

The Spanish Campaigns against the Kingdom of Tlemcen's Cities and the Resistance Movements from 1516 to 1530


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Many historians have concentrated on the Spanish-Ottoman conflict in the 16th century, and they have paid attention to the piracy activities of the Barbarossa brothers in the Mediterranean in the 16th century to affirm that the brothers had been pirates. In addition, they have examined the efforts of the Barbarossa brothers to evacuate the Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula. They have not, therefore, paid attention to the reaction of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to the Spanish colonisation in the second and third decades of the 16th century. This research analyses the steps of the inhabitants of the cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, Algiers, Tenes, and the city of Tlemcen to combat the Spanish colonists. It illustrates the relationship between the Barbarossa brothers and the efforts of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to combat the Spanish colonists in the cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen from 1516 to 1530. Consequently, this research concludes that the inhabitants of Algiers and the city of Tlemcen played a vital role against this colonisation when they summoned the Barbarossa brothers and legitimated the rule of the brothers in Algiers and Tlemcen.

Key Words: Algiers, colonisation, Barbarossa brothers, Spaniards, Charles V, Tlemcen

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INTRODUCTION

In the 16th century, there were four states in North Africa. First, the Mamlūks ruled the Mamlūk Sultanate, located in what is now

known as Egypt and the Levant (1250–1517). Second, the Ḥafṣids ruled the Ḥafṣid Kingdom, which was situated in today's Tunisia and North Libya (1229–1574). Third, the Waṭṭāsids (1471–1554) ruled the Kingdom of Fez, sited in the modern-day Kingdom of Morocco. [84] Fourth, the Zayyānid dynasty ruled the Kingdom of Tlemcen, located in what is now called the Republic of Algeria (1236–1556). This kingdom was also occasionally called the Zayyānid state because it was ruled by the Zayyānid dynasty, which was also known as Banū 'Abd al-Wād of the Zanātah tribe (Al-Tinsī 2011, 22).

The purpose of this research is to concentrate on the reasons for the Spanish campaigns against the cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, the reactions to these campaigns and the consequences of these reactions. The prime reason that led me to concentrate on this topic is that many historians and scholars have focused on the emigration and evacuation of the Moriscos to the Kingdom of Tlemcen in the 16th century (Al-Sa'īdūnī 1994, 222–43; Miller 2008; Maillo Salgado 2002, 86–101). In addition, they have examined piracy campaigns by the Barbarossa brothers and other pirates, which launched from the coast of the Kingdom of Tlemcen against the Christian ships in the Mediterranean during the 16th century (Al-Tamīmī 1989; Currey 1910; Heers 2017). However, they have not paid attention to the reactions of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to the Spanish campaigns against their cities and the consequences of these reactions. This study utilizes a historical methodology, which analyzes various Spanish and Arabic primary sources, including diaries, annals, letters and documents.

THE BEGINING OF THE SPANISH COLONISATION IN NORTH AFRICA

One of the aims of the Spanish colonisation that spread throughout the northern lands of the North African kingdoms was religious. In the 15th century, there had been hopes and also claims that the Catholic political authorities in the Iberian Peninsula, particularly the Crown of Castile, would recover North Africa from the Muslim rulers and bring the area under Christian rule. The Castilian historian and the ambassador of Henry IV of Castile (1454–1474), Ro-



drigo Sánchez de Arévalo, had hoped that 'Henry IV would recover North Africa, which his Visigoth predecessors had once possessed' (Sánchez de Arévalo 1959, 312). Meanwhile, the Castilian historian Diego de Valera commented that 'the king of the Visigoths, Wamba (672–680), had once ruled Ceuta, Tangier, and a large part of North Africa' (De Valera 1959, 173). Ceuta was seized by the Portuguese in the first half of the 15th century when de Valera was just three years old. It seems that the Portuguese colonisation of Ceuta and then Tangier gave de Valera hope that the Crown of Castile would capture other territories in North Africa and place them under Christian rule beside Ceuta and Tangier.

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Additionally, the weakness of North African states and, in particular, the Kingdom of Tlemcen, encouraged the secretary of the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand II (1479–1516) and Isabella I (1474–1504) in Granada, Hernando de Zafra (d. 1507) to convince the king and queen to conquer the northern cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. It is even recorded that, in 1494, Zafra is said to have stated that 'God made this kingdom weak for you [Ferdinand]' (Fernández de Navarrete 1867, 72).

Consequently, in 1494, Pope Alexander VI approved Zafra's suggestion to conquer the territories of Tlemcen. He allowed the Catholic monarchs to levy a one-tenth tax on all ecclesiastics in the Iberian Peninsula, to prepare for a crusade in North Africa (Bedini 1992, 11). This assistance from Alexander VI to Isabella I and Ferdinand II was granted because the pope had an interest in restoring the church there (O'Banion 2012, 95).

