierarchical reference) of the region for the three monotheistic religions – having seen in it their birth, development and spreading –, and of the great contribution that these systems of belief have made in spreading the values of humanity, tolerance and equality all over the world;
- respect for the freedom to believe and not to believe;
- the strong recognition of the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the two UN Covenants of 1966.

Considerations about the Catalogue of Human and Citizenship Rights

The list of rights to be included in the charter should be obtained by the comparison of the human rights which are recognised in all the

regional treaties taken into consideration. As previously underlined, every treaty is characterised by a particular approach to human rights and fundamental freedoms, but their human rights catalogue should be interpreted in relation to the principles proposed for the prospective preamble, having its limits of interpretation set by the respect for International Human Rights Law. [177]

Besides that, a group of specific rights, shared by peoples and accepted by governments, should be included in the EMCHR. Generally speaking, a useful way to proceed could be to extend European effective ideas to the Euromediterranean framework (Signore 2002). This suggests that it could be possible to draw inspiration from the list of citizenship rights included in the Nice Charter (V:39–46), and try to adapt them to the larger context of the *Mare Nostrum.* Choosing this way of proceeding highlights the criticalities of the present institutional architecture of the Union for the Mediterranean. The adoption of most of European Union citizenship rights to the UfM framework would require, as a matter of fact, a substantial evolution of its bodies and their functions.

In order to better explain the relation between Euromediterranean citizenship rights and the UfM bodies, an article of the EU charter is taken as an example. Article 39 of the Nice treaty recognises the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament (EP) for every citizen of the Union. The extension of a similar right to vote at elections for a common representative institution to all people living in the 43 partner states of the Union for the Mediterranean would possibly increase and consolidate that feeling of belonging which has been frequently underlined in the paper. Moreover, the UfM has a recognised parliamentary dimension, that is the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.

The EMPA is a second level parliamentary assembly because its representatives are chosen among elected members of national parliaments and of the EP. Direct election of EMPA representatives would push strongly in the proposed direction. Ideas and proposals for the reinforcement of the Assembly have been included in the Manifesto for the Mediterranean (Socialist Group in the European Parliament 2005) and in the 2008 EMPA Recommendation on the role of the Par-

liamentary Assembly in the Framework of the UfM, while a proposal towards the establishment of a more substantial Euromediterranean Parliament has been included in the Report of the Groupe de Sages (High Level Advisory Group 2003).

[178] By proposing a reinforcement of the functions of the EMPA, a better articulation of its work with the other bodies of the UfM and with the Anna Lindh Foundation and an evolution towards a directly elected Parliamentary Assembly, this specific Euromediterranean citizenship right (right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the Euromediterranean Parliament) may act as a model for the identification of other rights.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been underlined that the idea of the EMCHR is considered as the peak of a long path of promotion of intercultural dialogue in the region. It has also been anticipated that a functional way to foster the interaction among the huge diversities of heritage characterising the Euromediterranean region daily life is through the network activities of transnational civil society, being this multiple, rich of its diversity and of its innovating capacity (Akrimi 2007, 280). Civil society organisations are thus an essential tool of participation, mutual knowledge and promotion of intercultural dialogue.

For these reasons, waiting for the hoped institutional evolution suggested for the Union for the Mediterranean, the major role in the process of promoting and fostering the human rights charter and the notion of Euromediterranean citizenship should be played by the Anna Lindh Foundation. The Foundation puts together, coordinates, encourages dialogue, finances, and stimulates the intercultural activities of civil society associations throughout the whole UfM; it promotes own initiatives on six different fields of actions, all aimed at the understanding and the respect for cultural diversity; it includes more than 3200 members (Anna Lindh Foundation 2010), including local authorities, academic and religious organisations; it has a privileged channel to dialog with EMPA, the UfM bodies, the European Commission and the single partner States it receives fundings from.

The Foundation would have the necessary expertise and attributes of power to facilitate and promote the process of reinforcement of the

common sense of belonging among Euromediterranean peoples, while the Union for the Mediterranean would constitute the institutional frame of reference to realise and enforce the initiative.

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'Arabic – What for?' Jewish Students' Attitudes Towards the Arabic Language and Their Willingness to Learn It in Israel

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Although Arabic is one of Israel's two official languages, its status is problematic. Israel's monocentric proclivity excludes Arabic from everyday use. In 1997, Arabic language studies were introduced into the 7th–10th grade curricula as pupils' second foreign language, after English, in a program offering three weekly hours of instruction. In 2003, however, less than 50% of all pupils in grades 7 through 10 (who should have taken the Arab language under the new program) actually studied Arabic. Various studies have shown that pupils are poorly motivated toward Arabic studies, and harbor a negative attitude toward Arabic, which they perceive as the 'language of the conflict,' a language with limited usefulness, and a language whose status in the global cultural arena is at an ebb. The field study reported here was conducted in a comprehensive high school in an affluent northern Tel Aviv neighborhood. Its findings confirm research findings on this issue conducted several years earlier. Findings of this study show that pupils who elect to study Arabic have a tepid attitude toward the Arabic language. Pupils' parental origin and education have no significant effect on pupils' attitudes.

INTRODUCTION: ON THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF ARABS AND ARABIC IN ISRAEL

Israel is a bi-national state for all intents and purposes. At December 2009, the Central Bureau of Statistics estimated Israel's population at 7.5 million , of whom 20.3% were Arabs (CBS 2009a). According to forecasts, Israel's population at the end of 2010 is expected to reach 7.6 million, with approximately 5.7 million Jews and 1.6 million Arabs, which means that the proportion of Arabs will increase to approx-

imately 21% (CBS 2009b, table 2.26). By 2030, the Arab population is expected to reach 23.5% of the population, according to the CBS medium forecast (ibid).

The cultural-linguistic situation in Israel is a derivative of these [184] figures. Israel has a Jewish majority whose native language is Hebrew, and a growing minority of native Arabic speakers, including, of course, the country's Arab minority. In addition, however, there are more than a few Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin, whose cultural background was shaped by Arab countries, and whose mother tongue is Arabic. Based on the CBS social survey conducted in 2006, 20.8% of the Jewish population is proficient in Arabic (CBS 2008, table 17).

Hebrew is Israel's official language. It is dominant both in terms of use as well as in public presence. However, Arabic is also one of Israel's two official languages. It is the language used by the Israeli Arabs in their daily communication as well as in their separate school system. Israel is one of the few non-Muslim states to grant Arabic official status. Nonetheless, while Israel's two official languages have equal standing under law, the situation in practice is different. As early as 1980, Prof. Amnon Rubinstein (Minister of Education in the 1990s) described the status of Arabic in Israel as 'problematic' (Rubinstein 1980, 76), despite repeated State declarations on the status of Arabic as the country's second official language (Benziman & Manzur 1992, 155). In everyday life, Arabic does not enjoy the status of a second official language, and its use is limited. In 2008, a group of MKs proposed a bill (that did not pass) to revoke the official status of Arabic. According to their bill, Hebrew would be Israel's sole official language, and Arabic, Russian, and English would be defined as secondary official languages (Ilan 2008).

In effect, the use of Arabic is limited to contact between the authorities and the Arab citizens, road signs, and the state name on stamps and currency.

In short, as stated recently by an Israeli researcher, although Arabic is an official language in Israel, and although the law dictates the comprehensive Hebrew-Arabic bilingual conduct of state authorities, in practice, Arabic's public position in Israel is marginal; Hebrew enjoys almost absolute dominance in Israeli public spheres (Yitzhaki 2008).

It has already been noted that the State does not treat Arabic as an official language in the media, although it is spoken by roughly 40% (!) of the population. A large number of local Hebrew-language TV channels operate in Israel, but not a single Arabic-language channel, although Channel 33 offers programs in Arabic in addition to its Hebrew-language and English-language programs. The number of viewers in Israel of TV channels broadcast by satellite from Arab countries is estimated at two million. The Voice of Israel (the State's broadcasting service) operates one channel devoted to Arabic-language broadcasts, with an estimated two million listeners (Bar Ilan University 2004, 4). One independent Arabic-language radio station, Radio Al Shams, has been in operation since 2003. According to a 2007 survey by the Second Authority, the station has over 300,000 daily listeners, or 50% of all Arab radio listeners in Israel (Mandel 2007).

In summary, although Israel's linguistic policy does not state this explicitly, it has consistently supported a monocentric approach, and Arabic-Hebrew bilingualism in the Arab sector. In the national arena, Arabic-Hebrew dualism is clearly skewed in favor of Hebrew (Spolsky and Shohamy 1996).

THE STATE AND ITS ATTITUDE TO ARABIC LANGUAGE STUDIES

In view of the above it, is not surprising that the Israeli State demonstrates an ambivalent attitude toward Arabic language instruction in the Jewish sector. The Public Education Law explicitly states that one of the goals of education is to 'become familiar with the language, culture, history, heritage and unique tradition of the Arab population and other population groups in Israel, and to recognize the equal rights of all citizens of Israel' (Ministry of Education 2003). Nonetheless, there is a great discrepancy between this general statement and actual practice in the field. Moreover, the above goal is noted *last* in the list of goals of education.

It appears that the Ministry of Education has demonstrated its increasing awareness of the importance of Arabic language in recent years. This is reflected in a long series of documents which clarify the importance of becoming familiar with the Arab-Muslim world, its cul-

tural heritage, and its religion, and the importance of this knowledge for creating a foundation for a dialogue of peace between Jews and Arabs living in the same territory (Brosh 1991). Since 1989, the official position of the Ministry of Education on Arabic-language instruction
[186] has been reiterated in General Director Circulars and letters (Bar Ilan University 2004, 6), the most recent of which was published in 1996 on this issue, entitled 'General Director of the Ministry of Education Circular in the Matter of Language Instruction in Schools.' This document lists the languages, the instruction of which is supported by the Ministry of Education, and the scope of classroom hours recommended for these languages at each age. This circular is considered the most detailed and up-to-date official document on linguistic policy in Israel, and it entered in effect in the 1997 school year (Narkis and Stevens 2004). According to this document, classroom hours for grades 5–7 are two hours a week (not mandatory); three hours a week (mandatory for grades 7–10, but pupils may choose French instead of Arabic); and 3–8 hours a week for elective studies in grades 11–12 (Bar Ilan University 2004).

Thus we may state that Arabic-language instruction in Israel poses an anomaly. Arabic is the second official state language, alongside Hebrew, yet Arabic is not taught as a second language but rather as the *third language.* In contrast to mandatory English studies, the study of Arabic is not really mandatory, both because pupils may elect French instead, and because new immigrants from the FSU (Former Soviet Union) and Ethiopia are permitted instead to study their native language (for a period of four years from their immigration) (Bar Ilan University 2004).

Therefore it is not surprising to find a sharp asymmetry in the proficiency of the official state languages, Hebrew and Arabic among the state's sectors. The 2006 social survey of the CBS indicates that while less than 13% of all Arab adults in Israel do not know Hebrew, slightly more than 79% of all adult Jews do *not know Arabic at all* (CBS 2008).

Until the 1990s, the proportion of pupils who studied Arabic in Hebrew-language schools was very low. In 1982, only 22% of all the Hebrew-language elementary school pupils studied Arabic, and only

7% of all high school students (Abu Rabia 1998). In the early 1990s, 40% of all Hebrew-language schools studied Arabic in grades 7–9 (Kraemer 1993; Koplewitz 1992). In the 1995 school year, 132,400 7–9 graders in Hebrew-language schools studied Arabic. In 1996, this number rose to 136,923 (Bar Ilan University 2004, 10), and in 2003 less than half of all 7–9 graders studied Arabic (approximately 47,000 in each grade), notwithstanding the declared mandatory status of Arabic-language studies. The number of 10th graders, a grade in which Arabic studies were mandatory, had already dropped to 19,000, or less than one-fifth of all 10th graders in the country (Chromachenko 2004). The number of Jewish high school students who sat for their matriculation exams in Arabic is very low and does not exceed 3,000 in any given year (Friedman 2005). The number of Jewish high school students who sat for matriculation exams in high-standard Arabic (5 units) in 2006 was a mere 2009 (Kashti 2009). As of now, about 60% of the Jewish students in junior high schools learn Arabic for three years (Alon 2008). However, a mere 2% of those learning Arabic in junior high schools continue studying this language in the senior high school (Amara et al. 2008).

In this context one should perhaps pay attention to the conclusion reached not long ago by one researcher of the subject (Uhlmann 2008): the official policy is subverted at the local level of practice. On one hand, there seems to have always been a general consensus among policymakers that Arabic should be made compulsory for Hebrew-speaking students. On the other hand, no less remarkable than such ongoing consensus is its failure to materialize in practice. This policy is repeatedly subverted at the local level of schools and school districts, and the policymakers have so far been unable to force the issue.

GENERAL JEWISH ISRAELI PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD ARABIC

Teaching a language is never merely a technical, pedagogical issue. Language and literacy are elements of what the French sociologist Bourdieu has dubbed back in the 1980s *cultural capital* (Bourdieu 1986). It is an uncontested fact that language plays a key role in social integration and socialization in cultural and social values (Bekerman and

Horenczyk 2004; Fishman 1970; 1997). As a system of symbols, language shapes social identity, on one hand, and contributes to the stabilization or revival of identity and ethnic/national loyalty, on the other (Haarmann 1986; Smith 1998). In other words, language is a [188] primary socio-economic resource which nations use to unify or divide national/ethnic groups into language communities, each loyal to its own linguistically-related culture (Haslett 1989).

In view of the above it is not surprising that various studies that examined the topic of Arabic-language instruction in Hebrew-language schools, found that pupils' fundamental attitudes toward Arabic are disconcerting. Given the knowledge that attitudes towards learning foreign languages are affected by socio-psychological factors within the socio-political-cultural context (Gardner 1988), it is not surprising that Jewish pupils' motivation to study this language is limited. On this point, Arab attitudes toward Hebrew and Jewish children's attitude toward Arab are to some degree symmetrical. According to Jewish pupils, Arabic is the 'language of the conflict.' The Jewish-Arab historic conflict permeates all aspects of Israeli life. Arabic is the language of the majority of the hostile geographic region in which Israel is located; Arabic is also the language of Israel's unpopular, ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct minority (Abu Rabia 1998).

Moreover, going back to Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) it is easy to understand students' bias against the Arab language. The capacity to speak Hebrew and write English is necessary for appointments and promotion even at the university departments of Arabic! The Jewish cultural capital is inflated even in this area at the expense of the Arab cultural capital (Uhlmann 2008).

Attitudes toward language are actually a derivative of the Arab-Jewish cleavage, which is the gravest, most complex of all the divides that characterize Israeli society, which is *a priori* defined as a segmented society (Soen 2003, 309–438). It is the gravest schism that characterizes Israeli society because it is characterized by the clearest, unequivocal, dichotomous distinction. In other words, all members of Israeli society (with the exception of individuals of mixed origins, who account for a statistically negligible portion of society) clearly and objectively belong to one of the two camps divided by this chasm. The definition is clear-

cut and undisputable: either I am a Jew or an Arab. There is no room for wordplay or a graded definition of different degree of membership: it is a dualistic, emotionally laden distinction that is consistent with the definitions proposed by theoreticians who studied social schisms and separatism (Kerlinger 1984). [189]

As a result of the protracted conflict and division, the Jewish sector developed negative attitudes towards the Arab culture, Arab language and Arabic speakers (Shohamy and Donitsa-Schmidt 1998; Bar-Tal 1996). Numerous negative stereotypes of the Arab minority and reservations regarding the civic rights of this minority arose among Jewish children. This phenomenon is similar to what has been found in Northern Ireland, another country torn apart by intractable conflict (Cairns 1996). For example, a study in 2004–2005 on two samples, one of 890 Jewish 10th-graders and the second of 590 Jewish 11th-graders, has shown that youngsters are tainted with harshly negative perceptions of Arabs. A large majority of the Jewish pupils attributed negative traits to Arabs, including inferior intelligence (87.2%), lack of education (86%), lack of culture (84.4%), and lack of cleanliness (83.7%) (Kupermintz et al., 2007). Moreover, 46% of the Jewish youngsters declared their anger toward the Arabs, and 31.4% declared their hatred for the Arabs. In a national democratic index survey conducted in Israel in 2007, 75% of the Jewish survey participants defined Arabs as having a proclivity toward violent behavior, 55% defined Arabs as lacking the ability to attain the level of cultural development of Jews; and 43% agreed with the statement 'Arabs are not intelligent' (Arian, Atmor, and Hadar 2007).

Narrow-mindedness, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia of a large proportion of the Jewish sector toward the Arab minority have re-emerged with force in response to the widespread demonstration and riots of the Arab sector in October 2000. Despite objective data that indicate deep-seated and broad discrimination against the Arab population, over 60% of the Jewish participants in a *Yediot Aharonot* (Israel's most widely read daily newspaper) survey conducted by Dahaf Institute on a representative sample of adults, claimed that there was no discrimination against Arab Israelis (Soen 2003, 396). Furthermore, 64% of the survey participants saw no wrong in the government's con-

duct and placed no blame on the government for these riots. Moreover, 74% of the Jewish survey participants defined the conduct of Israeli Arabs during the week of rioting as 'betrayal against the state,' in clear contradiction to the conclusions of the Orr Commission[1] (Orr
[190] Commission Report 2005).

All these findings however, are overshadowed by the following single dramatic finding: A 1994 survey commissioned by the Ministry of Education, of a representative sample of 3,700 high school students, found that 37% of the Jewish pupils declared emphatically that they hated Arabs. Two-thirds of the pupils expressed the clear position that 'Arabs should not be granted full civic rights' (Soen 2003, 399). In the Democratic Index survey conducted in 2007 on a sample of the general population, only 56% of all Jewish respondents expressed support or strong support for full equality of rights for Arabs in Israel (Arian, Atmor, and Hadar 2007). A harsh picture also emerges from another study, published in 2007 by Haifa University (Kupermintz et al. 2007), and based on a sample of 1480 Jewish students in 30 high schools. As it turned out, a mere 47.3% of the respondents expressed support for full equality of rights for Arabs in Israel. Only 49.1% held the opinion that Israeli Arabs are entitled to protest against injustice and discrimination. What is more, 29.8% expressed fear from Arabs and 31.4% expressed hatred towards Arabs. The conclusion of other researchers (Seginer 1996; Hertz-Lazarovitch and Kupermintz 1996), that the attitude of Jewish youngsters toward Arabs is strongly affected by the historic context does not diminish the predominance of negative stereotypes of Arabs among large strata of Jewish youngsters in particular, and among the general public. As already mentioned, this widely spread xenophobia and anti-Arab sentiment impacts attitudes toward the Arabic language and lessens the motivation to learn it (Shohamy and Donitsa-Schmidt, 1998; Donitsa-Schmidt, Inbar-Lourie, and Shohamy 2009). The influence of socio-political factors on motivation to learn languages is widely recognized (Gardner 1988).

Motivation to learn a certain foreign language and attitudes towards its speakers have been analyzed in numerous studies. Findings have shown that attitudes towards foreign languages are influenced by

various factors, such as its socio-cultural significance, its role in the international arena, its instrumental and functional importance for the learner etc. (Schuman 1978; Pavlenko 2003; Donitsa-Schmidt, Inbar, and Shohamy 2004).

The conceptualization of motivation to learn the foreign language [191] was originally coined by Gardner and Lambert (1972) and subsequently adopted by many. Basically, it refers to two different types of motivation: *integrative* and *instrumental.* The first is described as a positive orientation towards the foreign language's group and a willingness to interact with its members. The latter concerns the pragmatic gains of learning the foreign language. In as much as actual achievements are concerned in terms of acquiring the foreign language, research findings are contradictory; they fail to show if any type of motivation is superior (Baker and MacIntyre 2000; Csizer and Domyei 2005; Petrides 2006).

If so, it is not surprising that a 1988 study on Jewish pupils' attitudes toward Arabic language found that the majority of respondents held negative attitudes toward both spoken and literary Arabic. Moreover, instrumental motivation was also found to be low. Respondents stated that Arabic is not important as a language of communication and therefore there is not a lot of point in studying it (Brosh 1988). Poor instrumental motivation was also found in a later study on pupils' attitudes toward Arabic (Ben Rafael and Brosh 1991).

Similar to the earlier study, this study also found that pupils viewed Arabic as a useless language, whose prestige was at low ebb. The pupils who held the most extreme negative attitudes were pupils of Middle-Eastern and North African origin, who emphatically resisted any degree of identification with Arab culture or with the Arabic language. This strong rejection of the Arab culture by Jewish pupils of Middle Eastern and North African extraction is seen to express their tendency to disassociate themselves from the perceived Arab characteristics in their own self-image and a desire to become more Westernized. Peres hypothesized that this expressed hostility expressed by the Oriental Jews toward Arabs was the result of perceiving similarity rather than dissimilarity between themselves and the Arabs (Peres 1971).

Subsequent studies (Kraemer 1993; Kraemer and Olshtain 1994)

reconfirmed these attitudes. Kraemer, who studied attitudes of 7–12 grade pupils in the Tel Aviv and Central region, found that respondents believed that Arabic had low status and that its instrumental contribution in facilitating employment was also limited. Finally, even [192] its utility in security-related contexts (that is, the advantage of proficiency in Arabic for individuals seeking to work in security-related agencies) did not constitute a positive factor when weighing the considerations and deliberating whether or not to study the language. The majority of the pupils who study Arabic did not show interest in the language outside school, and did not even attempt to understand Arabic-language newscasts on TV (Kraemer 1993). In a study conducted shortly thereafter (Kraemer and Olshtain 1994), researchers found that pupils prefer French over Arabic studies because of the superior global status of French. A 2006 study among junior high school pupils who study Arabic found that 42.7% did not plan to continue studying Arabic in high school; 31.1% were undecided and only 26.2% decided to continue Arabic studies in high school (Him-Yunis and Malka 2006).

A factor analysis performed indicated that the two main factors that affect pupils' decision-making were intrinsic-individual factors (love of the subject and interest in Arabic studies), and extrinsic-situational factors (the status of the subject in school, and teachers' skills). In any case, the most important point that emerged from this study was that only one-quarter of all the junior high pupils who study Arabic plan to continue in high school. A study that was concurrently conducted among Arabic junior high school teachers in 2006 confirmed this disposition: 56.3% of the teachers declared that the subject had a poor image, 38.5% of the teachers believed that the security situation was the cause of high schoolers' negative attitudes toward Arabic (ibid).

On the other hand, a study conducted by the Tel Aviv University School of Education (Levy and Miro 1995) generated extraordinary findings. This study found that 55% of the 7th-grade respondents noted that they 'like Arabic' or 'like Arabic very much.' An even higher percentage was found among 9th-graders – 62% stated that they 'like Arabic' or 'like Arabic very much.' The significance pupils in this study

attributed to Arabic was also high, and was consistent with their positive attitudes. To the question 'Is it important to study Arabic?' 75% of the 7th-graders and 65% of the 9th-graders responded that it is important or very important. When they were asked about the potential benefits of knowing Arabic, pupils mentioned the possibility of communicating with Arabs of their own age and with the Arab public in general. They also noted the potential benefits during their military service. It should, however, be noted that the pupils in this study made no mention at all of the spiritual or intellectual wealth of Arab culture!

Another favourable response to the study of the Arabic language was found recently in a survey carried out by two Israeli researchers (Abraham Fund 2007). The survey was carried out in an attempt to analyze the effect of the project, 'language as a culture bridge' initiated by the Abraham Fund. 78% of the respondents stated they were happy to study Arabic. 71% of the respondents believed that acquiring the Arabic language might contribute to improvement of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. About 52% of the respondents stated that their families encouraged them to study Arabic (ibid). The survey was carried out among 912 5th and 6th-graders in 17 primary schools in four towns in Israel.

Yet another survey, conducted during the late PM Yitzhak Rabin's administration, also is indicative of the importance of context for Arabic studies. During the second Rabin administration, when the peace process demonstrated significant progress, a survey conducted by Dahaf Institute in December 1994 posed the following question: 'In view of the progress in the peace process, do you think that Arabic studies in schools should or should not be made mandatory?' 65% of the interviewees stated that Arabic language studies should be mandatory and only 34% disagreed (Bar Ilan University 2004).

Finally, we can also infer the public's reserved attitudes toward Arabic language from interviews conducted by a *Haaretz* daily correspondent with Hebrew University students in 2007 (Rubinstein 2007). In these interviews, students were asked why they elected to study English, French, German, Japanese, or Chinese, rather than Arabic. One student's response was astonishing in its frankness: He stated, 'Foreign

language studies are like buying a key to a new house, filled with the treasures of science and culture. People who study Arabic also purchase a key, but they quickly discover that it is a key to an empty house: Ultimately, what can a person do with Arabic? – Be a Quran scholar or a
[194] Shin Beth [Israel's secret service] spy.'

ATTITUDES TOWARD ARABIC LANGUAGE OF STUDENTS WHO LEARN ARABIC: A CASE STUDY

In view of the above findings, the author decided to conduct a focus study of the attitudes of pupils who *chose* elective Arabic studies (I am deeply indebted to my student, E. Debi, who conducted the survey under my guidance in my seminar). As already mentioned, Arabic is not mandatory in the junior high school; pupils may choose either Arabic or French. In case they are newcomers to the country from either the FSU or Ethiopia, they may opt for their mother tongue instead.

Research Framework

This study was based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. One junior high school in north-east Tel Aviv was selected: All the pupils who chose Arabic language studies were included in the study. These 40 pupils were requested to complete a questionnaire that was distributed during one of their classes at school. On top of that, personal interviews were conducted with a number of pupils who completed the questionnaire. The students were asked to explain in their own words why they chose to learn Arabic, and tell the interviewer what their attitude toward that language was. They were also asked to tell the interviewer whether they liked their study, and why.

The findings of this study are rather interesting. The school is a magnet school for two elementary schools: one of which serves an area that is classified by the CBS as a high-SES neighborhood, and the second is classified as a middle-SES neighborhood. In this school, beginning in 7th grade, all pupils were required to study a second foreign language in addition to English. Pupils selected either French or Arabic, based on their own free will. The study questionnaire was distributed in this junior high school at the end of the school year to

8th- and 9th-grade pupils who studied Arabic, before the end of the second Initifada.[2] As already mentioned, some of the students were also interviewed.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire covered five themes. The first theme comprised a number of items from which it was possible to draw the respondents' socio-economic profile.

The second theme comprised nine items and was designed to tap into respondents' attitudes toward Arabic language. Items in this section were designed to discover the extent to which respondents found Arabic a pleasant, beautiful, rich, language, etc. (integrative motives, see Gardner and Lambert 1972), as well as the extent to which Arabic was perceived as a prestigious language, an important subject, an influential language in the world of politics, etc. Cronbach's alpha of this theme was 0.783.

The third theme comprised five items, and was designed to tap into respondents' will to translate their decision to study the language into actual time allotment. These items were designed to clarify the time respondents devote to their Arabic language studies compared to other subjects, and respondents' interest in participating in an Arabic-language after-school study group, etc. Cronbach's alpha of this section was 0.689.

The fourth theme comprised four items, and was designed to tap into the perceived usefulness of Arabic. These items were designed to discover whether pupils listen to Arabic language radio programs, watch Arabic language movies on TV, whether pupils think that the language is useful outside of school, etc. Cronbach's alpha of this section was 0.813.

The fifth theme comprised nine items designed to examine respondents' perceptions of the image of Arabic speakers. Items were designed to discover pupils' perceptions of the extent to which Arabic speakers contribute to world culture and to society, the importance respondents attribute to the language, etc. Cronbach's alpha of this section was 0.764.

To process the questionnaire, a five-item Likert-type scale, from 1

(greatest degree of agreement with the item) to 5 (lowest degree of agreement with the item) was used.

Research Questions

[196] In view of the numerous (and sometimes conflicting) findings of previous studies, the researcher posed the following questions: First, does pupils' origin affect their motivation to study Arabic and their empathy toward the language? Second, does the educational attainment of pupils' parents affect their motivation to study Arabic and their empathy toward the language? Third, and most important, how is Arabic perceived by pupils who elected to study the language? In this respect a whole series of questions and statements was posed to the students in order to find out: What is their degree of empathy toward the language? What is the extent of their motivation to study the language? How useful is the language perceived to be? What is the contribution of the language, as they perceived it to be? What image does Arabic have?

Research Analysis

The most important question is, of course, how Arabic is perceived by pupils who chose to study it; this is of special importance, because, as mentioned time and again, the questionnaire was distributed to pupils who *elected* to study Arabic. It might be expected that this 'elective public' would express a high degree of empathy toward the language, strong motivation, and conviction of its usefulness.

Practical arguments that support the study of Arabic (instrumental motivation) appear in numerous websites that function as a platform for surfers' opinions in this respect, as in newspaper features (see www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/149/485.html; http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/1/1016239/@@/talkbacks). For example,

> Maybe the study of Arabic – an official state language – should be instituted from elementary school to high school in Jewish schools. In Finland, civil servants are required to know Swedish because 6% of the population is Swedes. Holland requires proficiency in Flemish, because of the country's small Flemish minority. I also

> think that, even if there were no Arabs in Israel, the study of Arabic is necessary because of the neighboring countries.

and

> [Arabic] language which is not only official but also the native language of one-fifth of the country's citizens is effectively considered here as a foreign language, even the language of the enemy. The irony of this is that some of the country's soldiers also speak the enemy's language.

and

> It's important to know Arabic so that when an Arab asks you something in Arabic, you will be able to understand (Friedman 2005).

or:

> We are at war with the Arabs and so we have to understand them. And anyway, they are our neighbors.

In order to gauge the overall students' opinion of Arabic, a combined scale was devised based on the scores of twenty-six questions relating to the pupils' empathy towards the language, their motivation to learn it, its estimated usefulness, and its image.

The 'judgments' of our study group of pupils are interesting precisely for this reason. Thus, the weighted summated score of the Likert scale scores on language usefulness is extremely low (4.081; recall that the lowest score is 5). Pupils' average score of motivation to study the language was also rather low (3.850); empathy for the language was moderate (3.075) as was the image of the language (3.038) (table 1). In fact, none of the scores that were based on pupils' opinions was high! Overall, the study indicated that pupils' attitudes toward Arabic, a language that they themselves chose to study, were less than enthusiastic. This is consistent with the findings of some of the studies conducted in Israel, noted above. It is contradictory to the findings of other studies conducted.

TABLE 1 Motivation to study Arabic, attitude toward the language, its usefulness, and its image among the study group

Item	M	SD
Empathy		
How much do you like Arabic compared to other subjects?	3.525	1.198
I am sympathetic toward Arabic speakers.	2.325	1.023
Arabic is a pleasant-sounding language.	3.375	1.275
Arabic is not a beautiful language.	3.250	1.335
Arabic language textbooks are interesting.	3.050	1.358
Old-fashioned methods are used to teach Arabic.	3.000	1.219
Arabic is easy to pronounce.	3.300	1.159
Arabic is an important subject.	2.975	1.368
Total	3.075	1.241
Motivation		
Do you actively participate in Arabic lessons?	3.225	1.405
Would you like to participate in an Arabic language class in the afternoon?	4.350	1.051
How much time do you devote to your Arabic class, compared to other subjects?	3.975	0.800
Arabic is a difficult subject.	2.525	1.037
Arabic is necessary for academic studies.	3.825	1.299
Total	3.580	1.118

Continued on the next page

In this context, some positive statements made by the pupils during the interviews should be noted. Thus, a practical, instrumental attitude characterizes the following statement:

> I chose Arabic, first of all because it expands my personal knowledge. In addition, I think that everyone has to study Arabic because we live next to Arab neighbors. You have to know how to communicate with them. And most of all, I want to serve in the Intelligence Corps in the army. Whoever knows Arabic gets priority.

The following statement is rather candid:

> We live in the Middle East, surrounded by many Arab countries. Arabic is spoken in all of them. Studying Arabic lets you get to

TABLE 1 *Continued from the previous page*

Usefulness		
Do you listen to Arabic language radio programs?	2.525	1.132
I hardly watch Arabic language TV programs.	4.975	0.276
Do you watch Arabic language TV programs?	4.700	0.823
Arabic is also useful outside school.	3.125	1.522
Total	4.081	0.938
Image		
Arabic is an important subject.	3.150	1.331
Arabic contributes to world culture.	3.475	1.358
I do not want to come into contact with Arabic speakers.	3.025	1.405
Arabic speakers contribute to society.	3.250	1.032
Arabic speakers are friendly.	2.850	1.099
Arabic has a strong political influence on the world.	2.750	0.981
Arabic is a prestigious language.	3.725	0.987
Arabic has a rich literature.	2.625	1.148
Arabic is a rich language	2.500	1.359
Total	3.038	1.188

NOTES Maximum score (negative) – 5; minimum score (positive) – 1. $N = 40$.

know our neighbors better. And anyway, whoever studies Arabic at a five-unit matriculation level gets an academic bonus from universities. Whoever studies Arabic will leave [school] in a better position for civilian life and for army life.

Also interesting is the following statement:

I study Arabic because it's an easy language. You need another language anyway. Arabic is the easiest.

A resignation of sorts is reflected in the following statement:

I don't believe many of the junior high graduates will really know Arabic and will be able to conduct conversation with Arab colleagues. We don't learn the Arab culture.

And again:

> I myself decided to learn Arabic, but this language does not really interest my age-group very much. They think it is enough to study English. On top of that, my generation experienced Intifada and terror acts. My colleagues don't want to see Arabs; needless to say, they don't want to learn Arabic.

A completely different perspective is reflected in the following statement:

> I study Arabic because I want to get to a level where I can speak the language with Arab kids in Israel.

And yet again:

> My parents speak Arabic. I want to know the language they were born with better.

Finally, a statement that reflects an extraordinarily positive – and rare – attitude toward the language:

> At home I watched movies that we rented, The Thief from Baghdad, and Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves. I also heard some stories from The Thousand and One Nights. I really would like to be able to read these stories in the original.

All in all, the text of the interviews is a mixed bag. This way or another, the majority of positive statements were *instrumental.* In other words, they reflected a strongly utilitarian attitude toward language studies: whether related to a desire to serve in intelligence units in the army, or a desire to gain bonus points when applying for admission to university, or the desire to study an easy subject for matriculation exams. There were, however, also statements reflecting integrative motivation of pupils who noted their desire to communicate with their neighbors and learn more about Arab countries. Other statements – a minority – reflected empathy toward the language and the language's positive image: pupils' desire to learn their parents' language or their desire to read Arabic literature in the original.

TABLE 2 Pupils' empathy toward Arabic and motivation to study Arabic, by origin of parents

Parents' origin	Israel	Ashkenazi	Mizrahi	Total
Empathy toward the language				
M – average	3.470	3.630	3.530	3.530
SD	1.260	0.990	1.190	1.180
Motivation to study the language				
M – average	3.730	4.000	3.880	3.850
SD	0.810	0.650	0.810	0.790
Total	8	15	17	40

The picture concerning the impact of parental origin on pupils' attitudes toward Arabic is interesting in itself. A study conducted by researchers at the Tel Aviv University School of Education in 1995 among 1,500 7th–9th grades who study Arabic (Levy and Miro 1995) indicated that 40% of them have at least one parent who speaks Arabic. 16% of the pupils who studied Arabic also stated that one of their parents reads and writes Arabic. The profile of our study group, based on pupils' responses to the demographic items, is not categorical: 17 pupils (43% of the sample) are of clear Mizrahi origin (namely, Middle Eastern or North African descent); 15 (38% of the sample) are of Ashkenazi origin, and 8 pupils (12% of the sample) have parents and grandparents who were born in Israel (and whose origin is further unknown). In any case, 32 pupils (82% of the sample) noted that their family speaks Hebrew at home, 6 noted that their family speaks another language other than Hebrew or Arabic, and only two pupils (5%) reported that their family speaks Arabic at home.

The findings of our study also indicated that 65% of the pupils' parents have post-secondary education (a college or university degree), 20% have a matriculation certificate, and the remainder have lower education.

A recent study indicates that parental attitudes are one of the most important predictors of pupils' attitudes toward Arabic (Donitsa-Schmidt, Inbar, and Shohamy 2004). Since parents' attitudes were not examined in our study, an attempt was made to examine whether parental origin or education affected the respondents' attitudes toward

TABLE 3 Pupils' empathy toward Arabic and motivation to study Arabic, by parents' education

Parents' education	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Empathy						
M – average	3.070	3.750	3.640	3.800	3.500	3.430
SD	1.060	1.300	1.070	1.470	0.500	1.170
Motivation						
M – average	3.690	4.330	3.670	4.330	3.670	3.840
SD	0.850	0.240	0.750	0.840	0.330	0.800
Total	1	5	8	11	15	40

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) elementary, (2) incomplete high school, (3) matriculation, (4) college, (5) university, (6) total.

TABLE 4 Spearman's correlations between the four examined variables

Variable	Empathy	Motivation	Usefulness	Image
Empathy		0.56*	0.21	0.43*
Motivation			0.47*	0.38*
Usefulness				0.42*
Image				

NOTES * $P < 0.05$.

Arabic. Findings show that neither parental education nor origin has any impact (tables 2 and 3).

Finally, using Spearman's correlations, the author tried to find out whether empathy, motivation, image and usefulness of the language are linked, in as much as the pupils' attitude to Arabic is concerned.

Table 4 shows that a correlation does indeed exist between empathy and motivation (0.56) as well as between empathy and image of the language (0.43). Motivation is also correlated with usefulness of the language (0.47) and its image (0.38). And finally, usefulness is also correlated with the image of the language.

CONCLUSIONS

The research conducted on a focus group of junior high school pupils in a northern neighbourhood in Tel-Aviv posed several research questions: (1) Does pupils' origin affect their motivation to study Arabic

and their empathy toward the language? (2) Does the educational attainment of the pupils' parents affect their motivation to study Arabic and their empathy toward the language? (3) How is Arabic perceived by students who elected to learn the language? In this respect a series of questions and statements was posed to the students in order to [203] gauge: What is their degree of empathy toward the language? What is the extent of their motivation to learn the language? How useful is the language perceived to be? What image does Arabic have?

The findings of this study, similar to the findings of various other studies conducted among Jewish pupils who learn Arabic, indicate a half-hearted, unenthusiastic attitude toward Arabic, even among pupils who elected to study the language. Israel is a bi-national state in which Arabs currently account for 20% of the population. According to the demographic dynamics, their proportion of the population is on the rise. Various sociological and psychological theories indicate that inter-group contact – properly conducted in an appropriate climate – encourages mutual attentiveness, conciliation, and mutual acceptance, and undermines exclusionary attitudes (Allport 1979; Pettigrew 1998; Jolly and Digiusto 2009; Miller 2002).

Language is considered a cultural bridge which contributes to such outcomes (Haarmann 1995; Slavin and Cooper 1999; Bekerman and Horenczyk 2004). Since language expresses identity, culture, and tradition, in addition to its function as a medium of communication, language proficiency ultimately enables an egalitarian dialogue. The assumption is that proficiency in Arabic and familiarity with Arab culture might ultimately reduce fears and apprehension, eliminate negative stereotypes and prejudice, reinforce commitment to democracy, and encourage tolerance.

Nonetheless, numerous studies have repeatedly shown – this study included – that unfortunately, a great many of the Jewish pupils have a rather tepid attitude toward Arabic language studies. Even pupils who choose to study Arabic often do so unenthusiastically, and are not motivated by a strong love of the language or strong inner conviction. The weighted summated score of the Likert scale scores on the Arabic language usefulness turned out to be extremely low (4.081). Pupils' average motivation to study Arabic also turned out to be low (3.850).

Empathy for the language (3.075) and the image of the language (3.038) turned out to be moderate.

The findings of the research indicate that neither ethnic origin nor educational attainments of the pupils' parents affect their motivation [204] to learn Arabic and their empathy toward the language.

One point merits some discussion. The author's review of the many studies done in Israel on students' attitudes toward the Arabic language jumped back and forth between the first study conducted in 1988, studies done in the 1990s (some early before the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and before the 2nd Intifada) and studies done two years ago. As mentioned, a relationship has been found between students' attitudes toward Arabs and the tension between the two national groups, Jews and Arabs. In this respect there are four important benchmarks – the first *Intifada* (1987–1993), the second *Intifada* (2000–2005), the Israeli Arabs' October riots of 2000, and the Oslo accords of 1993. The first three benchmarks had a negative impact on relationships between the two national groups. The fourth benchmark had a positive impact on them.