In 1497, the Duke of Medina Sidonia in the southern Spain, Juan Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán (d. 1507), sent a fleet commanded by the Spanish leader, Pedro Estopiñán (d. 1505), who colonised Melilla, a coastal city in the Kingdom of Fez. Melilla was close to the north-western frontier of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, and the colonisation of Melilla occurred without any fighting. The conquest of Melilla by the Spanish fleet was due to the disputes between the Kingdom of Fez and the Kingdom of Tlemcen regarding their dominance of the port of Melilla in the late 15th century. This conflict led to the emigration of many of the inhabitants of Melilla (Bernáldez 1962, 380).

[86] The Spanish forces in Melilla consisted of seven hundred foot soldiers, fifty cavalrymen, two hundred labourers, three hundred cross-bowmen, one hundred arquebusiers, twenty artillerymen, thirty-five clerks, two clergymen, a doctor, a surgeon, and an apothecary (Bernáldez 1962, 380). The Spanish and Portuguese colonial settlements were thus spread on the northern territories of the Kingdom of Fez. The Portuguese had colonised some northern territories of the Kingdom of Fez, such as Ceuta (Sabtah) in 1415, al-Kasir al-Saghir (al-Qasir al-Şaghîr) in 1458, and Tangier (Ṭanjah) and Asilah (Aşilah) in 1471 (De Pina 1901, 140–160).

Then, in the first years of the 16th century, the Spaniards concentrated on the three northern cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen – Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, and Algiers. The Spaniards likely exploited the chaos that followed the death of the Zayyānid emir, Abū ‘Abd Allāh IV (1468–1504), to further inflame the quarrel between the Zayyānids for the throne of Tlemcen, which allowed the Spanish colonists to embark on their project against this kingdom without obstacles. Although Abū ‘Abd Allāh V (1504–1517) ruled Tlemcen after the death of his father, he was more focused on countering a rebellion by Zayyānid members, particularly his brothers Abū Zayyān and Yaḥyā al-Thābitī, than on any dangers around his kingdom. Abū Zayyān was, therefore, imprisoned in Tlemcen while Yaḥyā al-Thābitī fled to Fez (Al-Wazān 1979, 406–7).

THE FIRST SPANISH COLONY IN THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCCEN

In the spring of 1505, some Muslim corsairs of Mersa El-Kebir launched a series of devastating raids against the Iberian coasts, including the cities of Malaga, Elche, and Alicante (Heers 2017, 25). Therefore, in August 1505, the archbishop of Toledo, Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros (d. 1517), prepared a campaign, incorporating five-thousand strong army commanded by Diego Fernández de Córdoba y Arellano (d. 1518), to capture Mersa El-Kebir in the north-west of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, which included an important port. Cisneros likely wanted to benefit from the port of Mersa El-Kebir economically, as it was capable of sheltering a hundred ships during



storms and attracted merchants from the republics of Venice and Genoa (Al-Wazān 1979, 380–400). In October 1505, after more than a month of siege, the Spaniards captured it (Al-Madani 1965, 99).

The Spanish invaders of Mersa El-Kebir realised that it would be possible for them to make a life for themselves in the town if they could foster friendly relations with its existing inhabitants in order to get supplies, such as wheat and barley. However, these colonists were rejected by most of the town's inhabitants. In 1507, by way of retaliation, the Spaniards plundered the surrounding towns and captured a thousand Muslims and four thousand heads of cattle. Later in the same year, a force of many military volunteers from the city of Tlemcen responded to this plunder by killing two thousand Spaniards and carrying off four hundred prisoners (Garcés 2002, 20). However, Mersa El-Kebir remained under Spanish control until it was sold to the Ottoman authorities in Algiers in 1792 (Rummel 1999, 29). [87]

The military pressure that Cisneros brought against the Kingdom of Tlemcen stopped a few years after the conquest of Mersa El-Kebir because a crisis occurred in the throne of the Spanish Empire due to the sudden death of Philip I in September 1506. The death of Philip I raised concerns regarding potential assassination on the part of Ferdinand II (1479–1516), who had renounced the government of Castile, a huge part in the Iberian Peninsula and the lordship of the Indies in favour of Philip I in the Treaty of Villafáfila in June 1506, withholding half of the income of the Indies (Zurita 2005, 7).

THE PEAK OF THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPANSION IN THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCEN

The Spanish campaigns to capture other coastal cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen were resumed by Cisneros, beginning with Oran in 1509. In May 1509, the Spaniards captured the city of Oran in a single day through the military management of Cisneros, who sent General Pedro Navarro (d. 1528) to deal with this matter. The Spanish forces under the command of Navarro arrived in the Kingdom of Tlemcen on 17 May and captured Oran in the following day. The swift conquest of Oran demonstrates the lack of military arrangement be-

tween the city of Tlemcen, which was the capital of the kingdom, and the city of Oran. It also emphasises the lack of military arrangement among the inhabitants of Oran themselves.

[88] Most inhabitants of Oran decided to confront the incoming Spanish troops outside Oran. As the Spaniards were aware of this decision through their spies, they divided themselves into two battalions: the first encountered the inhabitants of Oran, while the second occupied the city (Al-Wazān 1979, 400). The authorities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen did not launch any campaigns to regain Oran, as they realised their military forces could not combat the Spaniards in Oran. The Spanish troops in Oran comprised around twelve thousand infantrymen and four thousand cavalrymen (Duro 1895, 73). Cisneros visited the city after it was captured by the Spanish forces. In addition, the Emir of Tlemcen, Abū 'Abd Allāh V angered the inhabitants of Oran by negotiating peace with the Spanish garrison in Oran and supplying them with wheat and barley in 1510 (Suárez 2005, 194). Following the conquest of Oran, the Spaniards released more than three hundred Christian captives from the hands of Oran inhabitants, most of whom were from the Iberian Peninsula (Al-Madani 1965, 113). These had been captured during the activities of the corsairs of Oran in the Western Mediterranean.

The conquest of Oran and the weakness of political and military authorities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen encouraged the Spaniards to colonise another northern coastal city of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, Algiers, the capital of the Republic of Algeria today, in 1510 (Al-Madani, 1965). The Iberian islands, Ibiza and Mallorca suffered from the raids of the corsairs of Algiers from the last decade of the 15th century (Al-Wazān 1979, 408–9).

The inhabitants of Algiers vacillated in their loyalty. In the first half of the 15th century, many of these inhabitants had been loyal to the Kingdom of Tlemcen, while others preferred to be subject to the authorities of the city of Bougie in the Ḥaḥḥid Kingdom due to its proximity to Algiers (Al-Wazān 1979, 408–9). Additionally, Algiers was granted a kind of independence by the political authorities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, which chose Oran to be the chief seaport of the Zayyānid dynasty rather than Algiers due to Oran's proxim-



ity to the capital, Tlemcen. Algiers was thus only nominally part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. One example in support of this view is that the Spaniards conquered Bougie on 5 January 1510, as it had launched many campaigns to attack the Iberian coasts since the second half of the 15th century (Al-Wazān 1979, 408–9). After the fall of Bougie, Salīm al-Tūmī, who belonged to the Arabian tribe, Tha'labah, exploited the situation between Algiers and the Kingdom of Tlemcen's political authorities, as well as the attitude of some inhabitants of Algiers towards Bougie, and became the emir of Algiers (Al-Wazān 1979, 410). Bougie remained under Spanish control until 1555 (Rummel 1999, 36). [89]

Accordingly, on 31 January 1510, Pedro Navarro forced Salīm al-Tūmī to accept Spanish hegemony over Algiers with an annual tribute for Ferdinand II (Playfair 1878, 35). The tribute was half of the profits obtained from agriculture and crafts. Navarro then built fortifications that included artillery and a garrison of two hundred men on the biggest rocky island off Algiers, Peñón, in order to prevent the inhabitants of Algiers from rebellion and piracy on the Iberian coasts (Sa'd Allāh 2007, 325). The loss of Algiers meant that the Kingdom of Tlemcen had lost the third of its coastal cities. The Spaniards then forced the emir of Tlemcen, Abū 'Abd Allāh V, to become a vassal of Ferdinand II in 1512. This emir therefore paid an annual tax estimated at twelve thousand *ducats*, twelve horses, and six hawks to Ferdinand II (Al-Wazān 1979, 381).

THE REACTION OF THE INHABITANTS OF ALGIERS TO THE SPANISH COLONISATION

In 1516, the natives of Algiers viewed the Barbarossa brothers, 'Arūj (d. 1518) and Khayr al-Dīn (d. 1546) as an effective power who would release them and protect them, their interests, and their rights from the Spaniards (Barbarūsā 2010, 74). The brothers had been traders in the Eastern Mediterranean, meaning that they had the ships to transfer their goods. Eventually, however, 'Arūj in particular decided to find a new career. 'Arūj thus became a sea captain, working under the authorities of the Mamlūk sultan, Qūnṣwā al-Ghūrī. During his period under the Mamlūk Sultanate, 'Arūj faced a serious event that

would impact his life: the ships that were under his leadership were attacked by the Knights of Rhodes. Subsequently, he became a pirate and corsair together with his brother Khayr al-Dīn.

[90] Current historians and scholars are divided into two camps regarding the terms used to describe the Barbarossa brothers' activities. Some Western historians, such as Albert Lovett, refer to the brothers as pirates, particularly Khayr al-Dīn, who established a pirate commonwealth in the Kingdom of Tlemcen with Algiers as its headquarters that plundered Christian ships in the Mediterranean (Lovett 1986, 132). Bernard Lewis also refers to the conduct of the brothers as piracy, as they aimed to take the money and enslave the crews of the ships they targeted (Lewis 1996, 53).

However, Eastern historians, such as the Tunisian historian 'Abd al-Jalīl al-Tamīmī, criticise the Western historians who describe the brothers as savage pirates (Al-Tamīmī 1989, 8). Al-Tamīmī accuses these historians of overlooking the brothers' honourable actions, such as the evacuation of the Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula, which was led by Khayr al-Dīn in particular. The Egyptian historian Zakariya Sulaymān refers to the brothers as heroes who conducted *al-jihād al-baḥrī* as a mean of resisting Portuguese colonisation in the Kingdom of Fez and Spanish colonisation in the Kingdom of Tlemcen and the Ḥafṣid Kingdom. Sulaymān also considers 'Arūj's piracy as a kind of economic siege against all of the Christian states and their ships in the Mediterranean during the 16th century, as it disrupted imports and exports between them (Sulaymān 1991, 79–80).