This is apparently why the Tel-Aviv University study, carried out before the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin (Levy and Miro 1995), revealed strong positive feelings toward the Arabic language. The positive attitude toward Arabic found in a study of 912 pupils in seventeen Jewish primary schools in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem and Carmi'el (Abraham Fund 2007) is altogether another story. This study was carried out in a period of high tension between the two groups. Hence, one could expect a negative attitude toward Arabic. The author's guess is that the positive attitude revealed is not typical of all schools; rather it represents the success of a unique project initiated in 2004 by the Abraham Fund, encompassing 100 schools – 'Language as a Cultural Bridge.' The 17 schools studied by Tel-Aviv University were part of that Project.

Juxtaposing the findings of our study in an ordinary junior high school in northern Tel Aviv with the findings of the sample of the Abraham Fund project schools serves to show that things could change. Despite the obvious impact of tension on relationships and attitude, the goal of affording the Arabic language and Arab culture

public legitimacy, thereby advancing equality and a shared future for both national groups in Israel, is still obtainable.

NOTES

1 The Orr Committee: A State committee established by the government to investigate the events of October 2000, in which 13 Israeli Arabs were killed and scores were wounded by the police who opened fire on demonstrators.

2 Intifada: The Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation. There were two Intifadas: the first – between 1987 and the Oslo Accords reached in August 1993; the second (also known as *Intifada-Al-Aksa*) started in 2000 and ended in 2005.

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The Bosniaks: Failing Role Models for Muslim Europeans

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THIS PAPER EXPLORES THE DIVERGING political orientations and the revival of Islam in the post-socialist and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, arguing that these new trends among the Bosniaks are resulting from their unclear viewpoints on security, citizenship and state. As a nation emerging from the political culture of a mixed eastern and communist heritage and the recent genocide, the Bosniaks are lacking trust both in institutions and in the essential mechanisms of European political heritage. This volatility is amplified by the Bosnian institutional framework in which the local political and religious leaders – along with the international community's representatives effectively ruling the country – keep on squandering the historic opportunity for redesigning the Bosniaks into a vibrant nation which could serve as a role model for the growing population of Muslim Europeans. The specific capacity and texture of Bosnian European culture in-between elaborated in this paper, indicates the need for multilateral cooperation in reshaping its outdated mechanisms with the emerging ones. While obtaining an appropriate niche on the European soil, the Bosniaks would also be able to contribute to a makeover of the traditional European contours into wider, all-inclusive and ecumenical European perspectives.

The Bosniaks entered the contemporary European and the world's stage, closing the 20th century as the victims of a genocide, better known as 'ethnic cleansing' during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although journalists' reports from the field clearly stated that there was a *genocide* going on (Gutman 1993; Vulliamy 1994; Rieff 1995), and even after they had won the most prestigious journalistic award for those dispatches, once the dispatches where bound in a book, the word *genocide* would be followed by a watered down apposition – *'ethnic cleansing,'* albeit in inverted commas. Roy Gutman's book: *A witness*

to genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-winning dispatches on the 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia is the most telling example of the occurrence.

This post-modernist euphemism was finally dropped fourteen years later when, in January 2009, the European Parliament adopted the Srebrenica Genocide Resolution and recognized July 11th, as the Day of commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide all over Europe. The Resolution refers to the infamous massacre of Bosniaks in July of 1995 as 'a carnage' in which 'more than 8 000 Muslim men and boys, who had sought safety in this area under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), were summarily executed by Bosnian Serb forces commanded by General Mladić and by paramilitary units, including Serbian irregular police units which had entered Bosnian territory from Serbia; whereas nearly 25 000 women, children and elderly people were forcibly deported, making this event the biggest war crime to take place in Europe since the end of the Second World War' (European Parliament 2009).

Nevertheless, the Resolution somehow avoids to mention that (a) those 8,000 Muslim men and boys, were the Bosniaks, and /b) that those victims were not 'men and boys' only.

According to the data available at the official web-site of Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Center (Memorijalni Centar Srebrenica-Potocari 2010), there were 57 women and girls among the massacre victims. Actually, a careful look at the still incomplete list of 8,373 Srebrenica genocide victims shows that the oldest victim happened to be a 97-year old woman, while the youngest was a girl, age 8. Alas, there was no mention of them in the European Parliament's Resolution on any official UN or EU document dealing with, what now everybody recognizes as, 'the biggest war crime to take place in Europe since the Second World War.'

The aforementioned General Mladić, indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the 1992–1995 siege of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre is still a fugitive from justice, since the attempts to hunt him down and arrest him have not hitherto produced any results. The only thing the police had managed to seize from Mladić were his diaries, whose content has been recently made public by the Tribunal. One of the most quoted lines from those

diaries refers to the fact that during the Bosnian war the then-Serbian and Croatian Presidents, Slobodan Milosević and Franjo Tudjman, respectively, held several clandestine meetings 'offering Bosnian Muslims to each other and none wanted them' (Macedonian Information Agency 2010). [213]

THE HISTORY OF UNWANTED NATION

For the past hundred years or so, the Bosniaks seem to be the main subjects of constant haggling and trade-offs of the ruling elites in Bosnia's neighboring countries – Serbia and Croatia. As a result, there have been constant reductions and changing interpretations of their national identity and fate in both the European and the international context. The root cause of this phenomenon can be tracked down by following the historic roots of Bosniaks.

The Bosniaks made up about 44 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's 4.5-million pre-war population. They embraced Islam some 600 years ago, when the Ottomans conquered the Balkans. Many of them converted to Islam from another Bosnian peculiarity – the Bosnian church, which constituted an indigenous separatist and schismatic sect, resulting from the import of Bulgarian and Manichean spiritual heritage, as well as Bosnian refusal of Hungarian attempts to appoint a Hungarian bishop in this medieval kingdom. Consequently, Hungarian leaders convinced the Pope of religious heresy in Bosnia and the need for a crusade against the Bosnian church between 1235 and 1241 (Fine 1975, 328).

This historic episode is very significant for the overall political and cultural profile of Bosnia, showing that even before the Ottomans, this country's inhabitants had never been a part of the European mainstream.

After the Austro-Hungarian Empire took over Bosnia from the Ottomans at the end of 19th century and, particularly, after Bosnia subsequently became adjacent to the newly formed multiethnic Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later called Yugoslavia) in the aftermath of the First World War, Bosnian Muslims residing in towns started embracing secularism, while the rural ones continued to adhere to what would be later dubbed 'being Muslim the Bosnian way' (Bringa 1995).

In Yugoslavia, where religion primarily served as a major ethnic identifier of the Slavic-speaking populations, the followers of Islamic faith were regarded by the largest ethnic groups (all of whom were Christians) as somewhat ominous reminders of 500 years of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

While the Bosnian Muslims remained uninterested in and unclear of their own ethnic identity, the orthodox (Serbs) and catholic (Croats) Christians – with whom the Bosnian Muslim shared the same land and language – grew progressively nationalistic. In the midst of competing Serbian and Croatian nationalisms within Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims limited their religious practice to occasional visits to the mosque, observation of religious holidays or important rites of passage, e. g. birth, marriage, and death.

Lacking the European cultural heritage, the Bosniaks had not understood the importance of ethnic identity in gaining recognition as a group, due to the universalistic and highly antinationalistic stance of Islamic traditional theology.

Therefore, they kept on identifying themselves as a religious group, seeing its own cultural and political identity as some sort of sacrilege against the universal Islamic nation – *Ummah* (the Islamic community). Such a stance was persistently spread by the local *Ulema* (Muslim clergy), as well as by the neighboring nationalist circles of Serbia and Croatia, who, in this way, were given a chance to assimilate the antinationalistic Bosniaks (thus considered 'anationalist') and include the Bosnian territory within their own national boundaries.

This trend was meandering in different directions during 45 years of the communist era following the end of the Second World War. At first, the Bosniaks were not recognized at all as a separate ethnic and cultural group. For the first 25 years in power, the communist regime continued to exploit the universalistic stance of immature Bosniak national elites.

Ironically, at the peak of secularization and atheization of Bosnian Muslims in the early 1970s, the Yugoslav communist leadership decided to forestall the rise of competing Serbian and Croatian nationalisms within the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership by recognizing Bosnian Muslims as 'Muslims,' a separate ethnic, in fact, a quasi-

religious nation, bestowing upon them a name which denoted their diminished, almost non-existent religious identity. Paradoxically, in this way the communist regime set the basis for an intense identification with the religious aspect of Bosniak identity which followed a couple of decades later. [215]

The communists decided to 'promote' the Bosniaks under the odd ethnic name – the 'Muslims,' as opposed to the religious group of Muslims (the local language requires the word 'Muslims' as a religious group to be written with lower case first letter 'm,' since the adherents of any religion, i. e. *'hrščani/krščani,' 'muslimani'* or *'budisti,'* are all written with lowercase first letters). In addition to the Bosniaks, the Muslims in Yugoslavia included the ethnic Albanians and some smaller ethnic groups (i. e. Gorani and the Turkish minority) residing primarily in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The communists needed the Bosniaks and Bosnia to serve as the Piedmont of the future socialist nation, which was meant to emerge from the melting pot of traditional nations. The recognition of the so-called 'Muslim' nation was an ironic compromise within the communist bureaucracy, since the recognition of the true national identity of Bosniaks was not convenient for either the Serbian or the Croatian nationalists within the communist establishment. Given the utopian cultural melting pot of Yugoslavian nations, the Bosniaks – as the central cultural corpus without any stronger political backing from the neighboring republics or abroad – was intended to be the main melting ingredient in the process of making a syncretic Yugoslav nation.

Consequently, the official recognition of Bosnian Muslims as 'Muslims' – a constituent nation within the Former Yugoslavia – actually made them vulnerable to the Serb and Croat pressures (Friedman 1996), because their national elites among the Yugoslav communists were not willing to accept the Bosniaks as anything more than a religious entity. At the time, they adamantly opposed the idea of allowing them even a somewhat more appropriate name – 'Bosnian Muslims'). Actually, having been aware of the fact that the recognition of the Bosniaks as an ethnic group would have been a true disaster for the Serbian and Croatian expansionist nationalism directed toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, those nationalists invested a full measure of their in-

fluence in the Yugoslav Communist Party to prevent recognizing the Bosniaks even as 'Muslims.'

Consequently, the fall of communism – which also resulted in the renewed ethnic nationalisms all over the Former Yugoslav republics and led to the series of wars in some of them – stirred even deeper turmoil in this semi-recognized group. The Bosnian Muslims became main victims of the 'ethnic cleansing' – the campaigns of mass murders, mass rapes and forceful expulsions of the entire Bosniak community, practised by the Serbian and Croatian nationalists in an attempt to conquer, divide and annex Bosnian territory into Serbia and Croatia proper.

As documented in the Report of the UN Secretary General on the fall of Srebrenica (United Nations 1999), for the first six months of the war, the Bosnian Serb Army in a blitzkrieg backed by then Yugoslav Army, managed to conquer and ethnically cleanse from non-Serbs some 70 percent of the Bosnian territory. It has been estimated that about 80 per cent of some 200,000 people killed in the 1992–1995 Bosnian war were Bosnian Muslims, while around 400,000 were expelled from their homes and left the country during the war.

As the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, the Bosniaks started being described and recognized in the international media as 'Bosnian Muslims.' However, no sooner had they risen from a relative international obscurity becoming a household word internationally, than they became an endangered species.

Regardless of the extensive media coverage and academic research (Cigar 1995; Cushman and Mestrovic 1996), the West remained a silent witness to the atrocities and crimes against them.

'If Bosnian Muslims had been bottle-nosed dolphins, would the world have allowed Croats and Serbs to slaughter by the tens of thousands?' – rhetorically exclaimed an American military strategist at the height of the Bosnian war (Luttwak 1993).

Around the same time, the political leaders of the Bosnian Muslims finally opted for the official name change: in September 1993, the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals re-introduced the historical ethnic name for their nation – The Bosniaks. Many applauded this decision, interpreting it as an attempt to discontinue European indifference to

the plight of those indigenous European Muslims, as well as a main barrier to the growing trend of globalization that came to Bosnia from the East (Alibašić 2005). At the height of Bosnian war, several hundred mujahedeens and other missionaries from the Muslim East came to Bosnia to fight alongside the Bosnian Army, which was comprised not only of Bosniaks but a significant percentage of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats as well.

While the arrival of mujahedeens and the missionaries in their war-torn country helped create the global Muslim awareness, solidarity and emotional attachment to the global Muslim community among Muslims in Bosnia (Alibašić 2005), it also contributed to deepening polarizations along religious and ethnic lines in hitherto multiethnic institutions on the territories controlled by the Bosnian Army. It helped give a certain legitimacy to the term 'Bosnian Muslim Army', which up till then could only be interpreted as a, more or less, unintentional and ignorant generalization made by the international journalists and other international representatives reporting from the ground on the war in Bosnia.

Therefore, the official name change that Bosniaks' leaders undertook in 1993 did not seem to help either this nation's destiny, or the fate of a multiethnic Bosnia. The European and the worldwide media continued reporting on the losses of Bosnian Muslim Army and the massacres of Muslim civilians, while the long lists of civilians massacred from the the Bosnian Serb Army artillery positions around Sarajevo, and Tuzla, or Bosnian Croat Army positions around Zenica, and other larger urban centers under the control of the Bosnian Army, continued to reflect and testify about the multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Europe, as well as the rest of the world, continued to stand idly by well after the aforementioned Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 took place.

However, it took yet another massacre in the besieged Sarajevo six weeks after the Srebrenica massacre, before the Western powers finally decided they had had enough of atrocities and genocide and launched a sustained air campaign led by NATO. The second massacre which occurred in Sarajevo's Markale Open Market in late August 1995, fi-

nally prompted the NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which successfully undermined the military capability of the Bosnian Serb Army in less than 21 days. The NATO military intervention was credited for bringing the Bosnian Serb leaders to the peace table and effectively ending the 3.5-year-long Bosnian war.

What followed was the Dayton Peace Agreement which officially ended the war by carving up once multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina and reducing it to what henceforth has been recognized as the country 'increasingly divided along ethnic lines' (Amnesty International 2010).

THE NATION IN SEARCH OF R&R

After they had been forcefully expelled from the rest of the country and squeezed on to roughly 25 percent of Bosnian territory, for the past 15 years the Bosniaks have experienced a collective notion of living in some sort of a Bantustan.

As explained in the above paragraphs, the Bosniaks are a European nation which has been constantly denied the possibility of self-declaration, while being continuously reduced to some other term for the purpose of ostracism.

On the other hand, the Bosniaks themselves have been traditionally confused by their politicians, their *Ulema* (Muslim clergy), as well as the competing Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. This has been further amplified by the notion of global indifference towards the uninterrupted annihilation policies aimed at Bosniaks, primarily originating from the neighboring countries of Serbia and Croatia.

Stymied and dysfunctional due to the intricacies of the Dayton Agreement, today's Bosnia lingers on as a semi-protectorate of the international community, i. e. European Union and the United States. Simultaneously, the Gulf countries, i. e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar invest heavily in its economy, as well as the religious revival of the country's Muslim community. The King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud Mosque in Sarajevo, built five years after the war, is supposedly the biggest mosque in the Balkans. The Saudi government is said to have admitted spending $1 billion on 'Islamic activities' in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1998 (Pejić 2010).

These parallel differing processes are resulting in numerous contro-

versies. Continuance of such a complex position makes the Bosniaks deprived of a clear stand on their national future, as well as of their past. They constantly vacillate between what at the very beginning of his book *Islam between East and West,* Izetbegović, the Bosniak war-time political leader, calls 'the third way in today's polarized world,' and *the submission* Izetbegović also calls upon in the book's last chapter (Izetbegović 1988). [219]

The Bosniaks nowadays seek comfort in the revival of traditional religion, along with the imitation of life in popular Spanish soap operas. Their current political culture is somewhat chaotic, confusing and mostly inconsistent with any recognized political orientation. Thus, their current position is best described as utter political desolation and disorientation – the feeling of a life on the edge of a precipice prior to the inevitable plunge into another round of carnage.

With their current political leadership (both secular and religious) being corrupt and incapable of devising any meaningful political strategy, the Bosniaks are growing all the more destitute. In search of a refuge, they have become increasingly susceptible to any sort of indifference or radicalism as their expedient.

In today's Bosnia, Islamic radicalism masquerading as *salafism* is facing off aggressive secularism masquerading as *liberalism* (Hladnik-Milharčič 2008). And once again, Europe and the rest of the world, together with the incompetent and corrupt Bosniak political leadership, idly stand by. This way, instead of capitalizing on the European shame over its repeated failure to stop the annihilation of one more European nation based on its religion, they have all become unwilling accomplices in the crime of turning one of the oldest Muslim Europeans into some sort of foreigners on their own continent.

Having no viable role model for this authentically European Islamic culture, that has never before in its history succumbed to Islamic radicalism, the international community eventually generated a confusion and lack of vision, trust and vigor among the Bosniaks. The failure to recognize the background of the Bosniaks' socio-cultural milieu, and to provide a new framework for this rather specific ethnic community, also translates into another failure – the failure to use the potentials of the Bosniak cultural reservoir for an updated model of European cit-

izenship, more fitting for the people of non-European cultural backgrounds.

Nevertheless, the Bosniaks still have the chance, as well as the necessity, to devise and communicate their message to the rest of Europe and the world in a way that would make them stakeholders of their own destiny. What needs to be avoided, though, is what Almond (2010) astutely calls 'the persistence of eschatology' among contemporary European theorists, e. g. Baudrillard and Žižek, who seem to have used Islam 'as a handy, minor component in a larger geo-political game' whose central quality is its resistance to the New World Order represented by the West.

Along the same lines, the Bosniaks are not to be used as yet another set of pawns in the global chess game between the pro-EU and anti-EU forces. If the Bosniaks are to be used as a model for Muslim Europeans, the specific texture of their European culture in-between should be first helped in reshaping its outdated mechanisms with the emerging ones. This, in return, would help them find their appropriate niche on the European soil, from where they can contribute to a makeover of the rigid Christian-only European contours into wider, all-inclusive and ecumenical European perspectives. That's where the Bosniaks *shall* also find some well-deserved R & R (rest and re-creation in military vocabulary) for their frazzled national identity, along with a refuge from the R & R (remove and replace) policies hitherto exercised toward them.

As prospective EU citizens, the Bosniaks are now drifting between the near past, which brought genocide and ethnic cleansing, and current European Islamophobia that constantly reminds them of their recent past and makes them skeptical regarding their collective and individual equality among the other European nations.

At the same time, the Bosniaks themselves do not invest enough effort in to adjusting their inherited political culture to the requirements of contemporary European integrations. But, being a small nation, the Bosniaks need a stronger external pull to be towed out of the present quagmire. Thus, the existing standstill requires a joint effort and strong initiative, both from the European strategists and their Bosnian counterparts.

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Trigger Factors of Terrorism: Social Marketing Analysis as a Tool for Security Studies – a Moroccan Case Study

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FOR THE FIRST TIME A MODEL identifying possible factors triggering potential attitude change towards terrorism has been generated, using regression analysis. This model has been developed along with a survey carried out in the area of Morocco widely accepted as the heart of recent terrorist activities in the country. Through standardized regression analysis, we have identified the factors that contribute positively or negatively to a change of state leading to potential terrorist activities. We identify a potential terrorist profile, blocking factors which prevent a change of state, and actions which may aid in the prevention of future acts of violence.