In 1514, the brothers attacked a Spanish colony in Bougie, besieging the Spaniards there for a month. However, they were unable to expel the colonists, and 'Arūj was defeated due to the exhaustion of their gunpowder (Gómara 1853, 361). This assault threatened Spanish interests in the Ḥafṣid Kingdom. Reinforcements, therefore, arrived in Bougie from the Iberian Peninsula in the form of five ships commanded by Martin de Renteria. Consequently, a second siege conducted by the brothers in 1515 also failed (*Mémoires de l'Académie nationale de Metz* 1844, 189). However, in the first few months of 1516, some delegations from some cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen came to the brothers, who were in their headquarter, Ježil, a north-



ern coastal city in the Ḥafṣid Kingdom after they had expelled the Genoese garrison from there in 1514 (Al-Wazān 1979, 424).

One of these delegations was from the inhabitants of Algiers, who asked the brothers to liberate their city from Spanish occupation; the Spaniards had forced them to pay tribute to Ferdinand II, who had died in the same year (Barbarūsā 2010, 74). Ferdinand II had also cut off one of the sources of income of the inhabitants of Algiers, namely piracy on the Iberian coast, from 1510 onwards (Anderson 1789, 44). 'Arūj and Khayr al-Dīn agreed to help them to overthrow the Spanish occupation, a move that would increase the brothers' popularity as well as earn them loyalty and support from the inhabitants of Algiers. They could thereby establish political strongholds in the various cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. Before expelling the Spaniards from Algiers, the brothers engaged in some strategic preparations.

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The brothers first captured Cherchell, a coastal town in the north-central part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, in the spring of 1516, as this was one of the chief refuges for some Granadans following the fall of Granada in 1492 (Ris 1935, 642). More than a thousand Muslims from Granada had already come to Cherchell in the 1490s. The Granadan emigrants then built the town, cultivated its lands, and also built many ships, which would be useful as reinforcements for the inhabitants and the Barbarossa brothers in their piracy operations and *jihād* against the Spaniards. Cherchell had been deserted since the conflict between the Kingdom of Fez and the Kingdom of Tlemcen in the 14th century (Al-Wazān 1979, 405). At the time, the Kingdom of Tlemcen primarily depended on the coastal cities, such as Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, and Tenes, for their ports.

At the beginning of the summer of 1516, 'Arūj arrived in Algiers and was able to expel the Spanish colonists from inside the city. In 1517, the brothers then killed some of the local rulers, such as Ḥamīd 'Eid, a ruler of Tenes who had been loyal to the Spaniards. The brothers then captured Tenes, a coastal town in the north-west of the Kingdom of Tlemcen (De Haedo 1612, 219–20). These victories assuredly increased the popularity of the Barbarossa brothers among the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Tlemcen.

[92] Following the expulsion of the Spaniards from within Algiers, 'Arūj did not immediately become its ruler. The local ruler, Salim al-Tūmī, initially remained in place. During this period, he tried to weaken the people's confidence in 'Arūj's forces, as they had been unable to displace the Spaniards from their fort on the rocky island of Peñón off the coast of the city of Algiers. As a result, al-Tūmī was executed by 'Arūj, who subsequently became the ruler of Algiers in August of 1516 (Muwafaq and Abū al-Sha'ar 1999, 17).

The domination of Algiers by 'Arūj alongside Khayr al-Dīn resulted in a number of attempts by the Spaniards to recapture Algiers. The Spanish authorities urged the local Christians of the Kingdom of Tlemcen to incite the rulers of the neighbouring towns, along with the tribesmen surrounding and within Algiers, against the brothers (Hess 2010, 64). Their attempts were unsuccessful, highlighting the desire of the inhabitants of Algiers to stabilise the brothers' rule in their city.

Subsequently, Cisneros sent the knight Diego de Vera (d. unknown) with less than a hundred ships to recapture Algiers in September 1516 (Al-Wazān 1979, 411). This campaign was repelled by the forces of the Barbarossa brothers, who captured four hundred infantrymen; they were also aided by a storm, which caused the deaths of three thousand of the Spanish forces when their fleet was sunk (Currey 2008, 48). This victory enhanced both the brothers' popularity and the enthusiasm of their followers.

THE LEGALITY OF THE DOMINATION
OF THE BARBAROSSA BROTHERS ON SOME CITIES
OF THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCCEN

In 1517, the inhabitants of the city of Tlemcen preferred the brothers over members of the Zayyānid dynasty, particularly over the new emir of Tlemcen, Abū Ḥammū III (1516–1528). The inhabitants likely began to hold the brothers in high esteem after observing their efforts, which expelled the Spaniards from Algiers. Abū Ḥammū inherited the throne of Tlemcen with the assistance of the Spaniards who dominated Tlemcen, which was contrary to the wishes of the Tlemcen city's natives. Abū Ḥammū neglected the internal affairs



of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, such as improving its economy (Sāmiḥ 1989, 59–60). The jurist of Tlemcen, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. Yūsuf al-Malyānī (d. 1526), was, therefore, in agreement with the inhabitants of the city of Tlemcen when they revolted against Abū Ḥammū and summoned the brothers in Algiers to liberate the city of Tlemcen from Spanish domination (Muḥammad 1964, 73). This jurist was also critical of the previous emir of Tlemcen, Abū ‘Abdallāh V, due to his submission to the Spaniards.

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The Barbarossa brothers' presence in Algiers increased 'Arūj's desire to conquer the city of Tlemcen. 'Arūj believed that Tlemcen would be 'a primary source of danger and crisis' for his rule in Algiers because, since 1512, the Zayyānid dynasty had been guided both internally and externally by Spanish colonists (Barbarūsā 2010, 85).

The Spanish military campaigns against the Barbarossa brothers in Algiers temporarily stopped due to some dissenting voices that rejected the rule of Charles V (1516–1556) in Spain from 1517 to 1518 (Zamalloa 1861, 51–2). However, the brothers were reluctant to conquer Tlemcen using military means, as they would have faced many obstacles if they had made such an attempt. Firstly, unlike Algiers, Tlemcen is not a coastal city; as the brothers had more expertise in fighting naval campaigns, an assault on Tlemcen would therefore have presented the brothers with difficulties regarding the use of ships to transfer their military equipment or to besiege the city. Secondly, Tlemcen was surrounded by Spanish garrisons in the north, particularly in Oran and Mersa El-Kebir in the Kingdom of Tlemcen and Melilla in the Kingdom of Fez. The brothers would have been forced to pass one of these garrisons in order to reach the city. Tlemcen had been a vital supplier of food for these garrisons, and the Spaniards would not have allowed any naval power in the Mediterranean to conquer it easily (Suárez 2005, 382). In addition, Tlemcen was too far away for the brothers in Algiers to move with their forces over land through the territories of the kingdom, most of which is desert.

However, quarrels among members of the Zayyānid dynasty and their followers for the throne of Tlemcen provided an opportunity for 'Arūj to rule the city from 1517 to 1518 without any need for a

[94] military campaign. In 1516, the emir of Tlemcen, Abū ‘Abd Allāh V, died. The preferences of the inhabitants of Tlemcen regarding the next ruler were subsequently divided between two members of the Zayyānid dynasty, Abū Zayyān and Abū Ḥammū III (Barbarūsā 2010, 82).

Most natives of Tlemcen at the time preferred Abū Zayyān, who had been in prison in Tlemcen during the rule of Abū ‘Abd Allāh V (Al-Wazān 1979, 406). The Spanish colonisation of the Kingdom of Tlemcen occurred during the rule of the latter, and after his death, Abū Ḥammū III was able to take the throne. The Spanish political authorities in Tlemcen assuredly intervened in the choice of the people of Tlemcen, working to instate Abū Ḥammū III in order to maintain Spanish dominance of the kingdom. Abū Ḥammū III was the son of Abū ‘Abd Allāh V, and the Spaniards likely believed that he would follow his father’s policy regarding the colonists.

Consequently, the inhabitants of Tlemcen revolted against Abū Ḥammū III and deposed him in 1517 (Al-Wazān 1979, 406). He fled to Spain and promised to be submissive to Charles V in order to regain the throne (ibid). The inhabitants of Tlemcen first appointed Abū Zayyān, who found that the kingdom’s army had no hope of countering the Spanish forces. The inhabitants then sent a delegation to ‘Arūj in Algiers promising their loyalty if he would agree to become the ruler of Tlemcen (Barbarūsā 2010, 86). At the beginning, ‘Arūj decided to keep Abū Zayyān as the emir of Tlemcen on the condition that he would provide the brothers with supplies, such as food and weapons, for their piratical activities, and also do as they instructed (Al-Filālī 2002, 76–7). However, Abū Zayyān rejected their demands, as they would surely have led to the Spaniards’ attempt to expel the brothers and himself from Tlemcen. He was consequently killed by ‘Arūj in 1517 (Al-Wazān 1979, 405).

The killing of Abū Zayyān did not anger the inhabitants of Tlemcen, who had previously suffered due to many conflicts among members of this dynasty for the throne during the 15th century. These inhabitants might have considered that the rule of ‘Arūj would finally put an end to any further conflict for the throne.

Accordingly, ‘Arūj stayed in Tlemcen with an army of thousand



men, while Khayr al-Dīn remained in Algiers with an army of three thousand. 'Arūj believed that Algiers needed more protection than Tlemcen, stating that 'if we lost Algiers, we would lose everything in this kingdom' (Barbarūsā 2010, 87). It is possible that the Spanish cannons situated in Peñón off Algiers were an obstacle for the brothers, as these cannons could potentially attack the coasts of Algiers, on which many of the brothers' ships were located (Gómara 1853, 368–71).