INTRODUCTION

To date, the arguments surrounding terrorism have mainly focused on two key areas: definitions and causes of terrorism. There is ample literature disputing the various definitions of terrorism, which also differ not only between governments but within them. For the purposes of this study, terrorism is the use of violence against civilians for impersonal non-monetary objectives by private actors. There are other odious activities that resemble terrorism, but by are properly referred to by other terms. For example, states engaging in violent oppression of civilians suspected of supporting their opponents are commiting war crimes. There is now a considerable body of literature defining and dealing with terrorism as a social phenomenon, and that literature can best be sampled rather than duplicated as a whole. To start with, this paper falls in to the category of those studies which outline the causes

behind terrorism. This paper also approaches the issue of terrorism at the individual level, thereby avoiding some of the structural arguments that some have raised. For example, to suggest that 'poverty causes terrorism' tends to exclude the primary author of the event – the accused [224] terrorist – from the discussion. Finding evidence that individual terrorists were impoverished or were motivated by a desire to have a more equitable distribution of wealth and income, however, allows us to escape the pitfalls of excessive structuralism. We are attempting to offer a model that reveals potential correlations between socio-economics, media and world events factors and the intention to resort to terrorist activities. The variables in the multiple regression model offered and backed by the data are held to be the trigger factors that lead an individual to consider and then possibly embrace violence. In general, the field has located the causes that motivate terrorism in socioeconomic conditions, ideology, oppression, socialization/social networks, psychology, and the existence of a terrorist structure. Of these explanations, the arguments linked with psychological pathology should be dismissed, because they tend to be attributive, and linked (questionably) either to attempts to demonize the terrorists, or to exonerate their faith system from indictment (Atran 2003, 1532–9).

There are theories that also attribute terrorism to poor socioeconomic conditions. These theories tend to originate from a Marxian stream that views Islamist violence as a latter-day rebellion against globalization on the universal scale (Cronin 2002, 34). After 9-11, Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková set out to test the idea that poverty causes terrorism at the individual level. They found that there is no link between terrorism and socioeconomic status (Krueger and Malečková 2002). When their book was reviewed by Atran, he found a positive co-relationship between education and terrorism (Atran 2008, 5). Krueger (2007) posits that terrorism appears to be co-related with oppressive governments, so that the more tyrannical the government, the higher the risk of terrorism. He is joined by Mohammed M. Hafez (2004), who argues that repression in Muslim countries is the primary cause of terrorism and violence, which are merely the forms that the inevitable rebellion takes.

For Hafez, the vehemence of repression is correlated with the mil-

itancy of ideologies used to confront the regimes. This reflects the arguments made by Bruce Hoffman and his associates (Hoffman 2006). For Hoffman, terrorism takes place after the articulation of a religious ideology which negates the other. To rid the world of the other, it uses an organization to conduct attacks. To that end, it can and will use both old and new forms of media, educational establishments, state and/or private support. Hoffman's approach has been contrasted with the Social Networking approach developed by Marc Sageman, and indeed, the two authors have exchanged sharp words in *Foreign Policy* (2008). For Sageman (2008) and likewise for Atran (2008), the social connections between the terrorists are a key element in radicalization. Using the Madrid attack cell as a case study, Atran also argues that there is an urgent need to understand the networks that create the terror attacks.

Our work takes into consideration all the prior findings and methodologies discussed above. Our variables, set within a social marketing methodological framework, are derived from the works cited above, and we hope that we can make a positive contribution to the field by stimulating debate and discussion about the use of tools from marketing in the study of terrorism.

Social Marketing is 'selling' attitudes to influence associated behavior. It is a tool that can be used to achieve specific behavioural goals, to improve healthy habits and lifestyle, and to reduce social inequalities and their related issues; recent research has shown that social marketing is effective in changing people's behaviour (Stead et al. 2007). Breckler and Wiggins define attitudes as 'mental and neural representations, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence on behavior' (1992, 409). Attitudes and attitude objects are functions of affective behavioural and cognitive components, the so-called ABC model. Attitudes are part of the brain's associative networks, consisting of affective and cognitive nodes linked through associative pathways (Anderson 1983; Fazio 1986). People interact with their environment based on how they perceive and interpret it. That is, people form an internal (cognitive) map of their external (social) environment, and these perceptions – rather than an objective external reality – determine their behavior. Perceptions of intent do affect aggression, and

Randy Borum demonstrates that there are internal and external factors that can affect one's perception of provocation or intent (2004).

Crenshaw (1988, 12) suggests that the principles of social cognition apply both to terrorists and to their organizations. She notes that [226] 'the actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are Psychology of Terrorism filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories.' Advertising, political campaigns, and other persuasive media messages are all built on the premise that behaviour follows attitude, and attitude can be influenced by the right message delivered in the right way. Social Marketing could prevent aggressive, terrorist behaviour through attitude change.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

We have based our study within various neighbourhood of Casablanca from a wealthy neighbourhood (Anfa) to poorer neighbourhood (Darb al Sultan, Sidi Moumen, Darb Rallef, Hay al Farah, Bachkou, Bernousi), from which originated the perpetrators of the 2005 terrorist attacks. Individuals living in these neighbourhoods will have an attitude and subsequent behavioural intention based on their specific interpretation of these difficult social realities. We focus on Casablanca, Morocco's largest city and home of 10 percent of its population, because it was the site of the most significant terrorist act in recent Moroccan history. Also, terrorism in Morocco exists in all localities but at different concentrations. The two 'hotpoints' are Casablanca and Tetouan.

An alternative approach would include the city of Tetouan, another locus of terrorism in Morocco, but there has been plenty of work conducted on Tetouan by Scott Atran and others. Consequently, we are helping fill a gap in the literature by focusing on Casablanca. Respondents were asked to rate their view of world events, socio-economics issues, and consequently how they intend to react to these. As a result of individual interpretation, various attitudes are formed, leading to specific behavioural intention. We can define 3 potential behavioural intentions: Doing Nothing, Peaceful Protest, and Armed Resistance state (*'Resistance'* as perceived solely by those committing or condoning

acts of violence). The intention-to-act or change in behaviour corresponds to 3 possible changes of states or transitions:

- Transition 1: Shifting from *Doing Nothing state* to the *Protesting Peacefully state.*
- Transition 2: Shifting from *Protesting Peacefully state* to the *Armed Resistance state.*
- Transition 3: Shifting from *Doing Nothing state* to the *Armed Resistance state.*

We propose to investigate 2 main attitude builders as potentially responsible for a change in behavioural intention: media exposure and world events/social issues:

- Are media channels (through which a specific perception of the political and social environment is formed) linked to the intention-to-act? If so, which of the channels are the main contributors? We define media as all the external communication channels through which information is brought to a person: TV, Newspapers, Internet, Family, Friends, and Religious authorities. Media channels are broadly defined as a 'Marketplace for Ideas.'
- World events or social issues are the beacons by which one forms an internal (cognitive) map of one's environment, from which an interpretation of reality is formed. Are these responsible for a change of state? If so which events and issues? We have listed the following factors: world events, perceived poverty (this includes price of food, clothing, transport, housing, etc.), access to education (is access to education perceived as fair and open), faith in government, and hope of employment.

We also propose to investigate potential links between personal factors and change of behavioural intention states:

- Is there a link between intention-to-act and personal factors? If so, what are the most salient personal factors responsible for a change of state: past experience (age), education, income or household size?

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the research objectives as previously stated the following research hypotheses are proposed, for the first transition we have:

- Transition 1: Intention-to-act from the state of *Doing Nothing* to the state of Intention to *Protest Peacefully.*

HYPOTHESIS 1 *Marketplaces for Ideas have a positive and significant relationship on this intention to shift from the state of* Doing Nothing *to the state of* Protesting Peacefully.

HYPOTHESIS 2 *Current Problems Factors have a positive and significant relationship on this intention to shift from the state of* Doing Nothing *to the state of* Protesting Peacefully.

HYPOTHESIS 3 *Personal factors have a positive and significant relationship on this intention to shift from the state of* Doing Nothing *to the state of* Protesting Peacefully.

These research hypotheses are then repeated for the remaining transition:

- Transition 2: from the state of intention to *Protest Peacefully* to the state of *Armed Resistance intention.*
- Transition 3: from the state of *Doing Nothing* to the state of *Armed Resistance intention.*

Marketplace for Ideas Factors

The main influences have been identified as: TV, religious authority (i. e. an Imam), the Internet, newspapers, friends, and family.

Television Influence. TV is an important source of violence propagation. People tend to identify themselves with a character who is looking to change the world, which substantially increases the likelihood that the character's aggressive behaviour will be modelled (Huesmann, Lagerspetz, and Eron 1984). Based on their survey results, Suriastini et al. (2005) concluded that the vast majority of respondents who harbour a wish to carry out violent behaviour also reported watching television coverage the day after the bombing. Further, the amount of television watched also influences, as Wright and Huston (1983) have proved

that aggressive behaviour is related to the total amount of television watched, and is not limited only to the amount of violence watched.

Influence of Religion. Bruce Hoffman (2006) suggests that the perpetrators of the attacks often rely on religious motivations as a justification for their violent acts. John W. Morehead (2001) claims: 'As we will see, the shift toward terrorism motivated by religious considerations is one of the reasons for terrorism's increasing deadliness.' Terrorist attacks resulting in numerous deaths are executed in direct response to religious extremism. Yet according to Robert Pape (2005), religion is only an incidental factor. In this respect, he states 'there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism or any one of the world's religions.' Likewise (and significantly), Michael A. Sheehan (2000) has argued that religious motivations are often used as transparent strategies or tactics in an attempt to hide any political goals and allow for a silent opposition.

Internet Influence. Within the context of 'Cyber Terrorism,' Lachow and Richardson (2007) claim that 'it is evident that terrorist groups are extremely effective in using the Internet to further their missions.' In this vein, he adds 'these groups use the Internet to create a brand image, market themselves, recruit followers.... Furthermore, these groups have become experts at using the Internet to manipulate both public opinion and media coverage.' Terrorists tend to use the Internet in order to attract some civilians; when these civilians become 'insiders" a certain level of commitment is to be maintained to preserve continuous interactions. Only by relying on the Internet, can terrorists create intense interactions with the so-called 'insiders.'

Newspaper Influence. The influence of a newspaper's content on people increases the societal influence (Meyer 2004). Local newspapers provide a brief and efficiently presented 'heads-up' about the dangers and opportunities that each new day presents (Lasswell 1984). The press not only transmits news, but also criticizes the government, and deals with political, social and religious issues, which impact citizens' states of conduct and their ability to act; however with a negative and steady rate of influence (Meyer 2004).

Influence of Friends. This variable aims at measuring the impact of friends on changing the intention-to-act. Research has demonstrated that delinquent behaviour is primarily committed in groups (Warr 2002); further, Piquero, Tibbetts, and Blakenship (2005) confirm that the more time spent with friends, the more adolescents adopt aggressive behaviour patterns and tend to act in a socially destructive manner.

Family Influence. According to Durmaz, Sevinic, and Yayla (2007), the research they conducted depicted a negative relationship between the terrorists and their 'uneducated' parents. Moreover, they suggest that the presence of some consultants in schools is highly recommended, as they would help young people gain self-awareness and an awareness of social issues through discussing terrorist violence – this may prove especially useful for youngsters who cannot openly speak with their parents about such issues. Sometimes, less educated parents fail to instil peaceful values and ideas in their children, or even do not encourage any conversation about such topics.

Current Problems Factors

The following current problems are the external factors that increase an individual's intention to take action. We summarize them as follows: world events, perceived poverty, access to education, low hope of employment, and low trust in the government.

World Events. This factor relates to one's degree of concern toward the world events. For Pridemore, Chamlin and Trahan (2007), there is substantial evidence that catastrophic and most serious world events, including terrorist attacks, lead to increased levels of violent or negative action, especially in communities in close proximity to such incidents. Individuals tend to identify with the crises and adopt a serious intention of taking action. The nature of the consequences following social encounters determines which moral values to adopt and which to avoid. Positive consequences motivate the individual to adopt the value expressed in the social encounter. Negative consequences inhibit the adoption of expressed values (Thomas 1997).

Perceived Poverty. This factor measures the degree of concern toward the perception of poverty made increasingly visible by such factors as the

increase in food prices, transportation and housing costs, and in the cost of living in general. For Abadie (2005), the relationship between poverty and terrorist action is not one of direct and clear causality, given that relatively few individuals living in indecent conditions (or even simply perceiving wide-spread poverty) move towards terrorism. [231] Likewise, Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2006) find no evidence suggesting that perceived poverty may generate terrorism.

Access to Education. This factor measures the degree to which people are concerned about the low access to education issue in their country. Some experts claimed that lack of access to education engenders terrorism and remains a significant cause of support for involvement in terrorist activities (Krueger 2007). The possibility for access to education, jobs, health care, and more equal rights provides individuals in vulnerable areas with a real future, giving them a strong reason to protest peacefully. Krueger further argued that it is widely recognized that growing concern for the lack of access to education is what breeds extremist attitudes and what causes people to turn to terrorism.

Hope of Employment. In terms of low hope of employment, Walter Laqueur (2004) convincingly addresses the issue of unemployment as a catalyst for an environment flourishing with different populist and (extremist) religious sects. As people develop high concerns towards the unemployment issue, they feel increasingly excluded from the mainstream society, and they are likely to protest either peacefully or violently, in order to voice their suffering from social marginalization.

Trust in the Government. The degree to which individuals admit to low faith in government concern seems to be an important driver for the intention towards violent action. T. P. Thornton (1964) advanced the claim that terror is the weapon which those individuals who have lost faith in their government use as mean for a political agitation. Also, when governments are not credible, conditions are favourable for the appearance of terrorism (Abadie 2005). Mostly trust in government is linked to issues such as corruption and, although the country tries to address the problem, Morocco remains hampered by corruption. In fact, corruption seems to have worsened over the past decade. For example, based on Transparency International's *Corruption Perception Index*

2009, Morocco went from a modest rating of 4.7 in year 2000 to a worse rating of 3.2 in 2006. Further, the country's overall position in comparison with all countries slipped from 79th place in 2006 to 80th place in 2008.

Personal Factors

It has been proven that personal characteristics play an important role in drawing the terrorist profile and triggering one's individual intention-to-act. Thus, they are grouped under the following characteristics: (1) level of education, (2) age, (3) income, (4) household size and we add to this combination of factors another characteristic related to personal distinctiveness, which is (5) the individual region of origin. Intentionally, the gender factor was excluded from our study, because according to Dialmy (2005) all the suicidal terrorists of Casablanca events were males; they were young and mature men, with old men and women missing from the terrorists' ranking.

Level of Education. According to Durmaz, Sevinic and Yayla (2007) education is the most effective factor in the formation of attitude, and in fact the effect of education on attitude is as strong as the parents' political and religious beliefs. The impact of education on attitudes increases with the level of education, so that the higher the educational level of a person, the higher the probability that he is influenced by what he has been taught, indeed new generations have a higher education level than their parents. Further, Jefferson and Pryor (1999), while examining the determinants of the existence of hate groups across states in the US, proved that the population of adults with a high school diploma or higher had a statistically significant, positive connection with the probability of joining a hate group. For Krueger and Malečková (2003), the truth remains that the terrorist or militant acts are more likely to be organized by well-educated people, rather than those less fortunate. Better-educated people would be tempted to resort to violence, as they have more potential to enact more complex stratagems. Thus it appears that it is not ignorance that tends to trigger terrorism, but knowledge.

Age. The age of an individual seems to be a key driver in changing citizen's behaviour to act in a given behavioural pattern. As an example,

Dialmy (2005) concluded that the suicide bombers in Casablanca were all young people. Also, the recruitment of future suicide 'martyrs' is done among young people chosen carefully in their neighbourhood mosques. However, Sharp (2005) disagrees, suggesting that age has no significant impact on an individual's changing behaviour. [233]

Income Level. Many researchers have tackled an individual's income level as a control factor. According to James Piazza (2006), if citizens are deprived of the right or means to fulfil their basic human needs and denied any possibility to benefit from reasonable economic opportunities, or are directly affected by socioeconomic disparities, soon they will feel hopeless and exasperated and may perceive violence as the ideal way to express their grievances and afflictions. This argument suggests that there may be a correlation between the income level and terrorist attacks. However, Piazza (2006) argues contrariwise that there is no strong evidence that credibly supports the idea that those underdeveloped countries with high rates of unemployment and high levels of income inequality experience higher levels of terrorism. Further, Krueger and Malečková's (2003) findings seem to stand against the first argument as well, as they claim that it is indeed not always the case that the perpetrators of the attacks are more likely to be poor, or have low incomes, or experience higher rates of unemployment. Finally, Abadie (2005) agrees that income is not significantly associated with terrorism intention.

Household Size. The number of members living together in the same house is an important factor to analyze in order to understand the transition behaviour of someone intending to act. Suriastini et al. (2005) stated that living in a household with few members appeared to afford some protection from terrorist ideology. These household members tend to have their head of family relatively well-educated and successful at fulfilling their needs, therefore they live in better life conditions and tend to avoid violence and to express their ideas peacefully.

INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS

Data for this research were collected via a survey administered to Casablanca's citizens. Professionals from the Casablanca-based re-

search firm 'BJ Consult' collected the information face-to-face from 500 correspondents living in the following neighbourhoods of Casablanca: Darb al Sultan, Sidi Moumen, Darb Rallef, Hay al Farah, Bachkou, Bernousi and Anfa. Most of them are low-standing neigh-
[234] bourhoods, with the exception of Anfa. The survey consists of 25 questions including demographic questions. The questions aim at defining the origins/causes for changing to the (undesirable) state of armed resistance (i. e. terrorist behaviour) by addressing the different possible triggering factors stated before. The majority of the questions were formulated on the basis of a 5-point Likert scale. The units of analysis of this study are young people of 15–45 years old, who live in Casablanca. This unit of analysis was based on random sampling. Our sample does not consider people living in high standing neighbourhoods of these cities, but still some small portions of these areas have been surveyed. The sample is composed of 500 elements, corresponding to a convenient sample including all education levels and different aged- groups. We have used logistic regression to uncover if a correlation exists between behaviour intention and the factors stated above, as well as to rank the relative importance of independents and to assess interaction effects. The methodology used here is similar to the methodology followed by Pan (2004).

RESEARCH RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics for Marketplace for Ideas Factors

TV *Influence.* Concerning the views of respondents about the level of influence the TV (as a mass media) has on their perceptions, only 3% asserted that TV had no influence, while 62% of respondents believed that TV is very influential.

Regarding the frequency of exposure to TV, about 6% declared watching TV for less than one hour per day, 28% tend to watch TV for 3 to 4 hours per day, and nearly 20% declared watching TV for more than four hours per day. The most popular television channel among the surveyed sample turns out to be Al-Jazeera at a proportion of 31%. The LBC channel ranks second with nearly 27%. While the Moroccan national channel RTM is the least watched, accounting for a proportion of less than 4%, the other Moroccan channel 2M concentrates about



FIGURE 1 Most watched TV channel by respondents

18% of the sample's responses. The respondents who declared their preference for other TV channels represented slightly more than 11%. Among the TV channels that the latter category reported to watch, we can mention such French channels as M6 and TF1. The results are summarised in figure 1.

With respect to the respondents' opinion of the credibility of the channels they declared watching the most, the results reveal that 13% believe their favourite channel is not credible at all, while 20% believe that it is very credible.

Religious Authority. This section consisted of two questions. The first investigated how frequently the respondents sought the advice of an Imam, and the results revealed that more than 40% never sought the advice of an Imam, while only about 6% did so often. The second question inquired about the knowledge of participants regarding Salafi principles. According to the survey, 23% of the respondents declared having no knowledge of Salafism, 45% had very little knowledge, and only about 7% declared being very knowledgeable about Salafi principles.

Internet and Newspaper Influence. A proportion of 23% reported not having ever read from the Internet, and 22% said that they read very often from the Internet. Concerning newspapers, 24% of the respondents reported not reading newspapers while 18% reported reading newspapers very often.

Influence of Family and Friends. When asked about the level of influence that family has on shaping their opinions, more than 42% of the surveyed sample asserted that their family does not influence their opinions in any way, while only 12% admitted that it is very influential. Concerning the influence of friends, 50% believed of those surveyed

stated that friends have no influence at all, while 5% believed they are very influential.

Descriptive Statistics for Current Problems Factors

[236] *Reaction to World Events.* With respect to the respondents' feeling of indignation towards current world events in general, 9% stated that they did not feel any resentment, and 50% expressed very high indignation. Of this 50%, 90% declared that the humanitarian crisis in Gaza affected them the most, while the invasion of Iraq ranked second with only 7%.

Concern Towards other Societal Problems. The socio-economic issue of perceived poverty produced the highest level of respondents' indignation (77%). Both issues of access to education and the generalized low trust in the government are second in terms of respondents' indignation level with 58%. Low employment hope follows, as 55% of the respondents declared being very concerned with this issue.

Descriptive Statistics for Personal Factors

Level of Education. Concerning the education level of respondents, 43% of the respondents declared holding a high school diploma. Only 22% held a bachelor degree, while less than 1% held a doctorate degree.

Age. Concerning the age pattern of the sample, 40% of the respondents fall within the age cohort of 21 to 30 years old, while less than 4% are more than 51 years old.

Income Level. With respect to monthly income, 32% fall within the income bracket of 3001 to 5000 MAD, 15% earn between 1501–3000 MAD, and 10% earn between 5001–7000 MAD.

Household Size. Concerning household size, the majority (73%) of the respondents declared living in a household that comprises 3 to 5 members, and 17% live in a household of more than 6 members.

Intention-to-Act – The Perspective of Bringing up Change

Given the choice to act towards the alleviation of the socio-economic problems mentioned earlier, 59% of the respondents declared their willingness to do nothing (figure 2). Further, 36% chose the option



FIGURE 2 Respondents' voiced intention towards the alleviation of the socio-economic and world events issues

of Protesting Peacefully and less than 5% chose Armed Resistance; and indeed 5% is a large number, given the implications of this type of resistance. Of course, answering positively to this question does not equate to being a potential terrorist, any more than the person choosing passive resistance. We note that it is important to identify the factors that will trigger a change of state from a state of No Action to a state of Passive Resistance or Armed Resistance.

Reasons Preventing People from Intention to Armed Resistance

Further, when asked about the reason preventing people from acting for change, 58% of the respondents identified the fear from authorities as their main obstacle. Lack of conviction and lack of trust in the existing resistance groups are the factors that produced only an approximate 2% of the total responses.

ANALYTICAL RESULTS

Note that since we used standardize logistic regression analysis, all the coefficients for each equation are in the same standardized units, so these coefficient can be compared to assess the relative strength of each of the predictors. Verifying normality assumption and multicollinearity is indeed the first step before analysing the logistic regression coefficients. For the 3 models the correlation matrices show no important correlation between the variables.

Regression Model 1 Based on the Market Place for Idea Factors

Significance of the Model. The model for P1 is statistically significant since the p value is < 0.05 (prob $> \chi^2 = 0.000$), and we are 95% confident that at least one of the independent variables contributes to the prediction of the intention to shift from the behaviour of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully.

TABLE 1 Regression model 1 based on the Market Place for Idea Factors

	b	*z*	*P* > |*z*|	%
P1 *(Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully; number of observations: 477, prob. > χ^2: 0.000)*				
TV inflence	–0,25669	–2,288	0,022	–22,6
[238] Religious authority	–0,31440	–3,492	0	–27,0
Internet	–0,01688	–0,199	0,842	–1,7
Newspapers	0,54533	6,063	0	72,5
Friends' influence	0,17928	1,525	0,127	19,6
Family influence	0,13763	1,332	0,183	14,8
P2 *(Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance; number of observations: 319, prob. > χ^2: 0.006)*				
TV influence	–0,05961	–0,233	0,816	–5,8
Religious authority	–0,19885	–1,124	0,261	–18
Internet	0,02523	0,132	0,895	2,6
Newspapers	0,23134	1,153	0,249	26,0
Friends' influence	0,54686	2,272	0,023	72,8
Family influence	0,11464	0,478	0,633	12,1
P3 *(Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance; number of observations: 204, prob. > χ^2: 0.0814)*				
TV inflence	0,07045	0,288	0,774	7,3
Religious authority	–0,05222	–0,296	0,767	–5,1
Internet	0,02464	0,126	0,9	2,5
Newspapers	–0,04805	–0,243	0,808	–4,7
Friends' influence	0,53608	2,436	0,015	70,9
Family influence	0,12638	0,613	0,54	13,5

NOTES *b* = raw coefficient, *z* = *z*-score for test of *b* = 0, *P* > |*z*| = *p*-value for *z*-test, % = percent change in odds for unit increase in *x*.

Transition 1. TV *Influence, Religious Authority and Newspapers.* Since for these 3 variables the *p* value is < 0.05, there is a significant relationship between TV influence, religious authority, newspapers and the intention to shift from the state of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully. One unit increase in standard deviation in the TV influence rate decreases the intention to shift from the passive state of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully by 22.6%, holding other variables constant. Similarly, holding the other variable constant as the influence of an Imam on the individual's opinion increases the intention-to-act (peacefully) decreases by 27.0%. Regarding newspapers, we find a positive correlation,

hence, as newspaper influence increases, the intention to shift from the state of Doing Nothing to the state of Protesting Peacefully increases by 72.5%

Internet and Friends and Family Influence. Since the p value is > 0.05, there is no relationship between the influence of Internet or family and friends on the individual's opinion and their intention to shift from state of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully. With 95% confidence, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence of any relationship between the intention to shift to Protesting Peacefully and the influence of internet and friends and family on individuals. [239]

Transitions 2 and 3. The model for P 2 is statistically significant since the p value is < 0.05 (prob > χ^2 = 0.000), however the model for P 3 shows a p value such that: 0.05 < χ^2 < 0.1. We have chosen a critical value of 0.05 to determine if the model is statistically significant; however, in the case of P 3, the number of observations are 1/3 lower than in the case of model P 2 and nearly 1/2 than the number of observations in the case of P 1. Thus this increase in p-value is to be expected. Hence we can assume that, since the p value for P 3 remains smaller than 0.1, the model for P 3 remains statistically significant.

For these two equations p value was found > 0.05 for the following variables: T V, Religion, Internet, Newspapers, and Family; hence we conclude that they are not significant in the intention to shift from one state to the other.

For both equations, we found that Influence of Friends has a p value of < 0.05, and hence it is the only factor contributing positively to a change of state. This means that friends have a positive influence on shifting from a state of No Action or Peaceful Resistance and also from shifting to a state of Peaceful Resistance to Armed Resistance. We found a 72.8% and 70.9% percent change in odds for unit increase in friends' influence for P 2 and P 3, respectively; i. e. a 72.8% increase in the intention to shift from the state of Protesting Peacefully to the intention to engage in Armed Resistance, and a 70.9% increase in the intention to shift from the state of Doing Nothing to the willingness to engage in Armed Resistance for a unit increase in friends' influence (all the other factors being held constant).

TABLE 2 Regression model 2 based on the Current Problems Factor

	b	*z*	*P* > |*z*|	%
P1 *(Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully; number of observations: 477, prob. > χ^2: 0.000)*				
World events	0,56241	5,16	0	75,5
[240] Perceived poverty	0,28921	1,84	0,066	33,5
Access to education	–0,55076	–4,053	0	–42,3
Employment hope	–0,37434	–2,995	0,003	–31,2
Trust in government	0,12075	1,056	0,291	12,8
P2 *(Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance; number of observations: 319, prob. > χ^2: 0.0602)*				
World events	0,24899	1,167	0,243	28,3
Perceived poverty	–0,02275	–0,064	0,949	–2,2
Access to education	–0,25102	–0,961	0,337	–22,2
Employment hope	–0,27868	–1,231	0,218	–24,3
Trust in government	0,77105	2,093	0,036	116,2
P3 *(Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance; number of observations: 204, prob. > χ^2: 0.1189)*				
World events	–0,29708	–1,377	0,169	–25,7
Perceived poverty	–0,21508	–0,667	0,505	–19,4
Access to to Education	0,25705	0,934	0,35	29,3
Employment hope	0,09945	0,345	0,73	10,5
Trust in government	0,68373	1,701	0,089	98,1

NOTES *b* = raw coefficient, *z* = *z*-score for test of *b* = 0, *P* > |*z*| = *p*-value for *z*-test, % = percent change in odds for unit increase in *x*.

Regression Model 2 Based on the Current Problems Factor

Significance of the Model. The three equations are statistically significant since the *p* value is < 0.05 (prob. > χ^2 = 0.000), and we are 95% confident that at least one of the independent variables contributes to the prediction of the intention to shift from one state to another.

Transition 1. Factor with positive contributions: World Events. Hence the more that people are concerned with world events, the more likely they are to engage in peaceful protest. One unit increase in standard deviation in the degree of indignation towards world events increases the intention to shift from the state of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully by 75.5%, holding other variables constant.

Factors with a negative contribution are Access to Education and Employment: the less people are concerned about Access to Education

and Employment, the more likely they are to change state. Holding constant all other variables, an increase of standard deviation of the degree of concern towards the access to education problem decreases the probability of moving from the state of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully by 42.3%. Similarly the probability of moving from the [241] state of Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully decreases by 31.2% for one unit and increases the degree of indignation towards this problem of employment.

Transitions 2 and 3. Here, P 2 shows a *p*-value of 0.0602: $0.05 < \chi^2 < 0.1$. This is linked to the reduced number of observation, and since *p*-value is < 0.1 we assume that the model for P 2 is statistically significant.

Regarding World Events, Perceived Poverty, Access to Education, and Low Employment hopes, we do not have enough statistical evidence to claim that there is a significant correlation with the individual's decision to shift from Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance, since the associated *p*-value is greater than 0.05.

Low Trust in Government: a unit increase of standard deviation of the low level of trust in the government increases the probability of shifting from Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance by 116.2%.

Transition 3. In this case the *p*-value for the overall model is > 0.1, the model is considered not statistically significant. However, given the low number of observations leading to an increased *p*-value (0.1189) that is close to the border value of 0.1 and the similarity in finding with P 2, we maintain that low Trust in Government is a major contributing factor, even if we have lower statistical evidence.

Regression Model 3 Based on Personal Characteristics

Significance of the Model. The overall model for the 3 Transitions is statistically significant, since for each Transition the p value is <0.05 (prob. $> \chi^2 = 0.000$), and thus we are 95% confident that at least one of the independent variables contributes to the prediction of the intention to shift from one state to another. Also, from the correlation matrices we do not observe an important correlation between these variables.

Transition 1. Both education and income have a significant and positive contribution. For every unit increase in the standard deviation of the

TABLE 3 Regression model 3 based on Personal Characteristics

	b	*z*	*P* > |*z*|	%
P1 *(Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully; number of observations: 477, prob. > χ^2: 0.000)*				
Household size	–0,26894	–1,294	0,196	–23,6
[242] Income	0,42592	6,598	0	53,1
Age	0,15262	1,537	0,124	16,5
Education level	0,20392	1,99	0,047	22,6
P2 *(Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance; number of observations: 319, prob. > χ^2: 0.033)*				
Household size	0,92131	2,065	0,039	151,3
Income	0,1222	0,854	0,393	13,0
Age	0,10137	0,442	0,658	10,7
Education level	0,91473	2,954	0,003	149,6
P3 *(Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance; number of observations: 204, prob. > χ^2: 0.045)*				
Household size	0,99228	2,196	0,028	169,7
Income	–0,30376	–1,807	0,071	–26,2
Age	–0,06783	–0,304	0,761	–6,6
Education level	0,48157	2,026	0,043	61,9

NOTES b = raw coefficient, z = z-score for test of b = 0, $P > |z|$ = p-value for z-test, % = percent change in odds for unit increase in x.

income, the probability of shifting from Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully increases by 22.6%. Regarding education, a unit increase in education level, increases the probability of shifting from Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully by 53.1%.

Transition 2. Both education and household size have a significant positive contribution. A one-unit increase in the level of education increases citizens' intention to shift from the state of Protesting Peacefully to the State of Armed Resistance by 149.6%; and a one-unit increase in household size increases the probability of shifting from Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance by 151.3%; holding constant the effect of other variables.

Transition 3. Income has a negative contribution. As income increases, citizens' tendency to shift from Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance decreases by 26.2%.

Regarding education and household size, the coefficients are pos-



FIGURE 3 Results for Transition 1

itives: the higher the level of education and the larger the number of family members, the higher the intention to engage in Armed Resistance, by 169.7% and by 61.9% respectively.

RESULTS SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Results for Transition 1 have been summarized in figure 3. In this diagram the significant triggering factors have been represented. Regarding the Marketplace for Ideas factor, it is clear that TV and the Imam both have a sedating effect. Regarding the negative correlation with the Imam's influence, it is worth noting that since the terrorist attack of 2005, all Imams have become civil servants of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and their sermons need to be approved prior to being delivered. Further, the Ministry requires all new Imams to receive university-level education at national seminaries, including mandatory courses in religious studies, foreign languages, humanities, and even basic computer skills. Likewise, for more experienced Imams, graduate and doctoral studies and professional development are now also encouraged by the Ministry. In terms of the media, newspapers seem to have a clear positive correlation with the intention-to-act peacefully;

this could be explained by the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) on attitude change. Central to this model is the 'elaboration continuum,' which ranges from low elaboration (low thought) to high elaboration (high thought). The [244] ELM distinguishes between two routes to persuasion: (1) the central route and (2) the peripheral route. The central route leads to high elaboration and lasting attitude change, while the peripheral route is less emphatic and of lesser duration. Reading a newspaper requires a higher elaboration than watching news on TV, hence newspapers lead to a deeper understanding, and subsequently a stronger conviction that something needs to be done, thus encouraging a change of state from Doing Nothing to Protesting Peacefully.

World Events (Gaza was most often mentioned) and perceived poverty are the two main positive trigger factors. However, Access to Education and Low Employment hopes have negative correlation factors. This means that the less a person is concerned about access to education or employment, the more this person is likely to get involved in some sort of peaceful protest. One can assume that indeed there is a level of indignation towards world events such as Gaza, but people looking for a job or education are more willing to focus on their personal goals rather than trying to solve external issues. This result seems to be in line with the finding for the personal factors which indicate that the group most likely to switch from the state of Doing Nothing to the state of Peaceful Action is the more educated and the better paid part of the sample. Such groups that reach a certain level of financial and social security are more likely to devote time to social or political issues.

Results for Transitions 2 and 3: from 'Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance' and from 'Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance' have been summarized in figure 4. In this diagram the significant triggering factors have been represented. Friends' Influence seems to be a major factor toward a shift from Doing Nothing or Acting Peacefully toward Armed Resistance. For both cases Armed Resistance is the direct result of a loss of trust in the government. At last, regarding the personal factors, those most educated with a large household size seem to be more prone to declare their intention to Armed Resistance.



FIGURE 4 Results for 'Protesting Peacefully to Armed Resistance' (Transition 2) and from 'Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance' (Transition 3)

Lower income is only a trigger factor in the Transition 3 scenario, from Doing Nothing to Armed Resistance.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis of the collected data shows that having a larger family, a relatively high level of education and lower levels of income seems to predictive of support for violent action. People also tend to be more influenced by friends rather than the TV and other agents of formal socialization, such as Imams. They also demonstrate a perceivable distrust of the government. From both a policy and a social marketing perspective, this study suggests several policy recommendations that ought to be pursued.

Short Term Actions:

- In the short term, it is important to increase the level of police presence in order to alert those thinking of violent action to the possible consequences of their actions.

Long Term Actions:

- *Anti-Corruption Initiative:* Low trust in the government has been assessed as being a major trigger factor for both transitions leading to armed resistance. The combination of increased FDI and

perceived corruption by the public has increased the awareness of inequality in the Moroccan society and the subsequent low trust in government. If trust in the government is to be restored, it is essential for the government to increase its effort in tackling corruption at all levels as well as curbing the perceived sense of impunity in the case of corruption, by (e. g.) publicly promoting the judicial system toward a zero tolerance regime, handing down large fines and extended prison sentences for corruption cases.

- *Monitoring of Youth Networks*: This research also suggests that the state needs to keep an eye on networks of youth and how those networks form. Of course, this presents us with a dilemma: increased monitoring of society means a narrower band for civil liberties. To some extent, this has already taken place with Law 03.03, which allows for nearly instant warrants for wiretapping and a 12-day administrative detention period. The Moroccan record of pursuing and disbanding cells and networks since the 16 May 2003 attacks suggests that the law is working and there is no need for further narrowing of the level of enlarging the scope of civil liberties. Nevertheless, Morocco remains a freer place than it has been at any period of time. Like all societies facing organized violence, Morocco has had to balance public safety and human life against suspects' civil rights.
- *Enhance Journalistic Capacity:* The findings concerning the press and journalism suggest that the press has not acted in a manner that reduces the threat of increasing the propensity towards terrorism. While it is not possible to secure total objectivity in journalistic reporting about events that entangle people emotionally, it is nevertheless important to improve the quality of journalism in Morocco in terms of both newspapers and the electronic media. Educational programs to improve the capacity of journalists already in service as well as new programs dealing with prospective journalists need to be considered.
- *Training of Imams:* This study demonstrates the impact that religious leadership has in maintaining people in a passive state; however, this suggests that with proper training and opportu-

nities for professional development, the imams could act as a powerful force against violence and fundamentalist political dissidence. We note, with satisfaction, that the Moroccan state has already begun a serious overhaul of the religious education for imams and murshidats (female religious specialists), requiring [247] them to obtain a degree in religious studies from a state university. Further, the curriculum now includes classes in foreign languages and computers, as well as courses in the arts and humanities, in order to produce a more 'grounded' clergy. This study suggests that the new curriculum could be fortified with further courses that will better help the clergy to address some of the factors which are triggers for violence (addressed in this paper), such as international studies and media-related courses. Likewise, imams and murshidats might benefit from training in counselling, in order to assist members of their congregations who are targeted by members of terrorist or extremist groups. It is critical that the clergy be encouraged to pursue training in communicating the dangers of these groups (especially online groups) to the parents at the mosques, so that they in turn are able to better help protect the youth.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has concerned the public opinion of urban Moroccans in an effort to identify the trigger factors that influence the resort to violence. Further, this paper has analysed the data from these opinions, and provided critical interpretation based on the analysis itself. It is evident from this study that, along with global challenges, Moroccans are concerned about such domestic issues as perceived endemic corruption and low levels of social justice. Hence the government may choose to act in this direction by curbing the perceived sense of impunity in the case of corruption, by (e. g.) publicly promoting the judicial system handing down extended prison sentences for large-scale corruption cases. As another triggering factor is the influence of friends and subsequently network formation, then the government may wish to focus its attention on the networks of Moroccan youth (both real world and virtual), in the hope of preventing violent actors from targeting

or adversely affecting young people at this critical stage in their development. The problem of political violence cannot be solved through one or two mechanisms alone in Morocco. There is a need for a sophisticated and multifaceted approach to deal with the rise of violent
[248] ideologies in the country, and this means that at least conceptually, the state's response is appropriate, although its eventual effectiveness will have to be tested over the next two or three decades.

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Models of Recognition of Knowledge in Higher Education in the European Union: Transformation from the European Union to Mediterranean Countries

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THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMORANDUM on lifelong learning emphasizes the key conditions for effective development of lifelong learning skills evaluation together with the objective. One of the key conditions for success of the lifelong learning represents recognition of knowledge. The recognition of knowledge acquired through non-formal and informal learning, lifelong learning is to contribute to the approximation of the learning needs of a knowledge society. So, the recognition of knowledge leads to important changes in the educational systems on national levels. In the European area, widely diverse skills recognition models are known, which are primarily conditioned by tradition and relationship development skills between the worlds of education and work. Despite this diversity, we can distinguish four models of the national recognition of knowledge, namely: the Scandinavian, Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon and Francophone model. The paper presents the similarities and differences by implementation of these models in higher education. In particular, we will be interested to know how the homogenization of the European Higher Education Area will impact on these models and how they will develop in the future. This is particularly important for countries in the area of the southern Mediterranean countries which want establish comparable standards for the recognition of knowledge.

INTRODUCTION

Paradigmatic changes in education policy of the European Union were first introduced thirty years ago and intensified over the past ten years. These are based on a priori economic changes. The education policy

of the European Union has seen a very strong focus on economic interests. A first look at the fundamental objective of the Lisbon Agenda, launched in 2000, suggests that the European Union would become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by year 2010 (Contribution of the European Commission to the special European Council in Lisbon 2000, 3).