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'Arūj then realised his need for human power to militarily secure Tlemcen. As such, he gathered the inhabitants from Oran and Mersa El-Kebir, along with the inhabitants of Tlemcen, and rewarded them with treasure from the Zayyānids' treasury (Heers 2017, 65). 'Arūj then planned to expel the Spanish garrison from Oran in the spring of 1518 (Barbarūsā 2010, 87).

THE REACTION OF THE SPANIARDS TO THE
DOMINATION OF THE BARBAROSSA BROTHERS
ON SOME CITIES OF THE KINGDOM OF TLEMCCEN

In January of 1518, the Spanish governor of Oran, Diego Fernández de Córdoba (1509–1512/1516–1518), sent an urgent demand to Charles V for help in combating the deteriorating situation in the outer frontiers of the Iberian Peninsula. De Córdoba considered confronting the Barbarossa brothers to be more important than holding the coastal fortifications in the Kingdom of Tlemcen. The presence of the brothers as Muslim naval forces in Tlemcen alarmed the Spanish authorities due to the possible connection of the brothers and their North African followers with the Ottoman Empire (Sorgia 1963, 15). This situation would threaten the stability of the Spanish Empire.

Accordingly, early in 1518, Charles V sent troops to the Kingdom of Tlemcen, which adopted the strategy of cutting the supply route over which aid from Algiers was sent west to the city of Tlemcen (Sorgia 1963, 15). The Spanish forces also established a blockade against the city of Tlemcen (Hess 2010, 65). The siege of Tlemcen affected the persistence of many of the local Muslim inhabitants, who were urged by the Christians of Tlemcen to renounce the rule

of 'Arūj (Shanhū 1972, 71–72). Subsequently, 'Arūj was killed along with his entire force in the summer of 1518 during their attempt to break the siege at night (Gómara 1853, 374–9). 'Arūj's head was cut off and paraded through most of the Spanish cities (Belachemi 1984, [96] 310).

According to Khayr al-Dīn's diary, 'Arūj died because of his perceived sympathies towards the inhabitants of Algiers and Tlemcen that were part of his army. 'Arūj's soldiers had become stuck in the town of el-Māliḥ, in the north-western part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, on their way to Algiers after fleeing from the siege of Tlemcen. 'Arūj therefore returned to die with them. Khayr al-Dīn declared that 'Arūj could not bear the cries of his soldiers who had fallen into the hands of Charles V's forces, so he returned to fight with them until he was killed' (Barbarūsā 2010, 92).

Khayr al-Dīn was saddened by the death of 'Arūj, and some of the brothers' followers and soldiers doubted whether Khayr al-Dīn would be as competent as his brother (Al-Tir 1989, 70). With regard to the situation of the city of Tlemcen following the defeat of 'Arūj, Abū Hammū III returned to become the emir of Tlemcen once again through the assistance of Charles V's forces. Most inhabitants of the city of Tlemcen, however, had previously rejected both him and the Spanish colonists and did not consider him legitimate. This emir continued to pay the same tribute to Charles V that had been paid by Abū 'Abd Allāh V to Ferdinand II since 1512 (Al-Wazān 1979, 381). The rule of the Zayyānids became confined to the city of Tlemcen and a few other cities of the kingdom until their deposition by the Ottomans in 1556.

THE SITUATION OF ALGIERS FROM 1518 TO 1525

Following the killing of 'Arūj, Khayr al-Dīn faced many challenges in Algiers. One of these challenges was the desire of the Spanish forces to seize the city and to kill him. In August 1518, a military expedition commanded by the Spanish leader, Hugo de Moncada (d. 1528), attempted to regain Algiers. However, this campaign failed because of a storm in the Mediterranean, which sank most of the ships of the Spanish forces, as well as the absence of their North African allies,



in particular the military assistance of Abū Ḥammū III (Al-Wazān 1979, 411). The defeat of the Spaniards in this campaign was also due to defence preparations made by Khayr al-Dīn and the inhabitants of Algiers (Barbarūsā 2010, 94).

Khayr al-Dīn then desired to return to fight at sea as a corsair, harming and plundering Christian ships, rather than remain in Algiers with its lack of military supplies. It is even recorded that Khayr al-Dīn stated that 'my purpose was to restrict the infidels on the Mediterranean and North Africa because it was my brother's way' (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). Notwithstanding Khayr al-Dīn's decision to resume being a corsair in September 1518, he remained in Algiers as a ruler until the end of 1520 (Gómara 1853, 384). The inhabitants of Algiers at the time wanted Khayr al-Dīn to be their ruler, rather than a corsair in the Mediterranean. They also wanted Khayr al-Dīn to protect them from another potential military campaign by Charles V after his forces were defeated in August 1518 (Barbarūsā 2010, 95).