This objective reflects on education as one of the key subsystems of the European Union. The new paradigm of education policy stresess the importance and role of non-formal and informal learning. Alternative forms of learning require the European Union to cope with increasing competition in the market, rapid technological developments and globalization. Despite the rapid development of non-formal and informal learning and mobility on the labour market,the problem in practice is an extremely diverse and often insufficient recognition of non-formal and informal learning by the state and employers. This has prompted policy makers of the European Union to establish bases for common standardization of the system of recognition of non-formal and informal learning. Recognition of non-formal and informal learning was, even ten years ago in the European Union, based on the principle of subsidiarity and within the domain of each Member State of the European Union. But since the last few years. is trying to standardize as much as possible.

So, the European Comission adopted in 2004 the common principles of recognition of non-formal and informal learning (Common European Principles for validation of non-formal and informal learning 2004).

Despite the clear principle of recognition of non-formal and informal learning at the European level, many differences are emerging at the national levels. In this paper we answer the question of what model of the recognition of non-formal and informal learning is used by countries of the European Union. In particular, we will be interested to know which models of recognition of non-formal and informal are the most effective and dominant in the European Union. This is particularly important for countries in the area of the southern Mediterranean countries,[1] which are faced today with the problem of a high level of mobility on the labor market.

RECOGNITION OF NON-FORMAL AND INFORMAL LEARNING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Lisbon Strategy has already clearly indicated that formal education alone can not pursue the basic objective of the European Union as the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy without integration of non-formal and informal learning (Contribution of the European Commission to the special European Council in Lisbon 2000, 9). But the integration of alternative forms of learning opensup the question of, how the results of these forms of learning would be recognized. This question has been for many years in the domain of the members, but now it is becoming the subject of a common European education policy. The latter also has a significant effect on the fact that today more and more European countries, are underlining the importance of recognition of non-formal and informal learning, which is taking place outside of formal education (Gomezelj Omezel and Trunk Širca 2006).[2]

In close connection with the Lisbon Strategy, in 2000 there was adopted the Memorandum on Lifelong Learning. The principal purpose of the Memorandum on Lifelong Learning was to 'create pan-European debate on a comprehensive strategy for the introduction of lifelong learning at individual and institutional levels and in all areas of public and private life' (Commission of the European Communities 2000, 3). By encouraging a discussion about a comprehensive strategy, the subsidiarity area was brought under the umbrella of the European Union. This can be understood in the context of dissatisfaction with the partial approaches to the development of lifelong learning. According to the drafters of the Memorandum, one should be thinking about lifelong learning to build on the common European basis, which may have different national implementations. At the same time, in the Memorandum was exposed one of the key substantive findings, that 'non-formal learning is truly undervalued' (ibid., 8). From the Memorandum grew the intention to develop alternative forms of learning and increase their role.

The contents of the Memorandum clearly establish that this will be posible only at the moment when the right individual and social force is provided. In this context we can understand the strong link be-

tween the development of non-formal and informal learning through the recognition of various learning outcomes.

That recognition of non-formal and informal learning is one of the key areas of the Memorandum is shown by the fact that this topic [254] is intended to be one of the most important fields. The fourth field highlights the next goal: 'a significant improvement the ways in which we understand and evaluate the participation and achievements, particularly in the non-formal and informal learning' (ibid., 28). In this context, the authors of Memorandum speak about 'the application of human resources in its fullness' as a factor in maintaining competitiveness. It is also noted that 'the diplomas, certificates and qualifications are an important recommendation for employers and individuals in the labor market and businesses' and 'the growing demand for skilled employers and increased competition between individuals to gain and maintain employment,' leading to 'much higher requirements of recognized learning than ever before' (ibid., 28). Further elaboration of the implementation of lifelong learning in practice will lead to 'achieving higher levels of general education and qualifications in all areas, providing high-quality adult education and training, while ensuring that the knowledge and skills of people respond to changed requirements work and jobs, the workplace and working methods' (ibid., 28).

Diverse national terminology and related cultural bases still contribute to the fact that the transparency and mutual recognition of non-formal and informal learning is a risky and delicate task. 'In integrated Europe, both the open labor market and civil rights to freedom of movement to settle, study, train and work in all Member States require that the knowledge, skills and qualifications can be comprehensible and easily transferable around the European Union' (ibid., 28–29). However, a high degree of consensus is needed at this level to do much more. 'Absolutely it is important to develop a high quality system of assessment and recognition of prior and experiential learning (Accreditaion of Prior Experiential Learning – APEL) and promote its use in different situations. Employers and those who receive the education and training need to be convinced of the value of this type of certification. The APEL system assesses and recognizes the individual's existing knowledge, skills and experience acquired over time and in

different circumstances, including non-formal and informal (experiential) circumstances. The used methods can identify skills and abilities of the individuals, which themselves may not even know that they have and that may be offered by employers. The process itself requires the active participation of the candidate, which in itself raises an individual's self-esteem' (ibid., 28). Recognition of prior learning in any form is clearly an effective way of motivation of 'non-traditional' participants and those, who on the labor market have not been active for some time, either because of unemployment, family responsibilities or because of illness (ibid., 28). 'Innovative forms of certification of non-formal learning are also important because of dissemination of recognition as such, irrespective of the type of participant under consideration' (ibid., 28).

Closely linked with the recognition of learning is also the fifth section of the Memorandum, which highlights information and advice on learning opportunities throughout Europe and throughout life. In the contemporary social and economic circumstances this requires a new approach, which provides advice and continuous access to all service that exceeds the distinction between educational, vocational and personal counseling, and reaching for new audiences. 'This means that the systems, to shift from the approach "offer" to approach "demand", put the needs and requirements of users in the center of attention' (ibid., 29). The future role of professionals in the counseling can be described as a commission, which should be directed to more comprehensive methods of counseling. Consultants will also be familiar with the personal and social circumstances of those for whom it is intended to provide information and advice, and should also be familiar with the situation on local labor market and the needs of employers. 'In recent years, also showed that a lot of information and advice to seek and find through non-formal channels and random. Official guidance and counseling services started to consider these factors not only by the development of networks of local associations and volunteer groups, but also to design less complex services in familiar surroundings' (ibid., 29). So, the Memorandum provides for a greater involvement of those who ultimately confirm the recommendations into practice and are familiar with the ways in which individuals and businesses use them in

their everyday lives. The social partners and relevant non-governmental organizations are no less important than the official authorities and professional educators.

An important milestone in the further development of recognition of non-formal and informal learning is represented by the year 2002. The basis for the development of recognition of non-formal and informal learning is the adoption of the Resolution on Lifelong Learning by ministers of education in the European Union. This Resolution urges Member States to develop 'a set of common principles regarding recognition of non-formal and informal learning with the aim of ensuring greater compatibility between approaches in different countries and at different levels' (Council resolution 27 June 2002 on lifelong learning 2002, 1). The Resolution gives intention to the question of recognition of results, regardless of whether the qualifications are for formal channels, or for the results of non-formal and informal learning. The same role in promoting of cooperation and measures to evaluate learning outcomes is recognized as the cornerstone for building links between formal, non-formal and informal learning. This should be a prerequisite for the creation of a European area of lifelong learning (ibid., 3). At the same time Resolution draws attention to the recognition of all forms of learning, which is crucial for the development of lifelong learning and acquiring knowledge in practical areas (ibid., 9).[3] This means that the recognition of learning outcomes is very important for both spheres, i.e. the sphere of education and the worlds of work, and presents a bridge between education, training, learning and work. Those decisions of the Resolution were reinforced at the ministerial meeting in Barcelona in 2002, when the 33rd. decision was taken to remove barriers by recognition of the results of formal, non-formal and informal learning (Presidency conclusions 2002, 4).

The contribution to the Lisbon strategy, which may (in addition to other requirements) offer education and training, is outlined in the work programme Education and Training in Europe: Different systems, common targets for 2010 (ibid.). The program is based on three long-term strategic objectives, and these are further broken down into 13 objectives and 42 key issues. The Second long-term strategic goal is 'all access to education and training systems in the light of the guiding

principles of lifelong learning, promoting employability and career development as well as active citizenship, equal opportunities and social cohesion' (ibid., 11). In the second subgoal is traced the intention to 'develop options for formal recognition of non-formal learning experiences' (ibid., 11). Similar thinking may have already been seen the year before in Concrete objectives of education and training in the future, where they may be among the measures that should help make learning more attractive. Here is written the desire to develop methods for official confirmation of non-formal learning experiences (Detailed work programme on the follow-up of the objectives of the education and training systems in Europe 2002, 28).

After extensive discussions between representatives of Member States and the European social partners, a set of common European principles was adopted for the recognition of non-formal and informal learning, namely at the European Council in May 2004 (Common European Principles for Validation of Non-formal and Informal Learning 2004). The common European principles have emerged as the need for establishing common basic principles for recognition of the learning outcomes. These principles were addressed intensively in Copenhagen (November 2002), in the discussions on enhanced European cooperation in vocational education and training. In accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen meeting, the main motivation for the development of such principles was to strengthen the comparability of different approaches at different levels and in different contexts. Methods and systems for the recognition have been largely designed and separated into national frameworks, and separately from one another.

The European perspective is to strengthen the comparability of the approaches to the recognition of non-formal and informal learning at different levels[4] and in different contexts, particularly important for the establishment and development of confidence in the international arena. This should be significantly helped by properly and consistently formulated common European guidelines. In an effort to make them more visible, in 2007 more detailed guidelines were drafted, which are designed to provide a reference point and an instrument of quality assurance methods and technical skills recognition in the European

Union (Commission of the European Communities 2007). Since this is guidance in terms of recommendations, it depends on each of the Member States to what extent the guidelines are actually used.

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SYSTEMIC REGULATION OF RECOGNITION OF NON-FORMAL AND INFORMAL LEARNING IN DIFFERENT GROUPS OF MEMBER STATES

In the previous chapter we pointed out that within the European Union there is established a process of homogenization of systems and procedures for recognition of non-formal and informal learning. However, since the path to complete alignment is more illusion than reality, the recognition of prior learning is governed by the principle of subsidiarity. Each state regulates this area in accordance with their respective systems, while facing various challenges.

Systems for recognition of non-formal and informal learning are different between Member States. Some of them have systematically settled the recognition of non-formal and informal learning, while others have just considered the opportunities for systemic regulation. Nevertheless, different degrees of order can enable the recognition of non-formal and informal learning to be divided by different criteria. In the desire for more transparency in the development of learning recognition, we used three criteria for the division of the European Union countries, namely:

- depending on the purpose and level of regulation,
- depending on the model, and
- depending on level of development.

Sharing Methods of Recognition of Prior Learning Depending on the Purpose and Level of Regulation

For the recognition of knowledge, skills and competencies, different approaches can be used. The main two, the formative and the summative approach, both in the formal and non-formal process of validation of knowledge, are equally important. The formative approach is designed as a decentralized and diverse tool for providing feedback and support for further learning, and avoids the association with the award

of formal qualifications. The primary purpose of formative recognition is to enable students to broaden and deepen their learning. With this approach, participants of the learning process gain feedback that would enable them to improve theit learning and, with the strengths and weaknesses of their learning, are provided with the basis for personal and work development. In the summative approach the purpose of recognition of non-formal knowledge is to gain acceptance for formally recognized qualification and acquisition of a (publicly valid) certificate. Although the process of recognition of the non-formal and informal learning is designed to be more sensitive to the needs of the individual, but because of the status and confidence, it is necessary that summative elements of recognition be based on (public valid) skill standards, which are used for summative evaluation in formal education. Taking those differences, we must be aware that often the summative and the formative approach are complementary. Their common concern is the opening of qualifications and qualification systems for learning outside of the formal education system. Significant systemic and institutional questions, which are addressed by various European countries in different ways, are: to what extent is the summative approach integrated to the national system of qualifications, and to what extent are these approaches connected with public and other bodies and standards?

It should be noted that both approaches, to a greater or lesser extend, applied in all Member States. The major difference between countries is the dominance of each approach. This is primarily dependent on the historical and social context and relationship between education and the qualification system. In countries where the concept of non-formal and informal learning and certification of qualifications occurs over time, the summative approach is dominant. Typical representatives of this approach are certainly England, Ireland and France. They are characterized by a well-established and regulated system of recognition of non-formal and informal learning. Nevertheless, we must recognize that even in this case, the formative approach is not insignificant. Countries with a formative system are characterized by more than a certification of qualifications which emphasizes participation of citizens in the non-formal and informal learning and

developing their permanent education plans. Most often, these countries appear high on the scales of adult participation in non-formal and informal learning. Among the countries with this approach can be included Sweden and the Netherlands. In Sweden can be traced largely
[260] a number of local and regional initiatives to integrate the non-formal and informal learning, which are aimed at specific target groups. A somewhat different approach can be found in the case of the Netherlands. Here, at the forefront, are not local and regional interests, but rather non-formal and informal learning promoted by business and labor organizations (Vuković and Žnidarič 2008, 26). But even in these cases there is the desire that participants of informal and formal learning will be motivated with recognition of their learning achievements.

Sharing Methods of Recognition of Prior Learning Depending on the Model

Bjørnåvold placed in the book *Making Learning Visible* four groups of models according to their similarity in forms and methods of recognition of non-formal and informal learning, namely:

- Scandinavian,
- Mediterranean,
- Anglo-Saxon and
- Francophone model (Bjørnåvold 2000, 11).

The first model is defined by Bjørnåvold as the Scandinavian model. In this model of recognition of prior learning we can find Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. All four countries joining a common tradition in the Scandinavian market training and work, which has enabled the international transfer of skills. They are connected by two characteristics, namely high institutionalization and formalization of public education and participation of employers and employees in management training. Despite the fact that the two countries are geographically close, they are not completely identical in the manner of recognition of prior learning. Finland and Norway, are on the issue of non-formal education, rather advanced countries. The introduction of reform and public debates about education are in these countries the main interest. Sweden and Denmark are in this area still somewhat on hold as such. For example, in Sweden the importance of

non-formal education is not clearly defined in the national educational system (ibid., 12).

The Mediterranean approach is characterized by a positive orientation in promoting non-formal education. In this model could be placed Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The common point for all [261] countries is a strong general education and a small number of participants in formal education. This speaks in favor of the development of untapped potential and large stocks of non-formal and informal learning. It should be noted that the actual recognition of non-formal education has not progressed, but there has been willingness to change, which is definitely positive. This is clearly reflected in the adoption of legislation and reform of vocational education and training (ibid., 13).

A flexible model is provided the Anglo-Saxon model, which is placed in England, Ireland and Holland. This model was the inspiration for many European countries, because the educational system is based on competences and is results-oriented. In this model are clear procedures of recognition of prior learning, which indirectly leads to (publicly valid) qualifications. Despite the positive characteristics of this system, it has also some weaknesses. The introduction of an acceptable qualification standard may make it difficult to maintain a balance between too general or specific definitions of competence (ibid., 14).

In the final model are included France and Belgium. This might be called as a challenge to formal certification. France is, according to many scientists, the most successful in the recognition of non-formal learning. The first attempt to establish recognition of the non-formal education system took place in France in 1989 with a system of 'bilan de competence.' This was followed by another big step in 1992 with the opening of a national system of vocational education and training for professional certificates obtained outside the education system. The third step in development of recognition of non-formal learning has emerged with the idea of establishing a idea of Chamber of Commerce about common procedures and standards for recognition of non-formal education, which are not based on formal education and training. France with the opening of national education and training, enables individuals to obtain the certificates under the national system

of recognition of prior learning. The problem of this system is to have formal certificates and diplomas given a major role in the education system, but to overcoming this obstacle is possible with transparency and diversity of non-formal education (ibid., 14).

[262] In the case of the four models designed by Bjørnåvold we can see the differences between individual countries in systemic approaches to dealing with the recognition of non-formal and informal learning. In this way, we have raised concerns about the quality and development of individual Member States in the field of recognition of prior learning.

Sharing Methods of Recognition of Prior Learning Depending on the Level of Development

Despite these differences in models of recognition of different forms of learning, the interest in different countries to develop this system at the national level is very different. Countries are at different stages of practical implementation of the recognition of non-formal and informal acquired skills and competences in education and the training system. In an effort to improve the implementation of the development of recognition of prior learning, the European Union at the end of 2007 modeled the distribution of the Member States relating to the level of development of this system. Member States are divided into three main groups. The first group includes countries that have already implemented the system of evaluation and recognition of non-formal and informal learning. Another group of countries comprises those which have established a national system that will allow individuals to gain a (public valid) certificate for their knowledge, skills and abilities. Most of this group has formed the normative basis, started to establish a methodology for recognition prior learning and is expected to implement methodology in the coming years. In the last group are countries where the system of recognition of prior learning is a new concept and is only exercised or receiving criticism, which hinders its further development. In accordance with that, CEDEOP classified the Member States into three groups, as follows (*Validation of Non-formal and Informal Learning in Europe* 2007):

1 countries where the procedure is well established, organized and

includes individuals already in it (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom),

2 countries in which the procedures are developed, the rule bases are in place, but people do not follow them (Austria, Czech Republic, Iceland, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Sweden), [263]

3 countries in which recognition of prior learning is not happening a lot and which are in early stages of development (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Slovakia and Turkey).

In order to see the benefits of each model of recognition of non-formal and informal learning, we compare models with the level of development, which was set in 2008 by CEDEFOP experts. As seen from table 1, the two models appear, all of whose Member States have achieved the highest degree of implementation. These two models are the Anglo-Saxon model and the Francophone model. The ranking of countries falling under this model reflects the fact that these countries have a long tradition of recognition of prior learnng. On this basis, it is understandable that most of these countries represent an a ideal model for other Member States.

A weaker development occurred in the Scandinavian model. In this case, all countries, except Sweden, are at the highest level of development. It is interesting to note that Sweden achieves a high degree of integration of the population in non-formal and informal learning, but has not yet reached full development of a system of recognition of prior learning. The Scandinavian model followed the Mediterranean model. In this case, Spain and Portugal have implemented the system of recognition of non-formal and informal learning. Italy and Greece are developing a system or are just in the initial stage of development.

Based on a comparison of different models for recognition of non-formal and informal learning, one can support the thesis about the close correlation between the model and the level of development of recognition of informal and formal learning. At same time, the fact

TABLE 1 Comparison of models and levels of development of recognition of prior learning

	Scandinavian model	Mediterranean model	Anglo-Saxon model	Francophone model
The system is introduced	Finland Norway Denmark	Spain Portugal	England Ireland Netherlands	France Belgium
The system is being developed	Sweden	Italy		
The system is in the initial stage		Greece		

is that Member States with a higher level of developement system of recognition of prior learning have a higher percent of the adult population involved in alternative forms of learning.

CONCLUSION

That the European Union understands the non-formal and informal learning as being a very important upgrade of formal education, is evidenced by the for homogenization of the two alternative forms of learning. The common guidelines and principles have created a basis for joint actions. But practice speaks in favor of the argument that the development of non-formal and informal learning is a distinct national subject. We are convinced of this by the great differences between Member States. If encouraging the development of non-formal and informal learning is often justified by the argument of approximating the retarded to the more developement countries, the facts show increasing differences. Extensive research does highlight the positive and significant correlation between the degree of involvement and success in formal education and the effectiveness of non-formal and informal learning. Countries with a more developed system of formal education will also achieve better results in the two other forms of learning. We must be aware that non-formal and informal learning can not exist isolated from formal eduation. Non-formal and informal learning will be effective only on the assumption that the formal education system functions effectively and that all forms of learning are complementary.

An important role in complementing the formal education, non-formal and informal learning can certainly be played by mutual recognition of all these forms of learning. This certainly can help the models which are detected by Bjørnåvold in the analysis of national systems. Selection of an appropriate model and adapting it to another national system will be not an easy task. By successful integration of a foreign model of recognition of prior learning, account must be taken of the socio-economic factors and specifics of the relationship between qualification and education systems.

NOTES

1 The importance of the recognition of knowledge in the Mediterranean countries is exposed in the UNESCO International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean, held in Nice in 1976. One of the most important objects of this convention was to 'ensure that studies, certificates, diplomas and degrees are recognized as widely as possible' (International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean 1976). Recognition of knowledge in Mediterranean countries was later discussed by the Intergovernmental Committee for the Application of the International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean, held in Split in 2005. In Article 6 of the conclusions was expressed the main goal: 'Considering that recognition refers to the studies followed and the certificates, diplomas or degrees obtained in the recognized institutions of a given Contracting State, any person, of whatever nationality or political or legal status, who has followed such studies and obtained such certificates, diplomas or degrees' (Intergovernmental Committee for the Application of the International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean 2005).