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Faced with the insistence of the inhabitants of Algiers – particularly from the jurists, merchants, lawyers, and nobles – Khayr al-Dīn agreed to remain, albeit on one condition, the inhabitants needed to offer allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, Salīm I (1512–1520) (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). The latter became the caliph of the Muslims following the inheritance of the holy places in the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant from the Mamlūk Sultanate in 1517. Khayr al-Dīn believed that allegiance to Salīm I would deter any potential attempts to conquer the city of Algiers, since he viewed the Ottoman Empire as the most powerful empire during this period. It is even recorded that Khayr al-Dīn stated that 'I have not heard of any force that could threaten the Ottomans and their subjects' (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). We can, therefore, infer that Khayr al-Dīn wanted to strengthen his rule in Algiers and other territories of the Kingdom of Tlemcen through Ottoman protection. He also wanted to use the Ottoman flag on his ships to protect them from Christian piracy. He stated that 'my follower, Ḥusayn Aghā, faced Venetian ships on his way from Istanbul to Algiers, but Venetian ships did not cause any problems for him because he raised the Ottoman flag on his ships' (Barbarūsā 2010, 94). Moreover, Charles V's dominance over the Zayyānid emir was

an additional reason that led Khayr al-Dīn to urge these inhabitants to proceed.

[98] Many inhabitants of Algiers agreed with this condition and wrote a request regarding this matter to Salīm I in October 1519 (TKS in Istanbul 1519, document 6456). Consequently, Salim I accepted the request of the inhabitants of Algiers without any conditions and provided Khayr al-Dīn with the Ottoman flag to terrify his enemies. It is even recorded that ‘Salīm I advised Khayr al-Dīn to carry the Ottoman flag with him wherever he went’ (Barbarūsā 2010, 96–7).

Khayr al-Dīn’s allegiance to the Ottomans removed the legitimacy of the Muslim dynasties of North Africa, especially the Zayyānid dynasty. Khayr al-Dīn obligated the people of Algiers, Tenes, and Cherchell to recite the name of the Ottoman Caliph in their Friday prayers and put the caliph’s name on their coins (Barbarūsā 2010, 96–7). The Ḥafṣid Sultan, al-Mutawkil (1494–1526), feared that Khayr al-Dīn would expand into his territories. Accordingly, the Kingdom of Ḥafṣid conspired to fight Khayr al-Dīn in the Kingdom of Tlemcen, although Khayr al-Dīn uncovered every one of these conspiracies (Ahiskali 1775, 41v–42r). One example of this is that the sultan, al-Mutawakil, incited some tribesmen in some territories of the Kingdom of Tlemcen against Khayr al-Dīn, but Khayr al-Dīn was able to defeat them, killing some of the plotters in December 1519 (Barbarūsā 2010, 101). Additionally, the kingdoms of Ḥafṣid and Tlemcen failed to incite the inhabitants of Algiers to revolt against Khayr al-Dīn. According to his diary, the people of Algiers favoured him because he had developed the trade of the city as well as united its tribes, who felt safe under the protection of the Ottoman Empire that he had initiated.

The Ḥafṣid Kingdom was likely afraid of initiating a direct confrontation with Khayr al-Dīn in Algiers because of his military reputation. Khayr al-Dīn had defeated the military campaign of Charles V’s forces against Algiers in August of 1518, resulting in the deaths of four thousand men and the capture of three thousand of Charles V’s troops (Al-Wazān 1979, 410–1). The Ḥafṣid Kingdom, therefore, relied on indirect confrontations through tribesmen in the Kingdom of Tlemcen in their attempts to unseat Khayr al-Dīn. The Ḥafṣid



Sultan convinced Aḥmad al-Qāḍī (d. 1525), the leader of the tribesmen located in the region of Kūkū in the north-eastern part of the Kingdom of Tlemcen close to Algiers, that Khayr al-Dīn was dangerous, and his aggression could possibly extend to Kūkū (Ahiskali 1775, 41v).

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While Khayr al-Dīn was able to defeat al-Qāḍī's military attack, he lost two thousand men from his forces, while another two thousand were wounded (Barbarūsā 2010, 114). This event saddened him because his men had been killed by Muslims. Following the defeat of al-Qāḍī, Khayr al-Dīn was forced by his soldiers to kill more than one hundred captives who had been soldiers fighting in al-Qāḍī's offensive against Khayr al-Dīn. Many jurists, as well as the people of Algiers, asked him to forgive these captives as they had been deceived by the Ḥafṣid ruler. Following the execution of the prisoners from al-Qāḍī's campaign, Khayr al-Dīn came to believe that most residents of Algiers would be unhappy if he stayed among them (Barbarūsā 2010, 114). He subsequently left Algiers temporarily for Ježil in 1520 (Gómara 1853, 383).

Khayr al-Dīn probably wanted to show the inhabitants of Algiers what would befall the city when it was not under his rule. In Ježil, Khayr al-Dīn resumed piracy, which increased both the wealth of Ježil and the power of his fleet. He plundered ships off the coasts of Sicily, Genoa and Venice bringing barley, wheat, olives, cloth, rice, silk, honey, money, ships and pepper to Ježil (Barbarūsā 2010, 120–2). Consequently, Ježil became attractive to the tribesmen and merchants of North Africa.