2 In reading the various documents of the European Union one should not neglect the report prepared by CEDEFOP, entitled 'Making Learning Visible – Identification, Assessment and Recognition of Nonformal Learning in Europe' (Bjørnåvold 2000). The report presents an

important overview of the existing national systems of recognition of non-formal and informal learning. At the same time this document points to and provides the basic guidelines of advanced development.

3 This topic was first presented at the European level in 1999 in White Paper on 'Teaching and Learning, Towards the learning society' (White paper on education and training 1999).

4 In the field of tertiary education one should understand the key role of the Ministerial Conference in Bergen. At the conference in Bergen, one of the four priorities to year 2007 was to create all possible opportunities for greater flexibility in higher education, including procedures for recognition of prior learning (Commission of the European Communities 2007). In the same document it was highlighted that under the previous education was understood the concept of all forms of non-formal and experiential learning. Recognition of this is used to increase the possibility of entry into higher education programs as well as recognition of parts of accredited programs. Recognition of non-formal and experiential learning can be understood as an effort to adapt curricula, learning methods and labor market needs.

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Perception of Destination Branding Measures: A Case Study of Alexandria Destination Marketing Organizations

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SUPPLIERS AND ORGANIZERS in the tourism sector seek to attract tourists by differentiating and marketing their products and services. While developing their marketing and sale methods they are now more and more using branding as one of their major tools, especially in the current intense global competition. Destination branding is not yet fully used in the tourism business sector of various countries such as Egypt. This study aims to investigate the branding perspective of destination marketing organizations (DMO's) in Alexandria. To achieve a high result, a survey approach was used to collect data from 100 respondents, official and public sectors using a completed questionnaire technique, a Likert scale and statistical models to test and interpret the research outcomes. The research findings explained that marketing organizations in Alexandria have not enough awareness of any destination branding's concept and that they are only implementing parts of a branding process.

INTRODUCTION

As tourism is one of the largest sources of economic activity in the world, travel and tourism generates economic activity worldwide representing over 12% of total global GDP (UNWTO 2006). The industry also accounts for over 200 million jobs direct and indirect. Tourism is not only one of the world's largest, but also one of its fastest growing industries. The importance of tourism and the entry of many new

destinations into the market have forced all to emulate and compete in the battle at a global level (Riege et al. 2001) to win many tourist markets (Konecnik 2002). This intense global competition in the tourism industry forces destinations to develop strong, unique, and competitive destination brands. Most tourist boards spend lots of money on 'selling' the country around the world. Blue skies, golden sands, and snow-capped mountains are only a tiny part of the reality of a country, but because these images are often so aggressively promoted, they have a disproportionate effect on people's perceptions of the country as a whole (Klooster 2004), so branding is the best solution for tourist destinations.

The concept of branding a tourist destination is not well known in Egypt until now. This research aims to shed light on the importance of branding for destinations, to investigate the branding perspective of destination marketing organizations (DMO's) in Alexandria, as well as to show how far parts of any branding concept are or are not implemented.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Destination Branding

Most tourism activities take place at a particular destination, therefore the destination itself forms a pillar of any modelling that is done for the tourism system (Pike 2004). Destination can be seen as an area that includes all services and goods a tourist consumes during his or her stay (Terzibasoglu 2004; WTO 2007). This destination appeal shape should transfer to a unique and competitive destination brand which expresses the reality of the destination and conveys the tourist perspective.

The destination marketing organizations (DMO's) and the enterprises are involved in the building and marketing of destination tourist services (Grängsjö 2003). This is why a tourist destination concept should focus on both customers and producers. The marketing success of a destination is dependent not only on the called push factors (market demand forces) but also on the pull factors (supply-side factors), that have a major impact on the branding success of a particular destination (http://fama2.us.es).



FIGURE 1 Elements of destinations (adapted from WTO 2007

Destination branding is defined as: selecting a consistent element mix to identify and distinguish it through positive image building (Cai Liping 2002), i.e. how consumers perceive the destination in their minds. Destination branding conveys the promise of a memorable travel experience that is uniquely associated with the destination; it also serves to consolidate and reinforce the recollection of pleasurable memories of the destination experience (Goeldner, Ritchie, and MacIntosh 2000; Kaplanidou and Vogt 2003).

The desire to become a recognizable destination presents a marketing challenge (Kotler, Bowen, and Makens 2006). For marketers, branding is perhaps the most powerful marketing weapon available to contemporary destination marketers confronted by tourists who are increasingly seeking lifestyle fulfilment and experience rather than recognizing differentiation in the more tangible elements of the destination product, such as accommodation and attractions (Morgan, Pritchard, and Pride 2004). A successful destination brand needs to convey the expectations, or promise, of a memorable travel experience that is distinctively associated with that destination (Ritchie and Crouch 2003; Blain, Levy, and Ritchie 2005; Knapp and Sherwin 2005).

Benefits of Branding

According to Kotler, brands' benefits, are two-fold; they serve as a 'major tool to create product/services differentiation,' and they represent a promise of value from a consumer's viewpoint (Kotler and Gartner 2002).

Clarke (2000) has identified six benefits of branding related to tourism destination products:

1 as tourism is typically high involvement, branding helps to reduce the choice,
2 branding helps in reducing the impact of intangibility,
3 branding conveys consistency across multiple outlets and through time,
4 branding can reduce the risk factor attached to decision making about holidays.
5 branding facilitates precise segmentation,
6 branding helps to provide a focus for the integration of producer effort, helping people to work towards the same outcome.

Benefits of branding for the community as a whole:

- Creates a unifying focus to aid all public, private, and non-profit sector organizations that rely on the image of the place and its attractiveness.
- Brings increased respect, recognition, loyalty, and celebrity.
- Corrects out of date, inaccurate or unbalanced perceptions.
- Improves stakeholder income, profit margins, and increases lodging tax revenues. Increases the ability to attract, recruit, and retain talented people.
- Enhances civic pride and advocacy.
- Expands the size of the 'pie' for stakeholders to get a larger share, rather than having to rely on pricing to steal their share (www.destinationbranding.com).

Brand Image

A country's image results from its geography, history, proclamations, art and music, famous citizens, and other features. The entertainment industry and the media play a particularly important role in shaping people's perceptions of places, especially those viewed negatively (Simonin 2008). This image can be seen as the sum of beliefs and impressions people hold about places. Images represent a simplification of a large number of associations and pieces of information connected with a place, they are a product of the mind trying to process and pick out essential information from huge amounts of data about a place (Kotler, Heider, and Rein 1993). The image is a reflection, sometimes distorted, of its fundamental being, a measure of its health, and a mir-

ror to its soul. It speaks to the way a country exists in people's minds and hearts as well as to the position it occupies in relations to other countries (Simonin 2008).

Destination image has a key role for tourism marketers. Several researchers (e. g. Mayo and Jarvis 1981; Woodside and Lysonski 1989) have illustrated that destination image and tourists' purchase decisions are positively correlated; this is an important issue in an individual's travel purchase related decision making, since the individual traveller's (dis)satisfaction with a travel purchase depends on a comparison of his/her expectation about the destination or a previously held destination image, and on his/her perceived performance of the destination (LaPage and Cormier 1977), it is an important determinant (Ritchie and Couch 2003).

Brand Equity

Brand equity is the value of a brand based on the extent to which it has a high brand loyalty, name awareness, perceived quality, strong brand associations, and other assets such as patents, trademarks, and channel relationships (Kotler and Armstrong 2001). It stems from the greater confidence that consumers place in a brand than they do in its competitors. This confidence translates into consumer's loyalty and their willingness to pay a premium price for the brand.

Brand equity includes many dimensions such as performance, social image, value, trustworthiness, and identifications (Lassar, Mittal, and Sharma 1995). For the marketer, the brand is a value; the brand name of the product marketed by them should lead to attaining brand equity. For the consumer, a brand which accumulates benefits means benefits in the sense of utility and service. A brand is said to have equity when the consumers prefer to buy a branded one instead of an unbranded commodity. When consumers are able to recall the brand name and its attributes for the long period (Krishnakumar 2009), they react more (less) favourably to an element of the marketing mix for the brand than they do to the same marketing mix element when it is attributed to a fictitiously named or unnamed version of the product or service (Keller 1993).

From this point of view, brand equity is the extension of brand loyalty and brand knowledge (Krishnakumar 2009).

Brand Identity

Brand identity is a part of the brand's overall equity, the total perception of a brand in the marketplace, driven mostly by its positioning and personality (Upshaw 1995). Brand identity clearly specifies what the brand aspires to stand for and has multiple roles:

1 It is a set of associations that the brand strategist seeks to create and maintain.
2 It represents a vision of how a particular brand should be perceived by its target public (Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000).
3 Upon its projection the brand identity should help establish a relationship between a particular brand and its clientele by generating a value proposition potentially either involving benefits or providing credibility, which endorses the brand in question.

Aaker (1996) has developed a comprehensive brand identity planning model. At the heart of this model is a four-fold perspective on the concept of a brand. To help ensure that a firm's brand identity has texture and depth, Aaker, 1996 advises brand strategists to consider the brand as:

1 a product;
2 an organization;
3 a person; and
4 a symbol.

Each perspective is distinct. The purpose of this system is to help brand strategists consider different brand elements and patterns that can help clarify, enrich, and differentiate an identity. A more detailed identity will also help guide implementation decisions (Yoo, Donthu, and Lee 2000). The most important thing to keep in mind about a brand identity is that it lives entirely in the mind of the beholder. An identity is not what marketers create, but what consumers perceive as what has been created (Upshaw 1995).

Brand Positioning

The brand positioning task consists of three steps:

1 Identifying a set of possible competitive advantages upon which to build a position.
2 Selecting the right competitive advantage.
3 Effectively communicating and delivering the chosen position to a carefully selected target market (Morgan, Pritchard, and Pride 2004).

Marketers focus on differentiation branding through relationships and emotional appeals rather than through discernible, tangible benefits (Westwood et al. 1999), as it is clear that the most difficult task facing any destination is the quest for true differentiation. To create a fair, rounded and attractive picture of a country in people's minds, a balance must be maintained between the different images (Anholt 2002).

Brand positioning is what a brand stands for in the mind of consumers and prospects relative to its competition in terms of benefits and promises (Upshaw 1995). Brand positioning is a very important stage which involves the establishment of a fit between the supply and the demand perspectives on the destination attributes (Ndlovu 2009).

Promotional mix plays an important role in positioning a destination. In order to promote tourism experiences, marketers have to think beyond traditional advertising techniques. As well as communicating the obvious, in marketing campaigns they need to bring brands to life by dazzling consumer senses, touching their hearts and stimulating their minds (Widdis 2001).

Applying the Tourist Destination's Branding Model to Alexandria

Although some writers have asserted that destination branding is difficult, as a tourism product consists of many components (Riege et al. 2001; www.scribd.com), others have asserted that successful cases from the tourism industry show that the complicated constructs of culture, history, and nature can be effectively used to create and market a unique image of a tourist destination (Saarinen 1997; Poimiroo 2000; Ooi 2001).

Alexandria is the second largest city in Egypt and is known as The Pearl of the Mediterranean. The city has an air about it that is more



FIGURE 2 Tourist destination's branding model (adapted from Saarinen 1997; Ooi 2001; Iliachenko 2005)

Mediterranean than Middle Eastern. The ambience and cultural heritage, along with an exotic Orient flavour, is truly captivating and attracts travellers from all over the world.

Founded by Alexander the Great in 331 B C, Alexandria became the capital of the Greco-Roman Egypt. This was also the center of learning in the ancient world. From the 19th c, Alexandria became the focus for Egypt's commercial and maritime expansion. The city came to be known as the city of commerce and cosmopolitanism. Alexandria, apart from its historical heritage, is rich in its natural beauty, beautiful sites and entertainment options. No wonder, it has evolved as an ideal tourist destination (www.asiarooms.com).

Nature Dimension: Alexandria is famous for its natural assets. It is distinguished by its strategic location, moderate climate, and its beautifully fine sandy beaches which cover a large area (www.sis.gov.eg). Alexandria is a year-round resort, in winter the sun still shines along the white sand coast while yachts race in the harbour; in summer, sun lovers seek out the cooling sea breezes (www.discoveralex.com).

- The Beaches, stretching from east to west: Maamura, Montaza, Assafra, Miamy, Sidi Bishr, San Stefano, Glym, Stanley, Rushdy,

Sidi Gaber, Sporting, Ibrahimia, and Shatby; all of which lie along the seafront boulevard, the 'Corniche.' On the western perimeter lie Al-Bitash and Hanoville beaches.

- Alexandria Corniche: one of the best places to watch the sun set over the Mediterranean Sea, the Corniche is a seaside promenade that stretches the length of the city and is constantly bustling with activity (www.alexandria.world-guides.com).
- Gardens in the city such as the Montazah Palace Gardens, the Antoniadis Gardens, and the Shallalat Gardens (http://egypttourinfo.com).

Historical Dimension: Alexandria was the site of one of the seven wonders of the ancient world (the lighthouse), which was the tallest man-made structure on earth (www.teflcourse.com) and unfortunately does not exist any more. Generations of immigrants from Greece, Italy and the East settled here and made the city an international center of commerce and Bohemian culture.

The city is rich with historical sites such as:

- Pompey's Pillar,
- the Roman Amphitheatre,
- the Catacombs of Kom al-Shoqafa,
- Al-Shatby Necropolis,
- the Tombs of Al-Anfushi,
- the Tombs of Mustafa Kamel (Rushdy),
- the Fort of Qaitbay,
- the Mosque of Mursi Abul Abbas (www.2travel2egypt.come).

Over its long history, Alexandria has been the cradle of several civilizations of the ancient world: Pharaonic, Hellenistic and Roman. This multicultural museum lies safely under Alexandria's Mediterranean coastal waters, and during the Fifth Century B C it formed part of the ancient city of Alexandria, which was devastated by earthquakes and tidal erosion. A project was initiated in 1992 by the Supreme Council for Antiquities, in cooperation with the European Institute of Submerged Antiquities, to make a topographic survey of the area of royal facilities at the submerged parts, specifically the Eastern Port, which

commands a major historical importance (www.boutiquestyle.net; www.2travel2egypt.com).

Culture Dimension: Culture in Alexandria relates to both immaterial components (e. g. beliefs, values, customs, etc.), and tangible compo-
[278] nents (e. g. languages, artifacts, cultural and archaeological sites attractions, etc.). Furthermore, immaterial components can themselves be made tangible through codification and transmission, whether in oral, written or artistic forms (www.efah.org).

Museums are part of the city culture such as: the Hydro-Biological Institute and Museum, the Greco-Roman Museum, the Royal Jewellery Museum, and the Museum of Fine Arts (http://egypttourinfo.com). Also the Alexandria Library, Bibliotheca, was inaugurated in 2002 as a resurrection of the ancient Great Library of Alexandria, which had formed the cornerstone of ancient intellectual life, and is a source of light and enlightenment (http://exoticholidays.com).

Many writers have accented Alexandria, such as Ibn Battuta:

> Alexandria is a jewel of manifest brilliance, and a virgin decked with glittering ornaments. It lights up the west with her glory, it combines beauties of the most diverse description, because of its situation between orient and occident. There every wonder is displayed for all eyes to see, and there all rare things arrive.

There's also Lawrence Durrell's Alexandria Quartet:

> The pale lengthening rays of the afternoon sun smear the long curves of the Esplanade, and the dazzled pigeons, like rings of scattered paper, climb above the minarets to take the last rays of the waning light on their wings.

He described it as 'The capital city of Asiatic Europe, if such a thing could exist.'

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether or not any branding concepts are applied to tourism destinations in general and specially

in Alexandria, the second largest city in Egypt with an economical as well as cultural importance. Specially, because the Egyptian tourist authority (www.egypt.travel) declared in its strategy 2009–2014 that they will develop a brand strategy for tourism in all destinations and communicate this throughout the industry.

By using Alexandria as a case study, we also intended to test the awareness of branding concepts within the involved organizations and indicate which destination branding techniques are currently being applied. We focused on both governmental and non-governmental organizations associated with branding.

The hypotheses tested in this study were as follows:

H1 *Tourism marketing organizations in Alexandria have no awareness of the concept of destination branding.*

H2 *Although some tourism marketing organizations in Alexandria believe they practice destination branding, they are only implementing parts of the branding process.*

H3 *There are many positive results in applying the concept of destination branding in Alexandria.*

To achieve the objectives and hypotheses of this study, the research methodology depends on conducting interviews with a number of experts working in the tourism sectors and public sector officials representing the various tiers of local government and their agencies, such as: Ministry of Tourism in Egypt, Egyptian Tourism Authority, Egyptian Tourism Federation, Egyptian Tourism Development Authority, and Alexandria Tourism Authority, in addition to managers of non-governmental organizations operating in the field of tourism marketing in Alexandria.

The research targeted 150 respondents in governmental and non-governmental organizations from August 2009 to January 2010. The response rate (table 1) reached 80% and 66% for governmental and non-governmental organizations, respectively.

Most of the non-respondent organizations mentioned many reasons such, 'they are not ready to deal with the questionnaire; they are too busy, these data are confidential, etc.'

Literature, site visits, and interviews were used to formulate con-

TABLE 1 Response rate

Category	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of organizations	5	140	145
Number targeted	10	140	150
Number shared	8	92	100
Response rate	80%	66%	67%

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) governmental organizations, (2) non-governmental organizations, (3) total.

TABLE 2 DMO's response to attractions in Alexandria

Attractions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Archaeological sites	6	5	50	33	4	4	.255	1.084	.271
Museums	11	17	28	39	3.7	3.7	.277	1.178	.318
Religious sites	11	17	33	28	3.5	3.5	.315	1.338	.382
Old buildings	6	17	33	33	3.7	3.7	.311	1.319	.356
Beaches	–	6	28	61	4.3	4.3	.244	1.036	.241
Library of Alexandria	–	5	28	61	4.3	4.3	.244	1.036	.241

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree, (6) mean, (7) std. error, (8) std. deviation, (9) CV.

clusions and recommendations to brand Alexandria as an international tourist destination.

The Likert scale was used to analyze officials responsible and experts towards the objectives of the study by answering a number of questions using the five-point scale '5–1 (strongly agree–strongly disagree.') Statistical models were used to analyze the data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results in table 2 show that there are many tourist attractions in Alexandria, such as: library of Alexandria, beaches, archaeological sites, museums, old building, and religious sites.

Results in table 3 show types of tourism that could be promoted in the city, such as: underwater monuments tourism, culture tourism, recreation tourism, religious tourism, and health tourism.

About the meaning of destination branding, the results in figure 3 show the following:

TABLE 3 Response to type of tourism could be promoted in Alexandria

Type of tourism	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Culture tourism	5	11	56	28	4	4	.189	.802	0.200
Recreation tourism	6	4	50	34	4	4	.255	1.084	.271
Religious tourism	6	33	33	22	3.6	3.6	.257	1.092	.303
Health tourism	22	17	39	11	3	3	.294	1.248	.416
Underwater monuments tourism	–	16	56	28	4	4	.159	.676	.169

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree, (6) mean, (7) std. error, (8) std. deviation, (9) CV.

FIGURE 3 Meaning of destination branding

1 34% of the respondents chose the first definition which was 'setting a logo to a destination in the marketing plan.'
2 33% of the respondents chose the second definition which was 'Use a slogan to a destination and marketing to it.'
3 22% of the respondents chose the third – the correct– definition which was 'a collective of creative activities which help achieving competitive advantage, identify and differentiate one destination from those of another.'
4 11% of the interviewees did not know the concept of destination branding.

The above results show that 67% of the interviewees chose incorrect definitions of the destination branding. This result proves the first hypothesis of this study.

Results in table 4 show the elements which may be used to brand Alexandria as a tourism destination, such as: good image, reputation, customs of local people, peace and safety, culture assets, infrastructure, a slogan or a logo of Alexandria, emotional appeal, and nature assets.