Regarding the internal situation of Algiers, its native inhabitants felt worse off under the rule of Aḥmad b. al-Qāḍī. They negotiated with him to withdraw from the city, but he refused. They subsequently appealed to Khayr al-Dīn to expel and replace him (Barbarūsā 2010, 120–2). Before Khayr al-Dīn reclaimed Algiers, he moved against the territories of the Ḥafṣid Kingdom. In 1525, he captured the Ḥafṣid territories of Annaba (Anābah) and Constantine, which were adjacent to his major bases, Ježil and Algiers, to forestall the Ḥafṣids' plots (Naylor 2009, 117). He was then able to regain Algiers from al-Qāḍī after two victories against him in the

eastern section of Algiers (Gómara 1853, 390–1). Al-Qāḍī was killed by tribesmen in Algiers in 1525 (Barbarūsā 2010, 125).

THE SITUATION OF ALGIERS FROM 1525 TO 1530

[100] Following his return to Algiers in 1525, Khayr al-Dīn worked to maintain the loyalty of the tribesmen. He flattered the tribal chiefs and appointed them to local lordships that he established (Rogerson 2012, 40). It is likely that he wanted to benefit from their experience and to maintain his rule over tribal land.

In Algiers, Khayr al-Dīn resumed his piracy along with his follower, Sinān Rīs. In 1528, Sinān captured six ships carrying various items that were necessary for the war and useful to the inhabitants of Algiers, such as cannon shells, gunpowder, wooden poles, oil, tar, cheese, honey, sugar, olive oil, and money (Barbarūsā 2010, 133–4). These items possibly strengthened Khayr al-Dīn and made him decide to expel the Spaniards from Peñón island off Algiers. The Barbarossa brothers had previously been unable to expel the Spaniards from Peñón island after capturing Algiers in 1516 because the Spaniards used cannons as part of their resistance (Gómara 1853, 368–71). Khayr al-Dīn realised that the continued existence of the Spaniards on Peñón island was a strategic mistake, as this island was located only a few hundred metres from the coast of Algiers. The Spaniards on this rocky island had not been able to attack the city since 1516 due to the existence of fortifications (Barbarūsā 2010, 134–5). Khayr al-Dīn likely wanted to prevent Charles V's forces from using this island as a base for further potential campaigns to recapture Algiers. Consequently, in May 1529, he besieged the Spanish fortress in Peñón and attacked it using artillery until the Spanish garrison there surrendered later that month (Garnier 2008, 20). Khayr al-Dīn then decided to destroy the rocky island and to use its rocks to construct a breakwater for the city of Algiers (Bosworth 2007, 23).

This victory angered Charles V, who expressed his rage in the following statement: 'How dare one of the thieves of the sea take my castle (Peñón)!' (Barbarūsā 2010, 137). Charles V did not himself directly retaliate against Khayr al-Dīn and Algiers. Instead, he trav-



elled to Genoa to observe the surrender of the French troops from the War of the League of Cognac in June 1529 (Blockmans 2002, 67). From Genoa, Charles V depended on his new Mediterranean naval ally, the Genoese Andrea Doria (d. 1560), to strike Khayer al-Dīn's territories in the Kingdom of Tlemcen (Tracy 2002, 137). In 1530, Andrea Doria attacked Cherchell to free the Christian slaves, but his campaign did not succeed, as they concentrated instead on plundering the town, while Khayr al-Dīn also launched a counterattack against them (Naylor 2006, 199).

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In 1530, Khayr al-Dīn sent Aydin Rīs to strike Gibraltar, Barcelona, and the Balearic Islands and to capture Andrea Doria, who had attacked Cherchell in 1530. These raids resulted in 3,000 Spanish captives (Barbarūsā 2010, 152).

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 16th century, Spanish colonisation extended from the Kingdom of Fez to the Kingdom of Tlemcen. The Spaniards captured some cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen, including the capital city of Tlemcen, Oran, Mersa El-Kebir, and Algiers. The inhabitants of Algiers and the city of Tlemcen played a vital role against this colonisation when they summoned the Barbarossa brothers and legitimated the rule of the brothers in Algiers and Tlemcen. Consequently, in 1518, the Spanish Empire dispatched a military campaign to Tlemcen which resulted in the killing of 'Arūj. However, Khayr al-Dīn had been obliged to stay in Algiers due to its inhabitants' decision to comply with all his requests. He defeated the Spanish military campaign in Algiers in 1518 and expelled the Spaniards from Peñón island off Algiers in 1529. In addition, he affirmed the importance of his presence in the Kingdom of Tlemcen to the inhabitants of Algiers and of other cities of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. As a result, the legitimacy of the rule of Zayyānids in the Kingdom of Tlemcen was affected, and the Kingdom of Ḥafṣid conspired to fight Khayr al-Dīn in the Kingdom of Tlemcen. Further research relating to the period and area of the current research should be undertaken. In addition, studies of the situation of the Moriscos in Algiers in the second half of the 16th century must be analysed.

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