Results in table 5 show proposed elements suggested for branding Alexandria's strategy:

TABLE 4 Response to branding elements which could be used to brand Alexandria

Branding elements	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Should a slogan or a logo exist?	11	6	22	33	28	3.6	.303	1.289	.358
Nature assets	17	–	–	44	39	3.8	.332	1.409	.370
Culture assets	11	–	5	56	28	3.8	.278	1.182	.311
Emotional appeal	11	6	27	28	28	3.5	.304	1.293	.369
Good image	–	11	–	45	44	4.2	.222	.942	.224
Reputation	6	–	5	50	39	4.1	.232	.985	.240
Customs of local people	–	11	17	44	28	3.8	.227	.963	.253
Infrastructure	5	11	17	17	50	3.9	.307	1.304	.334
Peace & safety	5	6	6	22	61	3.9	.285	1.211	.310

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree, (6) mean, (7) std. error, (8) std. deviation, (9) CV.



FIGURE 4 Level of practising destination branding

1 raise awareness of branding importance between stakeholders,
2 rebuilding Alexandria's image,
3 collaboration between tourism participants' efforts.
4 brand equity,
5 identify a new tourism market,
6 brand identity, and
7 best marketing activities.

Results in figure 4 show that 67% of the respondents do not practice the branding process for Alexandria as a destination, and 17% of them are neutral, while 16% of the respondents practice branding.

The above results show that most tourism marketing organizations in Alexandria do not practice branding.

Results in figure 5 show that 72 of respondents do not know about the logo and slogan of Alexandria ('Pearl of the Mediterranean'), while 28 do know about it.

TABLE 5 Points of view of respondents about elements of branding Alexandria's strategy

Elements	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebuilding Alexandria's image	6	–	–	44	50	4.3	.228	.970	.225
Raise awareness of branding importance between stakeholders	–	6	11	44	39	4.1	.202	.857	.209
Collaboration between tourism parties' efforts	5	–	5	34	56	4.3	.242	1.028	.239
Identify a new tourism market	6	–	11	44	39	4.1	.241	1.022	.249
Best marketing activities	5	6	–	28	61	4.3	.268	1.137	.264
Brand equity	6	–	5	33	56	4.3	.242	1.028	.239
Brand identity	5	–	11	39	44	4.1	.245	1.043	.254

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree, (6) mean, (7) std. error, (8) std. deviation, (9) CV.



FIGURE 5 Awareness about current logo and slogan of Alexandria



FIGURE 6 Studying and analyzing the competitors

Hence there is a negative result about the awareness between DMO's about the logo and the slogan of Alexandria.

In figure 6, the results show opinions of respondents about studying and analyzing its competitors to achieve competitive advantage; 84 of the respondents do not agree, while 5 of them strongly agree, and 11% of them are neutral. About effective strategies for competitor's success, the results in table 6 show many strategies such as:

1 more theme targeted marketing,
2 more knowledgeble staff,
3 theme target market,
4 low cost policy,

TABLE 6 Effective strategies to support Alexandria's branding for confronting competitors

Strategies	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Low cost policy	39	28	17	5	11	2	.318	1.352	.676
Theme targeted marketing	39	11	6	22	22	2.7	.400	1.699	.629
More theme targeted marketing	11	–	6	50	33	3.9	.285	1.211	.310
More knowledgable staff	17	6	–	27	50	3.8	.360	1.529	.402

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree, (6) mean, (7) std. error, (8) std. deviation, (9) CV.



FIGURE 7 Activities used for branding Alexandria

The results in table 6 and results in figure 7 show that there is no homogeneity in the branding policy for Alexandria. There is a lack of guidelines, and most of the DMO's try different methods on a more or less individual basis than on a city guidelined strategy. These results prove the second hypothesis of this study.

About the positive results in the case of applying branding for Alexandria, the results show that all respondents see 'there are many positive effects such as: Raising the number of tourists either domestic or foreign to Alexandria, encouraging investments either local or foreign in Alexandria, establishing infrastructure, building new units of accommodation to allow tourists to spend more time, and raising awareness of tourism among the local people.' The above findings prove the third hypothesis of the study.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This study shows clearly that there is no branding concept in Alexandria. Also no concrete plans exist, neither in the governmental nor in the nongovernmental organizations. On the contrary, most of the people questioned and interviewed did not even have a clear vision of what to identify within Alexandria so as to put it as a lead in their strategy plan.

In spite of the fact that Alexandria is the second important city to Egypt and is a unique city by its culture, and its nature, it has not been properly included in the map of international tourism. The share of Alexandria is about 1.2% of the total of international tourism in Egypt (Egyptian Ministry of Tourism 2009), and this province has not received its fair share from marketing efforts at the local, regional, and international level. [285]

The findings reveal that, although DMO's have the same opinion about multi-potential tourism attractions in Alexandria, they trace different perceptions of branding and do not agree on one or two outstanding identification objects to develop a brand based on a specific image of Alexandria, that everyone, – local or visitor – can relate to as characteristic.

To unify the DMO's it will be necessary to appoint a committee with a controlling function. This committee should consist of members of all involved governmental and non governmental organizations that can put all items together and send out the brand image that was agreed upon to all tourism organizations, for implementing the brand marketing process. Since this study examined the DMO's perspective about branding Alexandria, future research should be developed to test the perspective of tourists about the city.

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Résumés

Dialogue interculturel et droits de l'homme : perspectives pour une citoyenneté euro-méditerranéenne

PIETRO DE PERINI

Cet article traite du développement d'une nouvelle conception de la citoyenneté (plus complète, active et plurielle) concernant les populations des états membres de l'Union pour la Méditerranéenne. Cette nouvelle conception de la citoyenneté se fonderait sur le partage de valeurs ontologiques communes ainsi que sur le respect de la diversité culturelle. Du fait de ses fondements, l'éventuel succès de cette proposition repose sur le bon développement du dialogue interculturel et sur la garantie d'une protection égalitaire des droits de l'homme dans cette région. De plus, une évolution de la structure institutionnelle actuelle de l'Union pour la Méditerranéenne serait nécessaire pour assurer le succès de cette proposition et, suivant le contexte, favoriser l'émergence d'autres propositions dans ce domaine.

« L'arabe – pourquoi ? » Attitudes des étudiants juifs en Israël vis-à-vis de la langue arabe et leur volonté de l'apprendre

DAN SOEN

Bien que l'arabe soit l'une des deux langues officielles en Israël, son statut est problématique. La tendance monocentrique de l'Israël fait que l'arabe est exclu de l'usage quotidien. En 1997, l'apprentissage de la langue arabe a été introduit dans les programmes scolaires de la 7e à la 10e année, en tant que seconde langue étrangère après l'anglais, à raison de trois heures d'instruction par semaine. Pourtant en 2003, moins de 50% des élèves des classes de la 7e à la 10e (qui auraient ddû prendre la langue arabe dans le cadre de ce nouveau programme) étudiaient effectivement l'arabe. Plusieurs recherches ont mis en avant la faible motivation des élèves pour l'apprentissage de la langue arabe ainsi qu'une attitude négative envers cette langue qu'ils perçoivent comme « la langue du conflit », d'utilité restreinte et dont le statut sur la scène culturelle globale est en déclin. L'étude de terrain présentée ici a été menée dans une école secondaire polyvalente d'un

quartier riche située au nord de Tel-Aviv. Les conclusions de cette étude confirment les résultats des recherches auparavant menées sur ce sujet. Les conclusions de notre recherche montrent que les élèves qui choisissent d'étudier l'arabe ont une attitude plutôt neutre vis-à-vis de cette langue. Ni l'origine des parents d'élèves ni leur éducation n'ont une influence significative sur leur attitude.

Les Bosniaques : modèles fragiles pour les musulmans européens

ADISA BUSULADŽIĆ

Cet article explore les orientations politiques divergentes et le renouveau islamique en Bosnie-Herzégovine post-socialiste et d'après-guerre. Il y est évoqué que ces nouvelles tendances parmi les Bosniaques s'expliquent par une confusion de leur point de vue sur les questions de sécurité, de citoyenneté et d'état. Du fait de l'émergence de la culture politique de cette nation au patrimoine mixte de l'Est et communiste et du génocide récent, les Bosniaques manquent de confiance à la fois dans les institutions et dans les mécanismes essentiels du patrimoine politique européen. Cette instabilité s'amplifie par le fait que le cadre institutionnel bosniaque dans lequel les responsables politiques et religieux – ensemble avec les représentants de la communauté internationale qui gèrent le pays de manière efficace – continuent à galvauder une opportunité historique pour repenser la Bosnie comme une nation dynamique pouvant servir de modèle à la population grandissante des musulmans Européens. La force et la consistance spécifiques de cette culture « entre-deux » bosniaque et européenne mises en avant dans cet article, témoignent de la nécessité d'une coopération multilatérale afin de renouveler des dispositifs aujourd'hui obsolètes. En attendant de se faire une place qui leur correspond sur le sol Européen, les Bosniaques pourraient alors contribuer à une transformation des perspectives traditionnelles européennes en perspectives européennes plus ouvertes, complètes et universelles.

Les facteurs déclencheurs du terrorisme : Analyse du marketing social comme outil d'étude de la sécurité – une étude du cas du Maroc

NICOLAS HAMELIN, HOUDA AZNAY, CONNELL MONETTE, JACK KALPAKIAN

[291]

Grâce à l'analyse de régression, un modèle identifiant les possibles facteurs déclencheurs d'un changement de comportement pouvant aller vers le terrorisme, a pu être défini pour la première fois. Ce modèle a été développé à l'instar d'une enquête menée dans une zone du Maroc très largement connue pour être le cœur des récentes activités terroristes du pays. Au moyen d'une analyse de régression standardisée, nous avons détecté les facteurs contribuant positivement ou négativement à un changement d'état pouvant conduire à d'éventuelles activités terroristes. Nous identifions le profile du terroriste potentiel, les facteurs de blocage empêchant un changement d'état et les actions pouvant favoriser la prévention de futurs actes de violence.

Modèles de reconnaissance du savoir dans l'enseignement supérieur en Union européenne : la transformation de l'Union européenne en pays méditerranéens

DEJAN HOZJAN

Le mémorandum de l'Union Européenne sur la formation continue met l'accent sur les conditions fondamentales pour favoriser un développement efficace de l'évaluation des compétences résultant de la formation continue. Une des conditions clés du succès de la formation continue est la reconnaissance du savoir. La reconnaissance des acquis de l'apprentissage continu informel contribue à évaluer les besoins d'apprentissage d'une société instruite. La reconnaissance du savoir mène donc à des changements importants dans le système éducatif à l'échelle nationale. L'espace européen reconnaît différents modèles de reconnaissance des compétences. Ceux-ci sont principalement fondés sur une certaine tradition et sur des compétences de développement des relations entre le monde de l'éducation et le monde de travail. Malgré cette diversité, on peut distinguer quatre modèles nationaux de reconnaissance du savoir : le modèle scandinave, le modèle méditerranéen, le modèle anglo-saxon et le modèle francophone. Cet article fait état des similarités et des différences de

la mise en œuvre de ces modèles dans l'enseignement supérieur. L'intérêt particulier est de savoir comment l'homogénéisation de l'espace européen concernant l'enseignement supérieur influencera ces modèles et comment se développeront-ils dans l'avenir. Cette question est tout particulièrement importante pour les pays méditerranéens du sud qui visent à établir des normes comparables à celles des autres pays dans le domaine de la reconnaissance du savoir.

Perception des mesures du « branding » de destination : étude du cas des organisations de marketing de la destination d'Alexandrie

SUZAN BAKRI HASSAN, MOHAMED SOLIMAN ABDEL HAMID, HOSNY AL BOHAIRY

Les fournisseurs et organisateurs du secteur du tourisme cherchent à attirer leur clientèle par la distinction et le marketing de leurs produits et de leurs services. Le marketing et les méthodes de vente se développant, on observe une utilisation grandissante du « branding » comme outil principal par les professionnels du tourisme, et ce, tout particulièrement aujourd'hui dans un contexte de compétition globale et intense. Dans certains pays tels que l'Egypte, le « branding » de destination n'est pas encore pleinement sollicité dans le secteur du tourisme d'affaires. Cette recherche vise à étudier les perspectives des organisations de marketing de la destination (les DMO) à Alexandrie. Afin d'obtenir un résultat fiable, une enquête a été menée pour recueillir des données. Pour ce faire, 100 personnes issues des secteurs publics et officiels ont été interrogées. Des questionnaires leur ont été donnés à remplir ; l'échelle de Likert et les modèles statistiques prévus pour analyser et interpréter les résultats de recherche ont été sollicités. Les résultats ont montré que les organisations de marketing à Alexandrie ne sont pas suffisamment averties des concepts du « branding » de destination. Seuls quelques éléments de ce procédé sont connus et appliqués par ces organisations.

Povzetki

Medkulturni dialog in človekove pravice: možnost evrosredozemskega državljanstva

PIETRO DE PERINI

Članek obravnava predlog razvoja novega koncepta državljanstva (celovitejšega, aktivnejšega in pluralnega) za vse narode, ki živijo na ozemlju držav partneric Unije za Sredozemlje, ki bi bil zasnovan na skupnih ontoloških vrednotah in na spoštovanju kulturne raznolikosti. Uspeh tega predloga je zaradi njegovih temeljev odvisen od razvoja medkulturnega dialoga in od poenotene zaščite človekovih pravic v regiji. Za uveljavitev tega in drugih podobnih predlogov v tem kontekstu bi bil potreben nadaljnji razvoj zdajšnje insitucionalne strukture Unije za Sredozemlje.

»Arabščina – zakaj?« Odnos izraelskih judovskih učencev do arabščine in njihova pripravljenost za učenje arabščine

DAN SOEN

Čeprav je arabščina eden od dveh uradnih jezikov v Izraelu, je njen položaj problematičen. Monocentrična usmerjenost Izraela arabščino izključuje iz vsakodnevne rabe. Leta 1997 so učenje arabskega jezika uvedli v učni načrt za 7., 8., 9. in 10. razred kot drugi tuji jezik, takoj za angleščino, in sicer program predvideva tri ure pouka tedensko. Vendar se je leta 2003 manj kot 50 % vseh učencev od 7. do 10. razreda (ki bi se v skladu z novim programom morali učiti arabščino) dejansko učilo arabščino. Različne študije so pokazale, da so učenci premalo motivirani za učenje arabščine in gojijo negativen odnos do tega jezika, ki ga dojemajo kot »jezik konflikta«, jezik z omejeno uporabnostjo in jezik, katerega položaj v svetovnem kulturnem prostoru se slabša. Terenska raziskava, ki je tukaj predstavljena, je bila izvedena v tehnični srednji šoli v premožni soseski severnega dela Tel Aviva. Rezultati raziskave potrjujejo rezultate podobnih raziskav izpred nekaj let in kažejo, da imajo učenci, ki izberejo učenje arabščine, mlačen odnos do tega jezika. Izvor njihovih staršev in njihova izobrazba nimata pomembnega vpliva na njihov odnos do arabščine.

Bošnjaki: neuspeli vzor za evropske muslimane

ADISA BUSULADŽIĆ

Članek obravnava različne politične usmeritve in oživitev islama v post-socialistični in povojni Bosni in Hercegovini in zagovarja stališče, da ti novi trendi Bošnjakov izhajajo iz njihovih nejasnih predstav o varnosti, državljanstvu in državi. Bošnjakom kot narodu, ki izhaja iz politične kulture, ki je mešanica dediščine Vzhoda in komunizma ter nedavnega genocida, primanjkujejo tako zaupanje v inštitucije kot v osnovne mehanizme evropske politične dediščine. To nestabilnost še povečuje bosanski institucionalni okvir, v katerem lokalni politični in cerkveni vodje – skupaj s predstavniki mednarodne skupnosti, ki učinkovito vodijo državo – vedno znova zapravljajo zgodovinsko priložnost, da bi Bošnjaki lahko postali močan narod, ki bi služil kot vzor za naraščajoče število evropskih muslimanov. Specifična kapaciteta in zgradba bosanske evropske kulture na križpotju, ki je obravnavana v tem članku, kaže na potrebo po multilateralnem sodelovanju pri preoblikovanju njenih zastarelih mehanizmov. Medtem ko Bošnjaki pridobivajo primerno nišo v evropskem prostoru, bi lahko pripomogli tudi k preoblikovanju tradicionalnih evropskih okvirov v širše, vse vključujoče in splošne evropske perspektive.

Dejavniki, ki povzročijo terorizem: analiza družbenega marketinga kot orodje za študije varnosti – študija primera v Maroku

NICOLAS HAMELIN, HOUDA AZNAY, CONNELL MONETTE, JACK KALPAKIAN

S pomočjo regresijske analize je bil prvič izdelan model, ki definira možne dejavnike, ki lahko povzročijo spremembo vedenja v smeri terorizma. Model je bil razvit vzporedno z raziskavo, izvedeno v območju Maroka, ki na splošno velja za središče nedavnih terorističnih akcij v državi. Z uporabo standardizirane regresijske analize smo identificirali dejavnike, ki pozitivno ali negativno vplivajo na spremembo stanja in vodijo v potencialne teroristične akcije. Definirali smo profil potencialnega terorista, dejavnike, ki zavirajo in preprečujejo spremembo stanja, in aktivnosti, ki lahko pripomorejo k preprečevanju nasilnih dejanj v prihodnje.

Modeli priznavanja znanja v visokem šolstvu v Evropski uniji: preobrazba iz Evropske unije v sredozemske države

DEJAN HOZJAN

Memorandum Evropske unije o vseživljenjskem učenju poudarja ključne pogoje za učinkovit razvoj vrednotenja veščin vseživljenjskega učenja. Eden ključnih pogojev za uspeh vseživljenjskega učenja je priznavanje znanja. Priznavanje znanja, pridobljenega skozi neformalno vseživljenjsko učenje, pripomore k ocenitvi učnih potreb v družbi znanja. Priznavanje znanja torej vodi k pomembnim spremembam v izobraževalnem sistemu na nacionalnih ravneh. V evropskem prostoru poznamo zelo različne modele vrednotenja veščin, ki so v prvi vrsti pogojeni s tradicijo in povezani z veščinami, potrebnimi za razvoj odnosa med svetom izobraževanja in svetom dela. Kljub tej raznolikosti lahko razločimo štiri modele priznavanja znanja na nacionalni ravni, in sicer skandinavskega, sredozemskega, anglosaškega in frankofonskega. Članek predstavlja podobnosti in razlike pri uporabi teh modelov v visokem šolstvu. Še posebej nas zanima, kako bo homogenizacija evropskega visokošolskega prostora vplivala na te modele in kako se bodo razvijali v prihodnosti. To je še posebej pomembno za južnosredozemske države, ki želijo vzpostaviti primerljive standarde za priznavanje znanja.

Percepcija ukrepov destinacijskega brandinga: študija primera aleksandrijskih organizacij, ki se ukvarjajo z marketingom destinacije

SUZAN BAKRI HASSAN, MOHAMED SOLIMAN ABDEL HAMID, HOSNY AL BOHAIRY

Dobavitelji in organizatorji v turističnem sektorju želijo privabiti turiste z diferenciacijo in marketingom svojih izdelkov in storitev. Pri razvoju svojih marketinških in prodajnih metod danes vse pogosteje uporabljajo branding, ki velja za eno najpomembnejših orodij, še posebej v današnji intenzivni globalni konkurenci. Turistični sektorji številnih držav, na primer Egipta, še ne uporabljajo destinacijskega brandinga v celoti. Namen te študije je raziskati vidik brandinga organizacij, ki se ukvarjajo z destinacijskim marketingom (DMO) v Aleksandriji. Da bi dosegli visok odziv, smo izvedli raziskavo, s ka-

tero smo pridobili podatke stotih vprašanih iz uradnega in javnega sektorja. Uporabili smo metodo izpolnjevanja vprašalnikov, Likertovo lestvico in statistične modele za testiranje in intrepretacijo dobljenih rezultatov. Rezultati raziskave so pokazali, da marketinške organizacije v Aleksandriji niso dovolj osveščene glede koncepta destinacijskega brandinga, ampak uporabljajo samo dele postopka brandinga.

Continued from the front inside cover

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